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MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: A MARKET
APPROACH TO REGULATING THE DELIVERY
OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY*
John S. Dzienkovskit & Robert J. PeroniINTRODUCTION

The modem American legal profession has long maintained that
lawyers must control the practice of law.' Only lawyers can directly3
profit from the practice of law, 2 hold ownership interests in law firms,
or collect referral fees.' Rules barring the unauthorized practice of
law prohibit non-lawyers from practicing law, and also prohibit
lawyers from practicing law in a jurisdiction in which they are not
admitted. The organized bar's ethical rules prohibit lawyers from
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Edward L. Summers for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and Julie
Dyas, Andrea Lane, Melissa Pena, Jason Smyczek, and Susan Thompson for their
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1. See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (1999) (amended
1998) [hereinafter Model Rules]; Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 3102(A), DR 3-103(A), DR 5-107(B), (C) (1983) [hereinafter Model Code]; ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics 33, 34, 35 (1908) (amended 1928) [hereinafter Canons].
For an excellent overview discussion, see Richard L Abel, American Lawyers 40-157
(1989) [hereinafter Abel, American Lawyers].
2. See Model Rules Rule 5.4(a); Model Code DR 3-102(A); Canon 34; 2
Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 5.4.200 (2d ed.
1998).
3. See Model Rules Rule 5.4(b), (d); Model Code DR 3-103(A), DR 5-107(C);
Canon 33; 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, §§ 5.4:300,5.4:500.
4. See Model Rules Rule 5.4(a); Model Code DR 3-102(A); Canon 34; 2 Hazard
& Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:200.
5. See generally Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do
Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am.B.
Found. Res. J. 159 (1980) (reviewing in detail unauthorized-practice-of-law case law
and legislation). For an excellent theoretical critique of unauthorized-practice-of-law
rules, see Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopol."A Constitutional
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assisting non-lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law and from
practicing law in a jurisdiction in which they are not admitted.6 In the
American legal profession, to the extent that non-lawyers are allowed
to participate in the delivery of legal services, they must do so as
employees or independent contractors under the supervision of
lawyers.7
As the legal profession in this country has continued to embrace
these longstanding principles, lawyers and non-lawyers in other
countries have begun to offer multidisciplinary services 8 to clients
because the regulatory structures in those countries do not prohibit
non-lawyers from partnering with lawyers. 9 The Big Five accounting
firms1" have led the effort of non-lawyers to partner with lawyers in
various European nations." In fact, one of these accounting firms,
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Unauthorized Practice]. For other articles on the
unauthorized-practice-of-law rules, see infra notes 37-38, 44.
6. See Model Rules Rule 5.5; Model Code DR 3-101; Canon 47.
7. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 892-95 (1986) [hereinafter
Wolfram, Legal Ethics].
8. The term "multidisciplinary services" refers to the practice of integrating
different professional services in a single service provider to fulfill the needs of a
client. For example, lawyers, accountants, psychologists, engineers, chemists, and
business consultants can provide clients with integrated services relating to a
particular problem. Some refer to multidisciplinary services as a "One-Stop Shop"
for professional services. The acronym "MDP" refers to an entity that provides
multidisciplinary services; accordingly, this Article will generally follow the
convention of using "MDP" as a noun and not as an adjective.
The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice defined the term "MDP" as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that
includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes
the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that
holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services.
It includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with one or more other
professional firms to provide services, and there is a direct or indirect
sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Recommendations, Report, and
Reporter'sNotes on the ABA Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice,Appendix A
[hereinafter
ABA
Commission,
1999 Final Report] (available
at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html>).
This definition of the term
"MDP" will apply for purposes of this Article.
9. See Sheryl Stratton, ABA Rattles Unauthorized Practice of Law Saber While
Debating MDPs, 86 Tax Notes 1057 (1999) [hereinafter Stratton, Unauthorized
PracticeSaber] ("PricewaterhouseCoopers brought together all of its legal affiliates
worldwide under the name of Landwell and announced its intention to become one of
the world's five largest employers of lawyers.... Andersen Legal reportedly earned
$480 million in 1999 from its delivery of legal services worldwide .... ).
10. The "Big Five" accounting firms are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche,
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. One commentator aptly
suggests that a more accurate description of these firms would be to call them the Big
Five consulting firms, since the practice of accounting is now a minority of their total
worldwide business. See Robert J. Reinstein, Afterword: New Roles, No Rules? An
InternationalPerspective, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 1031, 1032 n.1 (1999).
11. See Mary C. Daly, Reporter's Notes, ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, pt. I.A. (June 8, 1999) [hereinafter Daly, Reporter's Notes] (available at
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Arthur Andersen, through its law network of over 2,700 lawyers, has
become one of the three largest providers of legal services in the
world.'2
In 1998, the then president of the American Bar Association
("ABA"), Phillip Anderson, created a commission to study
multidisciplinary services in the United States.' 3 For a one-year
period, the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (the
"Commission") gathered information and considered arguments
about how multidisciplinary services should be integrated into the
current system for regulating lawyers."4 In June of 1999, the members
of the Commission unanimously issued a series of recommendations
for consideration by the ABA House of Delegates at its August 1999
meeting.'5
The Commission generally recommended that the legal profession
allow lawyers and non-lawyers to offer multidisciplinary services to
the public.1 6 The Commission also recommended, however, that the
<httpJ/www.abanet.orglcprlmdpappendixc.html>);
Edward
Brodsky,
ABA
Endorsement of Multidisciplinary Practices, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1999, at 3
(PricewaterhouseCoopers employs over 1600 nontax lawyers in foreign countries);
Dianne Molvig, MultidisciplinaryPractices:Service Package of the Future?, 72 Wis.
Law. 10, 44 (Apr. 1999) ("All combined, [the Big Five accounting firms] employ more
than 5,500 nontax attorneys worldwide ....PricewaterhouseCoopers leads the way
with more than 1,600 lawyers in 39 countries.").
12 See Arian Campo-Flores, King Arthur, Am. Law., Jan. 2000, at 17; Jean
Eaglesham, Massed Ranks of Accountants Throw Lawyers' Defences into Disarray,
Financial Times (London), Aug. 11, 1999, at 3.
13. See ABA, News Release, ABA President Philip S. Anderson Appoints
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Aug. 4, 1998) [hereinafter ABA News
Release] ("The Commission is directed to study and report on the extent to which
and the manner in which professional service firms operated by accountants and
others who are not lawyers are seeking to provide legal services to the public.").
14. The best chronicle of the activities of the Commission is contained on the
Commission's web site. See Conunission on MultidisciplinaryPractice (visited July 22,
2000) <http:/wwv.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html>. Essentially, the Commission held
one hearing in 1998 and then issued a background paper on issues and developments
relating to multidisciplinary practice. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Development
(Jan. 22, 1999) [hereinafter ABA Commission, Background Paper] (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreport0l99.html>).
This background paper
asked five questions, all directed at how multidisciplinary practices should be
integrated into the current system of delivering legal services in this country while
maintaining the legal profession's core values of confidentiality, loyalty, and
independence. See id. This shaped the Commission's work for the next two years.
For a more detailed account of the Commission's activities, see infra Part III.B.
15. See ABA Commission, 1999 FinalReport, supra note 8.
16. See id The Commission's report was very positive on the development of
multidisciplinary services and their benefits. Overall, it strongly suggested that the
market for professional services be allowed to function and, accordingly, that clients
and professional service providers be allowed to determine the best vehicles for
delivery of multidisciplinary services. See id. First, the Commission recommended
that Model Rule 5.4 be amended to allow lawyers to share legal fees with non-lawyers
who provide services to clients. See id. Second, the Commission recommended that
Model Rule 5.4(b) and (d) be amended to allow non-lawyers to become partners or
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bar impose new burdensome regulation on non-lawyer controlled
providers of multidisciplinary services.17 The ABA House of
Delegates rejected the Commission's Recommendations and instead
adopted a Florida State Bar proposal not to change the rules to
accommodate MDPs until additional study demonstrated that such a
change would be in the public interest. Thus, the ABA Board of
Governors extended the Commission's mandate to study the proposal
for another year.
At the February 2000 ABA Meeting, the House of Delegates
adopted an Ohio State Bar resolution to encourage state and local

bars to investigate and prosecute unauthorized-practice-of-law
claims.18 In May of 2000, the Commission issued a recommendation
to the House of Delegates that approved the concept of lawyer
controlled MDPs and left the details of the implementation up to the

states.19 This recommendation approved the concept of MDPs and

fee-sharing, but it urged strong regulation to protect the core values of

the legal profession."0 In July of 2000, the ABA House of Delegates
by a resounding margin voted to reject all efforts to accommodate the

shareholders with lawyers in an entity providing multidisciplinary services. See id.
Finally, it opened all areas of practice, both litigation and non-litigation, to MDPs. See
id.
17. See id. The Commission's recommendations made a marked distinction
First, the Commission
between lawyer and non-lawyer controlled MDPs.
recommended that non-lawyer controlled MDPs be subject to an annual state bar
audit to ensure that the non-lawyers are not improperly interfering with the delivery
of legal services. See id. Second, the Commission attempted to expand dramatically
the definition of the practice of law so as to bring within the ambit of bar regulation
any entity that employs lawyers who offer clients services involving the interpretation
of legal rules. See id. Non-lawyer controlled entities that hire lawyers to perform
activities falling within the Commission's broadened definition of the practice of law
would thus be left with a difficult choice: subject themselves to state bar regulation, or
require that any lawyers they employ either give up their law licenses or stop holding
themselves out as being legally trained.
18. See Stratton, Unauthorized Practice Saber, supra note 9, at 1057
("'Nonetheless, the perception of most state and local bars looking at the MDP issue
is that current professional rules need to be enforced rather than relaxed,' Cheryl
Niro [president of the Illinois State Bar Association] said at the MDP Commission
meeting."). The resolution also required the ABA to set up a national reporting
mechanism for MDPs for the state bars to access. See ABA Commission, 1999 Final
Report, supra note 8.
19. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates (May 11, 2000) [hereinafter ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report]
(available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html>).
20. See id. The Commission recommended that: "Lawyers should be permitted to
share fees and join with nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal
and nonlegal professional services (Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the
lawyers have the control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in
the rendering of legal services." Id. The recommendation does limit the type of nonlawyer professional who may participate in such a multidisciplinary practice to
"members of recognized professions or other disciplines that are governed by ethical
standards." Id.
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participation of lawyers in multidisciplinary practice in this country
and discharged the Commission from any further activities. 21
The current debate over multidisciplinary practice raises many
issues that have divided the American legal profession over the past
20 years.' In 1983, the ABA House of Delegates expressly rejected
the recommendation of the Kutak Commission's Report that lawyers
be permitted to share legal fees with non-lawyers.? Throughout the
1980s, the ABA vigorously lobbied against the District of Columbia
Bar's consideration of a rule that would allow non-lawyers to become
partners in law firms.24 Nonetheless, in 1991 the ABA adopted its
own, alternative version of the District of Columbia rule, which
allowed lawyers to work wvith non-lawyers in delivering to clients
ancillary, law-related business services, but did not allow non-lawyers
to become partners inlaw firms.' One year later, however, the ABA
withdrew its rule and, in 1994, replaced it with one far less focused. 6
21. See generally Sheryl Stratton & Lee A. Sheppard, American Bar Association
Says No to MultidisciplinaryPractice,88 Tax Notes 311 (2000). With its actions at the
July 2000 annual meeting, the ABA has ended its formal study of multidisciplinary
practice services. The future development of rules relating to MDPs will likely take
place at the state level, with the ABA's input "done through the ABA sections acting
as clearing houses for information regarding what the states are doing." Id. at 316
(quoting ABA House of Delegates member Robert Keatinge).
22. For an excellent review of this background, see New York State Bar
Association Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Structure and Operation,
Report: Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession-The Place of
Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers (2000) [hereinafter New
York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report].
23. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:102; Cindy Alberts Carson, Under
New Mismanagement: The Problems of Non-Lawyer Equity Partnership in Law
Firms, 7 Geo. J.Legal Ethics 593, 595 (1994); Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The
Nonlawyer Partner:Moderate ProposalsDeserve a Chance,2 Geo. J.Legal Ethics 383
(1988).
24. See District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (1999)
[hereinafter D.C. Rules]; see generally L. Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms
that PracticeLaw Only: Society's Need, the Legal Profession'sResponsibility, 51 Ohio
St. LJ.229, 233-34 (1990) [hereinafter Levinson, Independent Law Firms]; David B.
Pitofsky, Note, Law Firm Diversification & Affiliations Between Lawyers &
Nonlawyer Professionals, 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 885 (1990); Randall Sanborn,
Showdown on Subsidiaries,Nat'l L.J., Feb. 11, 1991, at 1.
25. See e.g., former Model Rules Rule 5.7 (original version; adopted in 1991 but
repealed in 1992), reprinted in Professional Responsibility: Standards, Rules &
Statutes, 1999-2000, at 99 n.a (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1999). For commentary on
Model Rule 5.7, see Dennis J. Block, Irwin H. Warren & George F. Meierhofer, Jr.,
Model Rule of ProfessionalConduct 5.7: Its Origin and Interpretation,5 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 739 (1992); Arash Mostafavipour, Law Firms: Should They Mind Their Own
Business?, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 435, 438 (1998); Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and
the Perils of Professionalism:The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study,
35 Ariz. L. Rev. 363, 364-67 (1993) [hereinafter Schneyer, Perils of Professionalism];
Howard D. Reitz, Note, Model Rule 5.7: A Well Intentioned but Misdirected Reform, 5
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 975 (1992).
26. See Model Rules Rule 5.7. Specifically, the 1994 rule focuses on whether
lawyers providing law-related services will be subject to the rules of professional
conduct, rather than on what services could be provided. See 2 Hazard & Hodes,
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The emergence of multidisciplinary practice has placed great stress
on the organized bar structure.27 On one hand, some bar leaders
would prefer to bury their heads in the sand and return to the
imagined golden years, when the practice of law was viewed as a
profession, rather than a business, even if this vision of the legal
profession probably never reflected economic reality. 8 On the other
hand, the role of the global economy has forced the organized bar to
recognize that regardless of what it does, multidisciplinary practices
are inevitable.29
The rush of the ABA to study the subject was due in part to the
justified fear that if the American legal profession does not
accommodate multidisciplinary services, it is very likely that such
services will move abroad." Moreover, there was legitimate concern
that if the ABA did not soon develop a reasonable regulatory scheme
regarding the ethical rules relating to lawyers practicing in MDPs, the
movement toward multidisciplinary practice would continue, and
lawyers working in unlicensed, non-law entities would not be subject
supra note 2, § 5.7:101.
27. See, e.g., Charles L. Brieant, Is It the End of the Legal World as We Know it?,
20 Pace L. Rev. 21 (1999); James C. Moore, Lawyers and Accountants: Is the Delivery
of Legal Services Through the MultidisciplinaryPracticein the Best Interestsof Clients
and the Public?,20 Pace L. Rev. 33 (1999); Gary A. Munneke, A Nightmare on Main
Street (PartMXL): FreddieJoinsan Accounting Firm, 20 Pace L. Rev. 1 (1999).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Written Remarks to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Remarks of Fox] (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html>); Bernard J. Wolfman, Statement Before the
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 12, 2000) [hereinafter
Statement of Wolfman] (available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wolfman4.html>);
Bernard J. Wolfman, Written Remarks to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Mar. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Written Remarks of Wolfman] (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
wolfmanl.html>).
29. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, "Golden Age" is Over, Legal
Times, Aug. 2, 1999, at 27 [hereinafter Dzienkowski & Peroni, "Golden Age" is Over]
("The MDP naysayers have ignored the fundamental changes occurring in the ways
that goods and services are produced, distributed, and delivered to consumers around
the world.... Participating in the global marketplace is not just a goal for most
corporations, but rather a necessary economic reality."); E. Leigh Dance, How to
Compete with MDPs, 13 Marketing for Lawyers 3 (1999) (describing client demand
for cross-border legal services); Eaglesham, supra note 12, at 3 ("Other lawyers
counter that the trend is irresistible, and the profession should seize the chance to
influence how such partnerships are structured and regulated. 'My personal view on
MDPs echoes what Groucho Marx said about sex-it's definitely here to stay,' said
Elisabet Fura-Sandstrom, president of the Swedish Bar Association."); see also
Mostafavipour, supra note 25 (arguing that in today's business climate, law firms must
respond by offering non-law business services to their clients).
30. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, "Golden Age" is Over, supra note 29, at 28 ("If the
ABA chooses to slow down or stop the development of multidisciplinary practices, we
predict that Europe will become the 21st century hub of legal commerce as
multinational companies, including U.S. corporations, turn to law firms and
international professional service firms with offices in London, Frankfurt, and
Geneva.").
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to any bar regulation. Stated differently, the ABA had a window of
opportunity, which it has now chosen to abruptly slam shut, to play a
constructive role in helping develop reasonable ethical rules tailored
to lawyers engaged in multidisciplinary practice. Instead, the state
bars will now have to develop those rules on their own without any
formal input at the national level by the ABA.
This Article posits that the American legal profession must
abandon its past practices of self-interest and accommodate the
provision of legal services in a multidisciplinary practice setting.3 The
organized bar "must set aside the financial interests of the profession
and ensure that the public interest is served."'
Economic
protectionism has no place in the regulation of professional services in
the twenty-first century.33 States should modify their legal ethics rules
to permit the sharing of fees between lawyers and non-lawyers who
are delivering services to clients. In addition, the legal profession
should allow lawyers and non-lawyers to become partners in an MDP.
Ideally, states should permit fully integrated MDPs and tailor ethical
rules applicable to MDPs in order to protect the core values of the
legal profession. A "joint venture" model of MDP, however, may be
more politically and practically acceptable from the perspective of
enforcing the ethical rules of the profession. Adoption of the "joint
venture" model of MDP would be a considerable improvement over
the status quo if the organized bar cannot bring itself to embrace the
concept of the fully integrated MDP.
This Article examines the debate over multidisciplinary services in
the American legal profession. Part I presents a brief history
underlying the debate over multidisciplinary services. This part also
examines the different approaches to integrating such services into the
legal profession. Part II discusses the benefits of and demands for
31. The legal profession is not the only profession wary of the desirability of
multidisciplinary services.
University of Texas Accounting Professor Edward
Summers has conducted an empirical study of lawyers, accountants, and MBA
students and their attitudes and beliefs about MDPs. See Edward L Summers,
Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships: The Future of the Professions? (2000)

(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Professor Summers has found that a
majority of lawyers and accountants do not want MDPs and they do not believe that
the formation of MDPs is in the public interest. See id. Younger lawyers and
accountants were more receptive to the idea of MDPs, but they still opposed their

formation. See id.
32. ABA News Release, supra note 13, at 1 (statement of then ABA President
Philip S. Anderson charging the Commission to set aside the self-interest of the
profession in evaluating multidisciplinary practice).
33. For an economic analysis of MDPs and their role in the American legal
profession, see Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 Bus. Law. 951, 974

(2000) [hereinafter Fischel, MDPs] (concluding that "[a]lthough defenders of the ban
on fee-sharing have attempted to cloak their arguments in the rhetoric of

'professionalism,' 'lawyer's independence,' and the 'public interest,' their goals are no
different from any other trade union or interest group pursuing economic
protectionism.").
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multidisciplinary services. Part III summarizes and critiques the ABA
Commission's recommendations to the House of Delegates, and
discusses state bar attempts at dealing with the issues surrounding
multidisciplinary services. It also discusses the arguments against
MDPs. Part IV examines the various models for allowing lawyers to
participate in the delivery of multidisciplinary services and the
professional responsibility issues raised by each model. This part then
offers the authors' model for integrating multidisciplinary services
into the American legal profession and discusses various issues
relating to that model. Finally, this part provides suggestions for
changes to the legal profession's rules of professional responsibility
that would accommodate lawyers' participation in MDPs, while still
preserving the core values of the legal profession relating to
confidentiality, conflicts of interest, competence, and professional
independence.
This Article concludes that the legal profession's regulation of
MDPs should be designed under an efficient-regulation model.' A
narrowly tailored system of regulation of MDPs will accomplish the
important goals of satisfying client demand for multidisciplinary
services while protecting the legitimate interests of the legal
profession in preserving its core values. Regardless of whether state
bars adopt the changes suggested in this Article, MDPs are here to
stay. The only question is whether the organized bar will play a
constructive role in regulating MDPs or face losing control over the
delivery of legal services by U.S. lawyers both domestically and
abroad.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEBATE OVER MULTIDISCIPLINARY
SERVICES

A. Non-Lawyer Involvement in the Practiceof Law in the United
States
1. Unauthorized Practice of Law and Ethics Rules
An examination of the role of lawyers in the delivery of legal
services in the United States requires study of both the case law and
statutory rules dealing with the unauthorized practice of law and the
legal ethics rules. In each of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia, the practice of law is reserved solely for licensed
professionals. Until the 1930s, the state bars rarely invoked
34. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Profession
and Its Reform, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 451, 477-89 (1989) [hereinafter Dzienkowski,
American Legal Profession] (discussing the efficient-regulation model in the context
of formulating ethical rules for the legal profession).
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unauthorized-practice-of-law claims against non-lawyers. 5
The
economic pressure of the post-Depression society led state bars to
form unauthorized-practice-of-law committees and to enforce the
unauthorized-practice laws against non-lawyers.Today, the
unauthorized-practice-of-law rules are enforced in a number of
different ways,37 although in recent years enforcement of these rules in
actual practice seems to have increasingly declined.'

In many states, misdemeanor statutes prohibit the unauthorized
practice of law.39 Although these statutes do impose criminal
penalties, in most cases, prosecutors do not pursue cases against
practicing non-lawyers. Often, however, state bar authorities will seek
injunctions against those engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
to prevent them from practicing law in the jurisdiction.' Additionally,
clients receiving services from a person who violates unauthorizedpractice-of-law rules may seek to assert the fact that the person was
not licensed to offer legal services as a ground for nonpayment of the
fee.4" Clients of unlicensed service providers purporting to practice
35. See Christensen, supra note 5, at 159; Rhode, Unauthorized Practice, supra
note 5, at 7-9. New York was the exception to this general statement. New York
County appointed an unauthorized-practice-of-law committee and investigated
allegations against corporations. See Rhode, UnauthorizedPractice,supra note 5, at 7
(citing early New York case law on unauthorized practice of law).
36. See Rhode, UnauthorizedPractice,supra note 5, at 7-8. The ABA led the way
by appointing its first committee addressing the topic of unauthorized practice of law,
which offered guidance to state and local bars and other authorities investigating
unauthorized-practice-of-law complaints. See id. at 8; see also Abel, American
Lawyers, supra note 1, at 112-13 (discussing the efforts by the organized bar to
encourage states to enact unauthorized-practice-of-law statutes).
37. See generally John F. Sutton, Jr. & John S. Dzienkowski, Professional
Responsibility of Lawyers 231-39 (1989) (examining case law on unauthorized
practice of law). Issues relating to the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers
have spawned a large body of legal commentary. See, e.g., Stanley B. Balbach, Title
Assurance: A New Approach to Unauthorized Practice, 41 Notre Dame Law. 192
(1965); Michael Braustein, & Hazel Genn, Odd Man Out: Preliminary Findings
Concerning the DiminishedRole of Lawyers in the Hoinebuying Process, 52 Ohio St.
L.J. 469 (1991); Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L Rhode, Project- The
UnauthorizedPractice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 Yale
L. 104 (1976); Kathleen E. Justice, There Goes the Monopoly: The California
Proposalto Allow Nonlawyers to PracticeLaw, 44 Vand. L Rev. 179 (1991); John C.
Payne, Title Insuranceand the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law Controversy, 53 Minn. L
Rev. 423 (1969); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspective
on ProfessionalCodes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1981); Donald T. Weckstein, Limitations
on the Right to CounseL" The UnauthorizedPracticeof Law, 1978 Utah L Rev. 649.
3& See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers,
4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209, 216-21 (1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Legal Services by NonLawyers].
39. See, e.g., Rhode, Unauthorized Practice,supra note 5, at 11 n.39 (citing 37
jurisdictions with criminal penalties for unauthorized practice).
40. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Cortez, 692 S.W.2d 47 (Tex.
1985) (Texas bar seeking and obtaining injunction against immigration law clinic).
41. See, e.g., Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1986) (successful effort to
deny payment of a fee to lawyer who was not licensed in state where legal services
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law will also be able to hold the layperson to the standard of care of a

lawyer in a malpractice action.4" Finally, lawyers who assist nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of law are subject to disciplinary
action.43
The stated purpose of the unauthorized-practice-of-law rules is to

protect the public. 44 The theory is that a non-lawyer delivering legal
services will make errors in legal work that a lawyer would not make,
and will thereby harm the consumer of the legal services. In addition,
as the theory goes, because non-lawyers are not bound by the ethical
rules of the legal profession and are not subject to the discipline of the
courts and bar authorities, their clients do not obtain the benefit of
receiving services performed by a disinterested and loyal professional.
Thus, the bar wants to ensure that4 persons providing legal services are
qualified and competent to do so. 1
On one basic level, these statutes mirror the state regulation of
businesses in general. Various types of businesses must be licensed by
the state, and the state promulgates rules and regulations for the

licensing procedure.46 In that sense, the licensing of lawyers is based
on goals similar to those served by the licensing of electricians and
plumbers.47 On another, less public-spirited level, the unauthorized-

were provided).
42. See, e.g., Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32 (S.D. 1986) (bank employee who
drafted invalid will for client sued by intended beneficiaries and held to the standard
of care of a lawyer).
43. See Model Rules Rule 5.5(b); Model Code DR 3-101(A).
44. See generally Roger Hunter & Robert Klonoff, A Dialogue on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 6 (1979-80). This article quotes the
ABA's 1941 position on potential harm to the public caused by the unauthorized
practice of law:
The public, far more than lawyers, suffers injury from the unauthorized
practice of law. The fight to stop it is the public's fight. No man is required
to employ a lawyer if he does not wish to. But every man is entitled to
receive legal advice from men skilled in law, qualified by character, sworn to
maintain a high standard of professional ethics, and subject to the control
and discipline of the court. Not only this, he must be served disinterestedly
by a lawyer who is his lawyer, not motivated or controlled by a divided or
outside allegiance.
Id. at 6-7 (citing Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Report, 66
A.B.A. Rep. 268 (1941) (emphasis in original)).
45. Professor Rhode's empirical study identified the following concerns through
her interviews with bar personnel. See Rhode, UnauthorizedPractice,supra note 5, at
37-39. The organized bar wanted to ensure that consumers received competent
advice from professionals who were not "fly-by-night operations." Id. at 37. Bar
personnel were concerned that non-lawyers were giving clients bad advice concerning
legal matters, offering clients advice informed by only one aspect of a matter rather
than by the overall picture, and instead of offering clients advice tailored to the
situation, making use of a form or do-it-yourself kit. See id.
46. The goal of occupational licensure is to create and enforce standards for all
who practice a particular trade or business.
47. There are two notable distinctions between the regulation of lawyers and the
regulation of businesses in general. First, as professionals, lawyers depend upon selfregulation to a much greater extent than do other regulated businesses. Second, the
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practice-of-law rules give lawyers a monopoly over the way in which
the need for legal services is satisfied in this country.' s

It is a

profession's attempt to limit competition and preserve the power of
lawyers over the delivery of legal services.4 9

Unauthorized-practice-of-law prohibitions do have a significant
anti-competitive effect on the manner in which the need for legal
services is satisfied in the marketplace.' To the extent that the legal
profession prevents non-lawyers from offering a service provided by
lawyers, lawyers are protected from competition with non-lawyers,
which may result in higher fees to the ultimate client." Additionally,
license to practice law in many cases insulates lawyers from competition by related
professionals. In most other businesses, a license does not provide such protection
from competition. For example, psychologists compete with psychiatrists and
counselors. One major exception for law would be the area of tax advice. These two
distinctions should lead to some skepticism when one considers the legal profession's
activities in the enforcement of unauthorized-practice-of-law statutes. Thus, although
the stated purpose of such statutes may be to protect the public, which the profession
may well intend, there is a significant potential that some lawyers will use the
unauthorized-practice rules to protect themselves from competition.
48. In the words of Judge Richard Posner, for most of the past century the legal
profession in the United States has operated as "an intricately and ingeniously
reticulated though imperfect cartel." Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 33 (1995).
In recent years, however, "an accelerating accumulation of legal and especially
economic changes over the past three decades has transformed the profession in the
direction of competitive enterprise." Id at 64. Many of these same forces, of course,
also are accelerating the movement in favor of multidisciplinary practice.
49. See Abel, American Lawyers, supra note 1, at ch. 5. Professor Abel's study of
the American legal profession is done through a sociological history of the profession.
This work is significantly influenced by the Weberian approach of market dominance
to the study of the professions:
The central question is how actors seek and attain competitive advantage
within a relatively free market-one structured by the state but dominated by
private producers. The goals are economic rewards and social status, which
is partly a consequence of wealth and partly its legitimization. Market
competition constructs categories of adversaries within classes. The
functional division of labor among occupations is one by-product of this
process. But because unrestrained competition is certainly unpleasant, and
possibly intolerable, all economic actors seek protection from market forces.
Professions are distinguished by the strategies of social closure they use to
enhance their market chances.
Id. at 15 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) (relying on Max Weber, Law in
Economy and Society (M. Rheinstein ed. & E. Shils trans., 1954)).
50. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7,at 829 n.35, 833; Arlene Holen,
Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor Mobility and
Resource Allocation, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 492, 498 (1965); Alex Maurizi, Occupational
Licensing and the PublicInterest, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 399, 412-13 (1974); Peter Pashigian,
OccupationalLicensing and the Interstate Mobility of Professionals,22 J.L & Econ. 1
(1979). But cf.Malcolm Getz, John Siegfried & Terry Calvani, Competition at the Bar:
The Correlation Benveen the Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability of
Practice,67 Va. L. Rev. 863, 879-80 (1981) (indicating that bar exams may not be anticompetitive, although it "does not provide a definitive answer to the question").
51. In the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law, then Professor, now Judge,
Richard Posner argued:
[T]he practice of law is subject to a web of public regulations that make legal
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given the state-by-state system of regulation of lawyers, unauthorized-

practice-of-law statutes apply to lawyers who cross state boundaries to
practice law in a jurisdiction in which they are not licensed.52 This
application has the potential to increase legal fees for clients with
activities in a state where their counsel is not licensed. The selfinterest of lawyers as a collective group occupies a central role in
explaining the early history of unauthorized-practice-of-law
developments. The lack of empirical evidence of harm to the public in
recent years reinforces the criticisms that many of the concerns about
unauthorized practice of law are grounded in pure protectionism. 3
The lack of involvement of the higher levels of the organized bar in
enforcement schemes often leads to bar investigations that essentially

amount to market protection for lawyers.54 In recent years, the state
courts, legislatures, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice have begun to scrutinize
carefully the organized bar's claims of harm to the consumer. 5
fees higher than they would be in a free market. In order to be permitted to
practice law, an individual must have had at least three years of law school
and at least two of college. Yet, the practice of law encompasses many
services that can be performed adequately by people with less schooling and
at a lower cost since their prices would not include amortization of (and a
reasonable return on) a large investment in higher education.
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 346-47 (1st ed. 1973).
52. See, e.g., Birbrower v. Superior Ct., 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) (holding that New
York law firm violated unauthorized-practice-of-law statute by representing a
California corporate client in a dispute with another California based corporation).
The ethical rules prohibit a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is not admitted to the bar. See Model Rules Rule 5.5; Model Code DR 3101(B).
53. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective:Alternative Approaches
to Non-Lawyer Practice,1 J. Inst. Stud. Legal Ethics 97, 211-12 (1996) (noting that
there is no evidence that the work of accountants, real estate brokers, and insurance
agents has been inferior in quality to that of lawyers); Rhode, Legal Services by NonLawyers, supra note 38, at 230 (discussing survey showing that rates of client
satisfaction with assistance from lay specialists are higher than rates of satisfaction
with assistance from lawyers). It is difficult to imagine a legitimate public interest in
prohibiting individuals licensed by the United States Patent Office from practicing
patent law in the State of Florida. See generally Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
As suggested by Professor Rhode, courts should demand empirical proof of harm to
the public before adopting fact-findings of such harm in unauthorized-practice-of-law
cases. See Rhode, UnauthorizedPractice,supra note 5, at 85-86.
54. An interesting example of bar control over the delivery of legal services
involved efforts by the organized bar to negotiate consent agreements with other
professions on how to carve up the markets. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7,
at 41. Such efforts, however, were short lived because they were viewed as violating
the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, No. 80
Civ. 6129(LBS), 1981 WL 2150 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1981) (holding that the New York
County Lawyers' Association attempt to prevent corporate fiduciaries from giving
advice on trust and estate matters was barred by a consent decree agreed to by the
Association in an antitrust case).
55. See, e.g., Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay ConveyancersEmpiricalEvidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 Conn. L. Rev. 423, 471-74 (1999).
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Despite this background, there are many situations in which nonlawyers have been allowed to offer legal services that are closely
affiliated with their non-law businesses. Some of these examples are
explained by historic industry practices, and others are explained by
the market power of the other professions involved in the service. For
example, non-lawyers at banks are permitted to draft routine
mortgages and non-lawyers are permitted to execute these legal
documents with bank clients without running afoul of the
unauthorized-practice-of-law prohibitions.-6 Bank employees are also
permitted to execute the joint tenancy with right of survivorship
agreements on standard bank accounts. The theory underlying these
practices is that the transactions are relatively common and
straightforward for the client to understand, and society is unwilling to
force consumers to incur legal fees for making these types of
uncomplicated legal decisions. Many of these documents are also
non-negotiable, form agreements and could not be modified by the
client even if represented by an independent lawyer. The real estate
industry in most states has been given the power to execute contracts
on residential property in which the agent holds a commission.' In
some states, the non-lawyer employee must include an attorney
review clause in the agreement, and explain to the client that the
document will become binding in a certain number of days if it is not
revoked and should be reviewed by an attorney during that time."8
Additionally, in a number of states, certified public accountants are
permitted to perform state tax work.59 Thus, precedent does exist for
allowing non-lawyers to offer certain legal services in the course of
their routine businesses to clients.
The law of unauthorized practice is as much a product of history
and politics between professionals as it is an attempt by the bar to
56. See, eg., Miller v. Vance, 463 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1984) (providing an example of
a consumer unsuccessfully trying to invalidate a mortgage drafted and executed by
bank employee). Of course, under current law, a bank officer could not draft a will
for a client without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The individualized

drafting of a will is considered in most states to involve the practice of law because of
the very technical nature of the law of wills and the fact that if errors are discovered
after the client is dead, nothing can be done to correct them. See, eg., id.
57. See New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 93 NJ.
470, 475-76 (1983) (allowing non-lawyer real estate salespersons to execute real estate
contracts with an attorney review clause).
58. See id The attorney review clause in that case stated:
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT THAT WILL BECOME
FINAL WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS. DURING THIS PERIOD
YOU MAY CHOOSE TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY WHO CAN
REVIEW AND CANCEL THE CONTRACT. SEE SECTION ON
ATTORNEY REVIEW FOR DETAILS.

Id
59. See generally In re New Jersey Soc. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 102 NJ.
231 (1986) (per curiam) (allowing qualified certified public accountants in New Jersey
to prepare state inheritance tax returns).
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implement the legal monopoly to protect the public. 6° It is often
difficult to define precisely what is "unauthorized practice of law."' 61
Thus, as non-law entities have begun to offer services that arguably
constitute legal practice, the state bars generally have chosen not to
enforce unauthorized-practice-of-law rules against these de facto
MDPs.62 Currently, absent a showing of harm against the public
interest, such enforcement actions stand little chance of success. 63

2. Non-Lawyer Involvement and Ownership in Law Firms
The American legal profession has also embraced the concept that
non-lawyers should not become partners or owners in a law firm or
other entity delivering legal services for a pecuniary gain. 64 The 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics did not contain any restrictions on nonlawyer ownership of law firms. In 1928, however, the ABA amended
the Canons of Professional Ethics to urge that lawyers not create
partnerships with members of other professions if any part of the
business is to consist of the practice of law. 65 In 1969, the ABA
60. See generally Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and
Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary
Partnership,13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 217, 248-52 (2000) [hereinafter Daly, Choosing
Wisely] (examining the brief history of unauthorized practice of law and other
professions who offer services bordering on the practice of law).
61. See, e.g., 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:103 (discussing the difficulty of
defining the practice of law).
62. See Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84
Minn. L. Rev. 1529, 1535 (2000). Note, however, that opponents of MDPs believe
that state bars should increase their enforcement of the unauthorized-practice-of-law
rules. See generally infra Part III.C. The ABA adopted this position at its mid-year
meeting in 1999. See infra text accompanying note 337.
63. Many of the organized bar's efforts in this area have been unsuccessful, and
for good reason. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech.,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235, at *3, *11 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999)
(enjoining distribution of "Family Lawyer" software program in Texas as violation of
unauthorized-practice-of-law statutes), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (vacating injunction because Texas Legislature passed a statute aimed at
ending the lawsuit which excluded from unauthorized practice the marketing of legal
software if it is clearly marked that such software is not a substitute for advice of an
attorney).
64. The First Amendment rights of expression and association, as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protect a public interest organization's
rights to deliver legal services. See United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-25 (1967) (holding that union's right to hire lawyer to
provide legal services to its members is protected by First Amendment rights of
expression, assembly, and association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963)
(holding that NAACP's right to use the litigation system for political gains is
protected by First Amendment rights of expression and association).
65. 53 A.B.A. Rep. 119-30 (1928). Canon 33 stated:
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person should be
admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the
legal profession, duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional
discipline.... Partnerships between lawyers and members of other
professions or non-professional persons should not be formed or permitted
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strengthened this ban, making it mandatory in the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.' The ABA restated this position in 1983
by adopting Model Rule 5.4(a), which prohibits partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers. 67

In 1928, the ABA completed the ban on non-lawyer involvement in
the practice of law by adopting Canon 34 of the Canons of

Professional Ethics that prohibited any sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers.' Canon 35 also prohibited third party interference with the
professional independence of the lawyer. 6 The ABA later adopted
similar prohibitions in the Model Code and the Model Rules." The
adoption of these rules was the product of the collective effort of the
bar, the state judiciary, and their ethics committees."1 Although there
was some opposition to these rules, they were adopted largely on the

grounds of "professional policy" of the legal profession.

-

As noted above, the ABA largely carried forward the rules
contained in Canons 33, 34, and 35 in both the Model Code and the
Model Rules. In 1982, however, during the drafting of the Model

Rules, the Kutak Commission proposed a rule that would have
significantly changed the ABA's position on non-lawyer involvement
in the practice of law. A proposed model rule on the "Professional
where part of the partnership business consists of the practice of law.
Canon 33.
66. See Model Code DR 3-102(A).
67. See Model Rules Rule 5.4(a).
6& See Canon 34. "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." Id.
69. "The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer.... He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties
by or in the interest of such intermediary." Canon 35.
70. See Model Code DR 3-102(A) (banning the sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer), DR 3-103(A) (banning the forming of a partnership with a non-lawyer), DR
5-107(B) (maintaining professional independence of lawyers), DR 5-107(C) (banning
the practice of law in a professional corporation if a non-lawyer owns any interest in,
or is a corporate officer or director of, the corporation or if a non-lawyer has the right
to direct the professional judgment of the lawyer); Model Rules Rule 5.4(a) (banning
the sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer), Rule 5.4(b) (banning the forming of a
partnership with a non-lawyer), Rule 5.4(c) (maintaining professional independence
of lawyers), Rule 5.4(d) (banning the practice of law in a professional corporation if a
non-lawyer owns any interest in, or is a corporate officer or director of, the
corporation or if a non-lawyer has the right to direct the professional judgment of the
lawyer).
71. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 Hastings LJ.577, 585-86 (1989). It is
clear that the New York bar's interest in unauthorized practice of law influenced the
drafting of the prohibitions on non-lawyer involvement. See id. For an excellent
historical discussion of the derivation of the rules prohibiting non-lawyer involvement
in the practice of law, see Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some
Implicationsfor the Core Values Debate, 84 Minn. L Rev. 1115 (2000) (examining the
New York history).
72. Andrews, supra note 71, at 586.
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Independence of a Firm" provided that a lawyer could be employed
by an organization in which non-lawyers held a financial or
managerial interest as long as the professional independence of the
lawyer was preserved.7 3 This rule, however, was completely rejected

on the floor of the ABA House of Delegates meeting, 74 and rewritten
and replaced with the current version of Model Rule 5.4.75 Ironically,
the 1999 proposals of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice came almost "full circle" back to the Kutak position.7 6

In 1988, both the District of Columbia bar and North Dakota bar
proposed that their respective versions of Model Rule 5.4 be modified

to allow lawyers and non-lawyers to hold ownership interests in a law
firm.' The District of Columbia bar sought to change the rule in
order to allow non-lawyers to contribute to the legal services provided
to clients. 78 This proposal was in part a reaction to the non-law
divisions of lobbying, real estate, and investment banking that some

73. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and
Standards 301 (2000 ed.).
74. Professor Andrews identified four reasons why the ABA House of Delegates
rejected the Kutak Commission's version of Model Rule 5.4:
(1) the Commission proposal would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H &
R Block, or the Big Eight [now Big Five] accounting firms, to open law
offices in competition with traditional law firms; (2) nonlawyer ownership of
law firms would interfere with the lawyer's professional independence; (3)
nonlawyer ownership would destroy the lawyer's ability to be a
"professional" regardless of the economic cost; and (4) the proposed change
would have a fundamental but unknown effect on the legal profession.
Andrews, supra note 71, at 595-96 (footnotes omitted).
75. The narrative underlying the rejection of lay ownership or management of law
firms involved a question posed to Professor Geoffrey Hazard, the Reporter to the
Model Rules: "Does this rule mean that Sears, Roebuck will be able to open a law
office?" See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 23, at 392 (quoting interview with
Professor Hazard); see also Andrews, supra note 71, at 595-96 (quoting extensively
from an unofficial transcript that illustrates the fear by members of the House of
Delegates of the competition from Sears and other non-law entities); see generally 2
Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:102 (discussing the Sears hypothetical).
Professor Hazard answered "yes" and that was the end of the Kutak Commission's
proposed model rule. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 23, at 392 (quoting interview
with Professor Hazard); see also Andrews, supra note 71, at 596; Edward S. Adams &
John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer
Investment in Law Firms, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 9-11 (1998) [hereinafter Adams &
Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?].
76. See Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs"Context, History, and Process,
84 Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 1628-35 (2000).
77. See Sutton & Dzienkowski, supra note 37, at 241-43 (examining the District of
Columbia and North Dakota bars' proposals).
78. A key facet of the District of Columbia rule is the requirement that lawyers
and non-lawyers in the firm be engaged solely in the provision of professional legal
services to clients. See D.C. Rules Rule 5.4(b)(1). By imposing this requirement on
firms with non-lawyer partners and managers, the scope of services provided by the
entity is severely restricted. For example, it is unlikely that D.C. Rule 5.4 would allow
a lawyer to partner with a psychologist and a business planner in a family mediation
clinic because the practice of law would not be the sole purpose of such a partnership.
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District of Columbia law firms had begun to develop as subsidiaries.79
The North Dakota rule sought to allow lawyers and non-lawyers to

offer combined services."

Ultimately, after much debate and

controversy, the District of Columbia rule passed,"' but the North

Dakota rule was withdrawn by the state supreme court., In reaction to a perceived commercialization of the legal profession
that allegedly threatened the ability of lawyers to render independent
advice, the ABA began to consider an ethics rule on ancillary business
services.s3 Some in the ABA thought that the ABA needed to
provide the states with an alternative rule to D.C. Rule 5.4 so that
states would have an option when their lawyers pushed for modifying
the codes of conduct to accommodate non-legal services.' In 1991,
the ABA House of Delegates adopted new Model Rule 5.7,
"Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services."'
The 1991
79. At the time, the large Washington, D.C., law firm of Arnold & Porter owned
three non-law subsidiaries: an investment banking firm, a real estate brokerage house,
and a lobbying firm. See James W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practiceof
Law in the Year 2000, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 683, 689-92 (1988) (discussing the Arnold &
Porter example). Mr. Jones, an Arnold & Porter partner and then chair of its
management committee, made the following observations about the three
subsidiaries:
Arnold & Porter's experience with these three affiliated firms and the
nonlawyer professionals brought in-house has been an unqualified success.
The affiliates and the nonlawyer professionals have added richness and
diversity to Arnold & Porter's practice. They have enabled the firm to
better serve the needs of its clients. They have expanded Arnold & Porter's
horizons and forced the attorneys to think in much broader terms about the
most effective and efficient ways to deal with client problems.
Id.at 691-92. In the early 1990s, Arnold & Porter sold its interests in these three
subsidiaries. See James W. Jones, Focusing the MDP Debate: Historicaland Practical
Perspectives, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 989, 990 n.3 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Focusing the
MDP Debate].
80. See Sutton & Dzienkowski, supra note 37, at 242 (reprinting proposed North
Dakota rule). The North Dakota rule did not seem to limit the law yer's association
with non-lawyers to a law firm providing legal services only. The bar in North Dakota
drafted this proposed rule to foster small firm affiliations with non-lawyers targeted at
low- to middle-income clients.
81. See D.C. Rules Rule 5.4. For additional discussion of this approach to
multidisciplinary practice, see infra Part IV.B.3.
82. The fear of Sears owning a law firm played a major role in the withdrawal of
this rule. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 23, at 402 (noting that the North Dakota
Supreme Court received letters predicting that, in the words of assistant state court
administrator Larry Spears, "the world would come to an end if Sears came in").
83. See Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 777-92 (examining the
history of the promulgation of Model Rule 5.7); Schneyer, Perilsof Professionalism,
supra note 25, at 367-72 (discussing the history of the ancillary business debate). In
1986, the ABA appointed a Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism,
which ultimately asked the question: "Should practicing lawyers become active in the
operation of any business which may be ancillary to the practice of law (e.g., real
estate development or investment banking) or any business which may render other
services to the lawyers' client?" Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 779.
84. See Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 798.
85. See Professional Responsibility: Standards, Rules, and Statutes 1999-2000
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version of this rule was very strict as to lawyer involvement in lawrelated services provided to law firm clients. It required that such
services ancillary to the practice of law be provided only to the clients
of the law firm, and only by employees of the law firm, not of a
subsidiary.86 Also, the rule required that the lawyer make appropriate
disclosure to the client, and required that the law firm not hold itself
out to the public as engaging in any non-legal activities. 7 The
comments to the rule make clear that the ABA sought to restrict "the
ability of law firms to provide ancillary non-legal services through
affiliates to non-client customers and clients alike, the rendition of
which raises serious ethical and professionalism concerns. '
The severe restrictions of the 1991 Model Rule 5.7 were contrary to
many practices within state bars regarding the provision of lawyerowned non-legal services. In many states, lawyers owned title
companies that were marketed to the general public as well as to firm
clients.8 9 Thus, in 1992, the ABA House of Delegates deleted the
1991 version of Rule 5.7. In 1994, the ABA considered a different
approach to lawyer provision of ancillary business services and
adopted a revised version of Model Rule 5.7. The revised version of
Model Rule 5.7 does not address the ethical or professional
consequences of lawyers and law firms providing ancillary business
services. Instead, it focuses on the client expectations that may arise
when ancillary business services are provided by a law firm.
Essentially, under revised Model Rule 5.7, a law firm's ancillary
business services may or may not be included under the protection of
Edition 99 n.a (J. Dzienkowski ed., 1999).
86. See Model Rules Rule 5.7(b)(1), (2) (1991 version), reprinted in Professional
Responsibility: Standards, Rules, and Statutes 1999-2000 Edition 99 n.a (J.
Dzienkowski ed., 1999); see generally 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.7:101.
87. See Model Rules Rule 5.7(b)(3), (4) (1991 version), reprinted in Professional
Responsibility: Standards, Rules, and Statutes 1999-2000 Edition 99 n.a (J.
Dzienkowski ed., 1999).
88. See id. Rule 5.7 cmt. 3 (1991 version), reprintedin Professional Responsibility:
Standards, Rules, and Statutes 1999-2000 Edition 99 n.a (J.Dzienkowski ed., 1999).
One leading article on Model Rule 5.7, Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, is
representative of the organized bar's views toward the involvement of lawyers in
ancillary business services. It views such services as extremely dangerous to the selfregulation of the profession and as likely to cause significant harm to clients.
However, little or no empirical support is offered for these conclusions.
89. See, e.g., Patricia A. Wilson, A Guide to Ethics for the Real Estate Lawyer,
445 PLI/Real 305, 318 (Sept. 1999) ("Examples of ancillary businesses include court
reporting firms, title insurance agencies and companies, financial planning firms, and
real estate brokerage firms."); Howard W. Brill, Advisory Ethics Opinion Issued on
Ownership of Land Title Company, 33 Ark. Law. 40 (Summer 1998) (examining the
Arkansas position on whether such ownership is acceptable under the ethics rules).
For the ABA's position on whether a lawyer representing a client may use a title
company owned in part by the lawyer, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 331 (1972) (analyzing whether the Model Code permits an
ownership interest in a title company while performing real estate work for a client).
90. See Model Rules Rule 5.7(a).
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the rules of ethics.9' To avoid application of the ethics rules, a law

firm must provide the services in a manner distinct from the delivery
of legal services. 92 Additionally, the client must be informed that the
services are not legal services and that the protections of the attorneyclient relationship do not apply.93
Although the ABA properly identified one key issue in the
provision of ancillary business services-whether the attorney-client
relationship attaches to those services-the new version of Model
Rule 5.7 blatantly ignored all of the concerns that the ABA addressed
in 1991. 4 This exhibits the "politics of regulating the bar" within the
ABA.95 Although nothing was done to alleviate the professional
concerns in the provision of ancillary business services, the revised
rule accommodated the practices throughout the country whereby
lawyers provided non-legal services to clients and non-clients for
significant profits, in some cases without disclosing the lawyers'
ownership interests in the non-law business.
3. Lawyers in Non-Law Firm Settings
Any analysis of multidisciplinary practice must consider the current
contexts in which lawyers perform their work outside of traditional
law firms.96 This consideration is instructive for a number of reasons.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Andrew M. Goldner, Note, Minding Someone Else's Businesses:
PennsylvaniaRule of ProfessionalConduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
767, 779-83 (1998) (comparing Model Rules Rule 5.7 with Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 5.7, which offers a more comprehensive approach to
ancillary business services).
95. See eg., Schneyer, Perils of Professionalism, supra note 25. Professor
Schneyer's account of the use of the rhetoric of "professionalism" to debate the
ancillary-business rule offers an excellent portrayal of the politics at work in a debate
over how lawyers can profit from law-related services.
96. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. discussed this phenomenon, as follows:
In contemplating the MDP issue, we naturally think first of the big
accounting firms. However, there is a multitude of other entities that are
responding to the same underlying market forces. We should include the
management advisory firms that are now competing with the accounting
firms. We should include the big banks that are managing huge amounts of
money, in all different kinds of ways-money market accounts, securities
trading, loans and other investments, and now insurance. We should include
the insurance companies, which are themselves branching into other fields,
for example, healthcare financing and management. We should include
investment and securities companies, some of which have merged with or
been merged into banks and insurance companies. None of these companies
can operate without a large internal corps of lawyers. Of course, these
lawyers are serving the entity by which they are employed and thus are not
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. But the work these lawyers do
establishes the legal framework for the transactions with their employers'
clientele. In that sense, the corporate legal staffs are providing legal services
to the outside clientele.
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First, examples of lawyers practicing law outside of the traditional law
firm raise many of the same concerns that the organized bar and
various commentators have raised with respect to MDPs-including
unauthorized practice of law, professional independence, and sharing
fees with non-lawyers. Second, to the extent that lawyers are hired by
entities as employees to provide legal services for the entities, they are
displacing services that would be provided by traditional law firms.
Thus, lawyers in the non-law firm settings constitute yet another
source of competition for law firms in the legal marketplace. Finally,
the dramatic increase in lawyers practicing in non-law firm settings
helps to prove the value and prevalence of multidisciplinary services
in the modem global economy.
The early example of lawyers practicing in the non-law firm setting
arose with corporations hiring in-house lawyers to represent the
entity's interests. The early unauthorized-practice-of-law authorities
explored this issue, 97 and it was long ago established that corporations
and other entities may hire and control lawyers as employees. 98 Inhouse legal departments have grown dramatically during the past
twenty-five years.9 9 This is the case even though concerns exist about

the independence of in-house lawyers. The ABA uses the identical
rule to govern the conduct of both in-house and outside counsel in
representing the entity.1 °0
The use of in-house lawyers raised concerns when these lawyers
began to represent third parties. When a corporation's employees
represent an outside party, the corporation in effect becomes a
provider of legal services akin to a law firm. As stated in the
unauthorized-practice-of-law case law, non-law entities may deliver
legal services that are routine and closely related to their business.101
They may not, however, deliver general legal services unrelated to
their business, or deliver legal services that raise issues of conflicts of
interest or competent representation, such as a bank drafting a will for
a clientlm0 Many of these instances of non-law entities being allowed
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 Minn. L. Rev.
1083, 1084-85 (2000) [hereinafter Hazard, Foreword].
97. See Rhode, Unauthorized Practice,supra note 5, at 7 ("The New York County
Lawyers Association appointed the first committee on unauthorized practice in 1914,
and a series of cases against corporations, particularly title and trust companies, soon
followed." (footnote omitted)).
98. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 840-41.
99. See, e.g., The 1996 Corporate Legal Times 200 Largest Legal Departments,
Corp. Legal Times, Aug. 1996, at 1, 34 (noting increases in the legal staffs of 81
corporations); Timothy S. Robinson & Nance Confer, SoaringFees Spur DramaticInHouse Growth, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 30, 1981, at 1.
100. See Model Rules Rule 1.13; see generally 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, §
1.13:200.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
102. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 836, 841-44. For a detailed
discussion of this corporate-practice-of-law doctrine, see Grace M. Giesel,
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to offer legal services arise because of accommodation and historic
industry practices left unchallenged-they are often inconsistent with
the current scheme for protecting the legal profession's monopoly.
There is anecdotal evidence that these historical exceptions are being
stretched to accommodate new forms of legal services provided to
customers of non-law entities. 3 Moreover, evidence is developing
that some corporations are seeking to market their legal department's
law and non-law expertise to other corporations."'
The major example of in-house lawyers providing legal services to
outside clients involves insurance companies who use in-house
lawyers to execute their duty to defend what they owe the insured
under insurance policies. 10 5 In two states, the organized bar has
prohibited representation of insureds by in-house counsel."° In the
other states, in-house lawyers are permitted to represent the insured
in cases covered by the insurance policy unless a special conflict of

Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the Unauthorized Practice of
Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 Mo. L Rev. 151 (2000).
103. One of the authors received a non-confidential inquiry call from an attorney
who asked the following question: Can a corporation, which is organized as a venture
capital firm that acquires interests in intellectual property, provide legal services to
the inventor of the intellectual property? The attorney pointed one of us to a web site
where a British venture capital firm solicits opportunities for investment. Once the
British venture capital firm acquires a small interest in the venture, it then offers legal
services to the inventors in exchange for a larger percentage of the venture. This
particular firm had an office in Pennsylvania and seemed to be offering legal services
to the public. Of course, they were using their investment in the firm to claim that
they were performing legal services for a company in which they had a financial
interest. It is unclear whether this is improper. At a minimum, however, it pushes the
current rules to the edge. See also Corporate Legal Times Roundtable on
International Ventures, Counsel Steps to the Plate: Global Deals Let In-House
Counsel Shine, Corp. Legal Times, Mar. 2000, at 75 (discussing that when companies
form a joint venture, one company's legal counsel usually performs legal services for
both entities and the joint venture).
104. See Steven Andersen, The Law Department is Reborn as an Entrepreneur:
Owens Coming Turns Mass Tort Experience into a Thriving Business, Corp. Legal
Times, Mar. 2000, at 1. Owens Coming has taken part of its legal department and put
it in a wholly owned subsidiary, Integrex, that services its parent company and third
parties in the areas of corporate claims management. See id. Corporate claims
management includes drafting of exculpatory clauses in manufacturing contracts,
discovery services, records management, and other similar services. See id. Integrex
has 550 employees with 60 attorneys. See id. Of course, in order to avoid problems of
unauthorized practice, non-lawyer ownership, and lawyers sharing fees with nonlawyers, Integrex is probably organized as a management consulting company dealing
with risk management and the attorneys it employs probably do not practice law, but
rather offer business services.
105. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 428-33; see also Ted Schneyer,
Professionalismand Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
449, 463-68 (1988) (discussing cases).
106. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 569-70 (Ky.
1996) (finding impermissible conflict and impairment of professional judgment of the
lawyer); Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517, 519 (N.C. 1986)
(prohibiting use of in-house counsel to represent insured).
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interest arises between the insurance company and the insured' 7
This practice belies all of the arguments that the profession has
against non-law entities practicing law." In terms of independence,
however, the practical difference between an in-house lawyer and an
outside lawyer who represents only one or two insurance carriers in
routine cases may be so insignificant that the organized bar is willing
to tolerate the exception. °9
As discussed later in this Article, a second area in which non-law
entities offer legal services is the various fields of law preempted by
Congress." 0 Accountants and enrolled agents have provided legal
services in the tax field."' Members of the United States Patent
Office have provided legal advice in the patent registration area."2
Although these areas are relatively well-defined, lawyers in these nonlaw firms may not generally offer legal services outside of the
preempted area to clients.
Recently, the Big Five accounting firms have expanded their
consulting practices to include "estate planning; litigation support
(including dispute resolution efforts and front-end services, such as
investigation and discovery); valuation and business planning advice
(including issues of environmental and labor law compliance and
employee benefits issues); and financial planning.""' 3 These services
are classified as consulting work not involving the practice of law, and
the firms claim that
they do not hold themselves out as offering legal
114
services to clients.

In the last ten years, many other non-law entities have begun to hire
lawyers in large numbers. These entities often claim that they are not
offering legal services to clients; it is difficult to distinguish, however,
107. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 429-30.
108. This analysis assumes that insureds are the clients of the lawyer and insurance
companies are third-party payors. Professor Charles Silver has argued that insurance
companies should be viewed as co-clients of the lawyer. See Charles Silver, Does
Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
1583, 1591-92 (1994).
109. An outside lawyer or law firm with all of the business coming from one or two
insurance company clients may be no more independent than the employees of that
insurance company.
110. See infra Part I.A.4.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 119-27.
112 See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); see also 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1994).
113. Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New
Rule?, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 869, 881 (1999) [hereinafter Terry, MDP Primer];see also
Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 Minn. L.
Rev. 1359, 1360-64 (2000) (examining the services offered by accountants).
114. See Elijah D. Farrell, Note, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice
of Law: Who Is the Bar Really Trying to Protect?33 Ind. L. Rev. 599, 600 (2000). For
a new approach to defining the practice of law for purposes of determining whether
an accountant who prepares an opinion about a corporate filing is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, see Susan B. Schwab, Note, Bringing Down the Bar:
Accountants Challenge Meaning of Unauthorized Practice,21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1425,
1451-52 (2000).
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what they do from what law firms do for clients. A comprehensive list
of such organizations is difficult to compile. Thus, this discussion will
only focus on three types of non-law organizations that have begun to
hire lawyers.
Lobbying firms have hired lawyers to represent clients in their
lobbying efforts.115 These lawyers draft proposed legislation, write
opinions and memoranda criticizing specific proposals, and interpret
judicial opinions. In examining the effects of proposed legislation, it is
inevitable that these lawyers give planning advice to clients.
Management consulting firms have begun to hire lawyers to provide
clients with an analysis of a client's legal affairs.11 6 These lawyers
evaluate the work of current counsel, identify potential legal problems
with a particular course of action, and give advice as to what a
company should change in the future. For example, a management
consulting firm may be hired to examine the best way to gain access to
the European Union market. The management consulting firm's inhouse lawyers will opine to clients regarding the legal dimensions of
this decision. These activities are clearly of the sort that would be
provided by outside law firms for other clients.
Investment banking firms hire lawyers to provide services that
clearly straddle the fields of investment banking and the practice of
law. 7 The lawyer employees of investment banking firms evaluate
legal documents for clients, draft proposed language, and help offer
planning advice on future transactions. In a recent move, Merrill
Lynch hired one of the country's top international tax lawyers to head
a global tax unit and help develop effective tax strategies and
corporate finance and acquisition strategies for Merrill Lynch's
clients." 8 Of course, in the area of investment banking, many of the
clients have in-house and outside counsel also advising them on the
transaction. The point to be made here is that the investment banking
firms seem to be hiring many lawyers who offer services to clients in
the non-law firm setting.
115. APCO, a Washington, D.C., lobbying firm spun off from Arnold & Porter,
hires and employs attorneys to represent its lobbying clients. See Claudia
MacLachlan, Arnold & PorterSells Subsidiary to Ad Company, Nat'l Li., June 17,
1991, at 3.
116. McKinsey & Company interviews at leading law schools around the country
and employs attorneys to provide clients with a legal perspective on management
consulting advice.
117. A member of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Robert
Mundheim, former dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, was a
senior executive vice president and the general counsel of Solomon Smith Barney
Holdings, Inc., an investment banking firm, at the time he joined the Commission. He
is now a partner at the law firm of Shearman & Sterling in New York City.
118. See eg., Sheryl Stratton, Weil, Gotshal Loses Top InternationalTax Talent to
MDPs, 86 Tax Notes 921 (2000) [hereinafter Stratton, Well, Gotshai Loses Top
InternationalTax Talent] (describing the departure of international tax lawyers at the
Washington, D.C., office of Weil, Gotshal & Manges to join Merrill Lynch).
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The legal profession needs only to look to the placement offices of
the top law schools in the major cities in this country to see how many
non-law entities are interviewing the top students and what they
promise the students in return for accepting employment with them. It
is our position that legal services of the multidisciplinary variety are
being provided throughout this country. Thus far, the state bars have
chosen to do little to limit this development, or to threaten such

entities with claims of unauthorized practice of law.
4. Federal Tax Practice in a World of Mixed Federal Preemption
As mentioned above, one major area in which non-lawyers and
lawyers in accounting firms have been involved in the delivery of legal
services is in the practice of tax law. 119 State unauthorized-practice-of-

law statutes and case law must be read in conjunction with the federal
system of authorizing lawyers and non-lawyers to practice in certain
areas in the federal system. 2 Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress
and the Executive Branch can preempt state regulation of the
unauthorized practice of law.' Although the federal system has often
deferred to the state bar system of lawyer regulation, one major area
of federal preemption is federal tax practice. The federal scheme
and certain non-lawyers to
authorized by Congress allows lawyers
22
practice in the area of federal tax.1
In recent years, the Big Five accounting firms, as well as mid-sized
accounting firms, have hired thousands of tax lawyers for their
119. The debate over the proper role of accountants and lawyers in tax law has
simmered for many years. See, e.g., Erwin M. Griswold, A FurtherLook: Lawyers and
Accountants, 41 A.B.A. J. 1113 (1955) (examining the extent to which accountants can
practice tax law). Dean Griswold's article discusses many of the same issues raised
today by the practices of the Big Five accounting firms. See id. at 1179.
120. See generally Matthew A. Melone, Income Tax Practice and Certified Public
Accountants: The Case for a Status Based Exemption From State Unauthorized
Practiceof Law Rules, 11 Akron Tax J. 47 (1995).
121. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
122. Part of the historical background here is that the bar may have been more
relaxed in enforcing its professional monopoly in the tax law area vis-a-vis the
accounting firms because of the low regard with which lawyers traditionally viewed
accountants. Cf. Yves Dezalay, TerritorialBattles and Tribal Disputes, 54 Mod. L.
Another commentator explains the dominance of
Rev. 792, 797-99 (1991).
accountants in the tax field as having occurred "when law firms abdicated preparation
of individual 1040 income tax returns to accountants when they no longer became
profitable, after which the accountants automated the tax return process, gaining the
associated tax-related legal advice and services to individuals of means, closely-held
corporations and corporations for whose executives tax returns were prepared." Ward
Bower, MultidisciplinaryPractices-The Future, in Global Law in Practice 155, 167
n.2 (J. Ross Harper ed., 1997) [hereinafter Bower, MultidisciplinaryPractices]. The
same scenario could happen with legal services generally if law firms choose to ignore
the competitive threat posed by MDPs. See id. For a discussion of the development of
the accounting firms, see New York State Bar Association Special Committee,
Report, supra note 22, at 140-51.
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growing domestic and

international

tax planning

practices 1

(including well-known partners from major law firms in cities

throughout the country).2 These efforts have been met with great
concern and suspicion by state bar authorities and lawyers in general.
In fact, several state bars have investigated the activities of the "Big
Five" firms for violations of the unauthorized-practice-of-law statutes,
but to date no unauthorized-practice-of-law complaints have been
successfully maintained against such firms. "
The Big Five accounting firms have argued that they are not
engaged in the practice of law, but instead are engaged in tax
consulting, something somehow different than tax law practice even
though it involves interpretation and application of tax law. This
argument appears to have no substance."t ' A better argument by the

Big Five accounting firms would be that to the extent they are
engaged in the practice of tax law, at least at the federal level, the

preemption doctrine prevents state bar authorities from successfully
123. See Campo-Flores, supra note 12 (describing Arthur Andersen report stating
that it employs 2,734 lawyers in 35 countries); Farrell, supra note 114, at 604 (stating
that "Ernst & Young employs approximately 3,300 tax attorneys worldwide and
about 850 in the United States"); Elizabeth MacDonald, Accounting Firms Hire
Lawyers and Other Attorneys Cry Foul, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8 (noting that
Arthur Andersen has 1,000 attorneys, Ernst & Young has 800 attorneys, and Price
Waterhouse (now PricewaterhouseCoopers) has 500 lawyers); Molvig, supra note 11,
at 44 ("The Big Five accounting firms have succeeded in attracting top attorneys. All
combined, they employ more than 5,500 nontax attorneys worldwide (excluding
lawyers practicing tax law exclusively within the firm's accounting or tax divisions).").
124. See e.g., Rufus Jones, Having It All: Can the Big Five Hire Every Tax Lawyer
in the US?, 11 Int'l Tax Rev. 15 (Apr. 2000) (describing the recent raids of U.S. law
firms by the Big Five accounting firms and asking how law firms can persuade their
best lawyers to stay); Sheryl Stratton, E&Y Erpands; KPMG Wants Weil's
International Tax Group, 86 Tax Notes 324 (2000) (describing the negotiations
between the Big Five accounting firm of KPMG and the international tax lawyers in
the Washington D.C. office of Weil, Gotshal & Manges); Stratton, Weil, Gotshal
Loses Top International Tax Talent, supra note 118 (describing the departure of
international tax lawyers at the Washington, D.C., office of Weil to join KPMG).
125. See e.g., Molvig, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that Texas filed a complaint
against Arthur Andersen and Deloitte & Touche in 1997 which was dismissed 11
months later); see also Farrell, supra note 114, at 613-15; Elizabeth MacDonald, Texas
ProbesAndersen, Deloitte on Charges of PracticingLaw, Wall St. J., May 28, 1998, at
B15.
126. As stated by Lawrence Fox, a leading opponent of MDPs: "The argument that
these lawyers are not engaged in the practice of law has as much merit as President
Clinton's claim that he did not engage in sex." Lawrence J. Fox, Old Wine in Old
Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72 Temp. L Rev. 971, 973 (1999)
[hereinafter Fox, Preserving Professional Independence]; see also Remarks of Fox,
supra note 28. For other, less colorful critiques of this claim by the accounting firms,
see Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 952-53; John H. Matheson & Edward S. Adams,
Not "If" But "How": Reflecting on the ABA Connission's Recommendations on
Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1269, 1272-73 (2000) [hereinafter
Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Connission's Reconmmendations]; and
Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers to Participatein MultidisciplinaryPractices:
Business as Usualor the End of the Professionas We Knoow It?, 84 Minn. L Rev. 1315,
1325-27 (2000).
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maintaining unauthorized-practice actions against them.127

Federal law clearly preempts unauthorized-practice-of-law
complaints by state bar authorities if and to the extent that the
accounting firms' activities fall within the federal scheme of
preemption. A federal statute, 128 Treasury Circular 230,129 and the Tax
Court Rules 130 specifically authorize accountants and lawyers to
practice in the area of federal taxation. Further, this federal authority
does not limit partnerships or associations between lawyers and
accountants working in this area.
131
makes clear
The Supreme Court's decision in Sperry v. Florida
that when the federal government authorizes non-lawyers to practice

before it, the Supremacy Clause precludes a state from prohibiting
such practice as the unauthorized practice of law. 132 Sperry likewise
precludes the bar authorities of a state from prohibiting a lawyer not
admitted in the state from performing activities authorized by federal
law,

even if those

activities

would

otherwise

constitute

the

unauthorized practice of law under state law. Because various federal
statutes and Treasury Department rules authorize accountants and
attorneys to practice federal tax law, under Sperry, states may not
directly or indirectly interfere with133the right of accountants or lawyers
to practice in the federal tax area.

127. See Lee Sheppard, Why Do Lawyers and Accountants Fight?, 24 Tax Notes
823 (1984) (quoting William Raby, a leading tax accountant-commentator, who
referred to the work of tax accountants as the "authorized" practice of federal tax
law).
128. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (Supp. IV. 1996).
129. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (1999).
130. See Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court, Rule
200(a) (1998). If an applicant for admission to practice before the Tax Court is not an
attorney, the applicant must pass a written examination in order to be admitted. See
id. Rule 200(a)(3).
131. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
132. Sperry involved whether the State of Florida could prohibit a non-lawyer not
admitted to the bar of any state from preparing and prosecuting patent applications
for clients in Florida before the United States Patent Office. See id. at 381-83. The
United States Supreme Court did not and could not question the state courts'
determination that preparing and prosecuting patent applications for others
constituted the practice of law under Florida law. See id. at 383. The Supreme Court
held, however, that because a federal statute expressly permitted the Commissioner
of Patents to authorize non-lawyers to practice before the Patent Office, the
Supremacy Clause prohibited Florida from using its unauthorized-practice-of-law
rules to deny non-lawyers the right to perform acts within the scope of the federal
authority. See id. at 384-85.
133. But see Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1986). In Ranta, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that an attorney licensed in Minnesota, but not in North
Dakota, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in North Dakota when he
traveled there to provide legal advice for a North Dakota client about certain federal
tax issues. See id. at 164. The court held that the exception to the unauthorizedpractice rules developed in many jurisdictions for federal court practice did not apply
because the attorney did not appear before a federal court. See id. Thus, the court
held that the attorney was not entitled to recover any fees for the unauthorized
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Thus, to properly apply the preemption doctrine, the relevant
inquiry is what activities within the area of federal tax practice are
authorized by federal law.-34 There are three broad categories of
services that fall within this area: (1) tax return preparation, (2) tax
advice and planning, and (3) tax controversy work including litigation.
Numerous statutes and Treasury and court rules address these
categories of services.
First, both accountants and lawyers are authorized to prepare
federal tax returns.'35 Indeed, anyone who meets certain recordkeeping requirements and files the requisite information with the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") may prepare federal tax returns for
clients. 3 6
Second, a federal statute' 37 and Treasury Circular 230" s specifically
authorize lawyers, accountants, and enrolled agents to provide clients
with tax advice. Such advice may encompass current and future tax
problems, including interpretation of statutes, regulations, and case
law. It may include comparison for tax purposes of the different
structures that a taxpayer could use to conduct a business or
investment activity. It may also include the preparation of tax
opinions for use by the client and third parties.
Third, Treasury Circular 230 allows accountants, enrolled agents,
enrolled actuaries, and lawyers to represent clients in tax
controversies before the IRS. 139 If the controversy continues beyond
administrative proceedings within the IRS, whether an accountant or
accounting firm lawyer may continue to represent the client depends
upon the client's choice of forum in which to litigate. If the client
chooses to litigate in the Tax Court, a national court that hears cases
in various locations throughout the country, the Tax Court rules
permit an accountant as well as a lawyer who works at an accounting
firm to represent the client."4 The client instead may choose to pay
the disputed taxes but file suit for a refund in the local federal district
court or in the United States Court of Federal Claims. In that case,
only a lawyer admitted to practice before the federal court and
practicing in a law firm, as a sole practitioner, or as in-house counsel,
could represent the client.
practice of law in North Dakota. See id. at 166.
134. See Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants: A Study of Interprofessional
Relationships: Statements on Practice in the Field of Federal Income Taxation and
Estate Planning,36 Tax Law. 26,27 (1982) (joint project of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants and the ABA).
135. See id. at 33 ("It is a proper function of a lawyer or a certified public
accountant to prepare federal income tax returns.").
136. See 26 U.S.C. § 6060 (1998).
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (Supp. IV. 1996).
138. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.97 (1999).
139. See id. § 10.3 (1999).
140. See Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court, Rule

200(a)(3) (1998).
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Fourth, in 1998, Congress created a new federal tax practitionerclient privilege in Section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code.14
Under this provision, with respect to tax advice, the same common
law protections of confidentiality that apply to communications
between attorneys and their clients also apply to certain
communications between a client and any federally authorized tax
practitioner to the extent the communication would be a privileged
communication between a taxpayer and an attorney.142 A federally

authorized tax practitioner for this purpose is "any individual who is
authorized under Federal law to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service. "143 There are, however, numerous limitations which make
this new privilege much narrower in scope than the attorney-client
privilege,

and

may lead

to client

confusion

about

whether

communications with a particular tax professional are privileged. 144
Nevertheless, the creation of this privilege represents congressional
recognition of the key role that accountants and other non-lawyers
who are admitted to practice before the IRS play in tax return
preparation, tax planning, and tax controversy work.
There has been some suggestion that if a lawyer practices tax law in
an accounting firm (that is, prepares tax returns, advises clients on tax
matters, or appears before the IRS and represents clients before the

Tax Court), that lawyer is in violation of Model Rule 5.4, because the
lawyer is both sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer and practicing law
with a non-lawyer in an entity owned by non-lawyers.145 Sperry and
141. See 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (Supp. IV. 1998). Section 7525 was enacted as part of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 3411(a), 112 Stat. 750. See Therese LeBlanc, Note, Accountant-Client Privilege:
The Effect of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 67 UMKC L. Rev. 583,
585-87 (1999); Alyson Petroni, Note, Unpacking the Accountant-Client Privilege
Under LR.C. Section 7525,18 Va. Tax Rev. 843,844-46 (1999); Michael Wilson, Note,
Careful What You Wish For: The Tax Practitioner-ClientPrivilege Establishedby the
InternalRevenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 319,
320-21 (1999). Besides this special statutory tax practitioner privilege for accountants
in the federal tax law area, the Supreme Court noted in Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973), that "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal
law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases." Id. at 335.
Some states, however, do recognize such an accountant-client privilege.
142. See 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
143. Id. § 7525(a)(3)(A). "Tax advice" for this purpose is "advice given by an
individual.., which is within the scope of the individual's authority to practice"
before the IRS. Id. § 7525(a)(3)(B).
144. First, the tax practitioner-client privilege does not apply in any criminal tax
matters. See id. § 7525(a)(2)(A). Second, the tax practitioner-client privilege does not
apply in state tax matters (although, in some states, a separate privilege created under
state law may apply). See id. § 7525(a)(2)(B). Third, the tax practitioner-client
privilege does not apply to written communications between a "tax practitioner and a
director, shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or representative of a corporation
in connection with" certain matters relating to tax shelters. Id. § 7525(b). Moreover,
the precise scope of the privilege remains to be determined through judicial
interpretation.
145. This argument may emanate from ABA Committee on Ethics & Professional
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the preemption doctrine, however, should preclude state bar
authorities from attempting to prohibit such activities in the federal
tax area. Neither Congress, nor the Treasury, nor the Tax Court has
ever raised any concerns about cooperative practices between lawyers
and non-lawyers in the tax area, even though such arrangements have
been in existence for decades.
The Congress and the Treasury have made a policy decision that
lawyers, accountants, and enrolled agents possess the necessary
competence to offer tax services to the general public." This decision
is based upon the training of these professionals and on the need for
the general public to obtain affordable tax services in planning their
affairs and complying with the law. Society is better off because
competition exists in the tax practice area, and the public can access
professional services from a variety of sources. The self-assessment
nature of our federal tax system depends upon the availability of
competent professionals to assist taxpayers in voluntary compliance
with the tax rules. The efforts of state bars to limit non-lawyer
involvement in tax practice or lawyer involvement in accounting firms'
provision of tax services is contrary to the public interest and violates
the federal constitutional principle of the Supremacy Clause."
There is, however, one collateral aspect of tax practice that could
involve the unauthorized practice of law. If a non-lawyer or a lawyer
in an accounting firm provides tax services about a future transaction,
and the client decides to adopt the advice, that client will often need
non-tax services to implement the tax plan. Such services may include
drafting of a will, transferring title to a property, or drafting the
documents for a family limited partnership. Providing these services
could arguably constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
There is no doubt that if a non-lawyer or a lawyer practicing in an
accounting firm drafted an entire agreement and had the client
execute the agreement in the accounting office, this activity would
constitute the practice of law and could be enjoined by the state bar
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1032 (1968), which held that an attorney may not
represent clients before the IRS when the attorney is an employee of an accounting
firm. See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 269
(1945) (finding that an accounting firm can only employ a lawyer who ceases to hold
self out as a lawyer and who ceases practicing law); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 272 (1946) (stating that an accounting firm may not
employ a lawyer to offer legal services to clients).
146. "[I]t is well to remember that the overwhelming proportion of the
government's employees actually administering the tax law are not lawyers."
Griswold, supra note 119, at 1114.
147. Professor Mary Daly describes in detail the arguments made by commentators
claiming that accounting firms are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when
they offer tax-planning services. See Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 254-57.
Such arguments are without merit and are against the public interest. They can only
be explained as protectionist in nature, aimed at protecting the bar from competition
in the tax law arena.
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under the current ethical rules. 4 A non-lawyer or a lawyer practicing
in an accounting firm should, however, be able to propose language
for inclusion in a legal document and draft such language without
violating the unauthorized-practice-of-law rules. Such language could
be provided to a client with the instruction that the client should take
the language to an independent lawyer and have the lawyer include it
in the legal documents only after review. Furthermore, an accounting
firm could also draft an entire document for review by the client's
lawyer. Although this comes closer to the practice of law, if the
accounting firm sent this draft directly to the client's lawyer, that
would arguably still be authorized by federal tax law. For the
accounting firm to provide the draft directly to the client raises more
serious liability concerns. On a case-by-case basis, it is unlikely that
giving the draft to the client would trigger unauthorized-practice-oflaw restrictions if the accounting firm makes it clear that the client
needs to engage a separate lawyer to review the document before it is
executed. There is always a risk, however, that a client could attempt
to execute a complete document without review by a lawyer. 49 Thus,
an improperly executed will, for example, could be invalid and could
subject the accounting firm to liability. 5
15
B. Developments in Other Countries 1

As noted by other commentators, it is very difficult to compare the
development of the ethics rules relating to involvement of nonlawyers in the American legal profession with the development of
such rules in other countries. 52 First, many tasks typically performed
148. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 838-40.
149. If the client is a large corporation with in-house counsel, it is likely that
concerns about liability and unauthorized practice are substantially reduced by simply

handing the documents to an in-house lawyer.
150. See, e.g., Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32, 35 (S.D. 1986) (holding that a bank
employee is liable for drafting will for client).

151. An excellent source for a comparative sociological study of the legal

professions in different countries around the world is the three volume work: Lawyers
in Society (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988). For a comprehensive
survey of the treatment of MDPs in selected foreign jurisdictions, see New York State
Bar Association Special Committee, Report, supra note 22, at 185-291. For other

works focusing on the treatment of MDPs in other countries, see Lawyers' Practice

and Ideals: A Comparative View (John J. Barcelo, III & Roger C. Cramton eds.,

1999) [hereinafter Lawyers' Practice and Ideals]; Ronald A. Landen, Comment, The

Prospectsof the Accountant-Lawyer MultidisciplinaryPartnershipin English-Speaking
Countries, 13 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 763 (1999); and Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six
Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices
Should be Permitted in the United States, 21 Fordham Int'l L.J. 190, 197-203, 232-36
(1997).
152. See ABA Commission, Background Paper,supra note 14; see generally Daly,
Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 227-40 (examining the provision of legal services
by accounting firms outside of the United States); Terry, MDP Primer, supra note
113, at 883-90.
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by lawyers in the United States are instead performed by non-lawyer
professionals in other countries. 153 Notaries, conveyancers, and tax
advisers may provide legal services in many foreign countries."4 Thus,
in many countries around the world, non-lawyers may give legal

advice and notarize legal documents.

55

Second, it is difficult to

determine the extent to which unauthorized-practice-of-law rules are

enforced in other countries. Finally, although many other countries
have adopted restrictions against non-lawyer involvement that are

similar to those in the United States, one can often plan around those
rules with various contractual or entity arrangements. "
The concept of professionals practicing together in an MDP
originated in Germany, where lawyers and tax accountants have been
able to practice together in a partnership since the end of World War
II.1 Interestingly enough, under prior law, lawyers in Germany were
permitted to partner with accountants only because the accounting
profession was considered to maintain high professional standards.
The German law relating to MDPs has undergone substantial recent
change, however, and under the current rules, a lawyer may form an
MDP with the following categories of professionals: patent lawyers,
tax advisors, auditors, tax assistants, and sworn-in accountants.55
Until recently, other European countries had traditional law firms
instatus-conscious legal professions. 159 A major change in the legal
153. See, eg., Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions: An
ExploratoryEssay, 1985 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1, 29-30.
154. See, e.g., David S. Clark, Comparingthe Work and Organizationof Lawyers
Worldwide: The Persistenceof Legal Traditions,in Lawyers' Practice and Ideals, supra
note 151, at 9, 55-57; New York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report,
supra note 22, at 277.
155. See, e.g., New York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report, supra
note 22, at 275. There is no evidence of significant problems involving incompetence
or unethical conduct arising in foreign countries that permit non-lawyers to provide
legal advice. See Rhode, Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, supra note 38, at 230-31;
Rhode, UnauthorizedPractice,supra note 5, at 89-90.
156. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the Law
Practiceof European and American Lawyers, in Lawyers' Practice and Ideals, supra
note 151, at 301, 309 [hereinafter Wolfram, Multidisciplinary Partnerships](noting
that despite United Kingdom rules that prohibit solicitors from entering into
unincorporated associations with non-solicitors, multidisciplinary practice
arrangements exist, such as Arthur Andersen establishing Garret & Co., a law
practice in England).
157. See Ward Bower, The Case for MDPs: Should MultidisciplinaryPracticesBe
Banned or Embraced?, Law Practice Management Magazine (July/Aug. 1999)
(available at <http'//www.abanet.orgllpm/magazinelmdp-bowe995.html>).
For a
detailed study of MDPs in Germany, see Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to
Learn, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1547 (2000) [hereinafter Terry, German MDPs].
158. See Terry, German MDPs,supra note 157, at 1561-62.
159. See David M. Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan & John R.Davis, Global
Restructuringand the Law: Studies of the Internationalizationof Legal Fields and the
Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 407, 422 (1994).
Addressing European legal practice, the authors note:
Lawyers operated as solo practitioners or in small firms that specialized in
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profession in European countries coincided with the creation of the
European Union:
As a result of the creation of the EC, the opening of European
borders, the restructuring of European economies, and the growing
number of business firms that operate simultaneously in several
countries within Europe, a new market for legal services to business
has emerged.... The old business law structures of the European
legal fields have proved incapable of meeting the new demands
generated by the Euro-law market. 16°
The demand was immediately met by three different sources of
legal services: large American
161 law firms, large accounting firms, and
corporate in-house counsel.
It is against this background that the Big Five accounting firms
began to evolve as providers of legal services in European countries. 162
In each country, the firms had to contend with old rules regulating the
provision of legal services; thus, each country has a unique system for
permitting forms of associations between lawyers and non-lawyers.
Given, however, the relative inability of European law firms to meet
the demand for business and tax services, and the special position that
the accounting firms occupied because of their role as auditors,
accounting firms quickly were viewed as a viable option to meet the
demand. 63 Additionally, the regulators of the legal professions in
these countries generally have not been able to stop the development
of multidisciplinary practice arrangements. 164
In Europe, some jurisdictions explicitly allow lawyers to practice
with non-lawyers in a single entity. Switzerland has permitted single
entity MDPs for a number of years, and this is not viewed by the bar
specific areas of the law. Legal practice was oriented around litigation, and
lawyers played relatively restricted roles in the general affairs of business
firms. The idea of the lawyer as a general business advisor, or the law firm
as a conglomerate of specialties, was slow to develop.
Id.
160. Id. at 426.
161. See id. at 427.
162. The growth within the last ten years is dramatic. Compare Andrew Eburne,
Accountants and Lawyers Headingfor a Showdown, Int'l Fin. L. Rev., May 1991, at
15, 18 (listing the number of lawyers in accounting firms in the early 1990s), with
ABA Commission, Background Paper,supra note 14, pt. I.
163. See Richard L. Abel, TransnationalLaw Practice, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
737, 747 (1994). The author states:
[Accounting firms] gained a foothold in providing legal services in Europe
because continental lawyers emphasized litigation. Even British solicitors
were slow to develop a tax competence. Indeed, continental lawyers were so
preoccupied with advocacy that the accounting firms developed litigation
support services to complement lawyers' courtroom skills in the same way
solicitors compliment barristers.
Id.
164. See Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 236-40 (examining the responses
of foreign regulators to the formation of MDPs).
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as being a controversial position."6 The Swiss economy, which is
dominated by the banking industry, has long recognized the value of
decisions informed by many different professionals."
As noted
above, Germany has permitted partnerships between accountants and
lawyers for many years.
Lawyers could not share fees with
accountants, however, until a 1994 statute changed this result. 67
In France, accounting firms relied upon the French law that allowed
drafters of legal documents called "conseil juridique" to offer drafting
services to their clients. Accounting firms hired these drafters as
employees."6 France also allowed accounting firms to affiliate with
independent law firms or networks of firms. 69 Recently, France
merged the two legal professions-"avocats" and "conseil
juridique"-to form one profession. 7 ' Since that time, the accounting
firms have been affiliating with or acquiring the combined law firms.'
The rules in France have led to the accounting firms using a "captive"
law firm arrangement. A "captive" law firm remains separate in
structure from the accounting firm, but the two share the same client
base and often provide services in an indistinguishably unified
manner.1 2 The accounting firm often provides the law firm with
support, and the law firm provides the accounting firm with legal
services.
In the United Kingdom, the current rules do not allow lawyers and
non-lawyers to partner in the same entity or to share legal fees with
165. See New York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report, supra note
22, at 278-79 (stating that the ability to form MDPs depends on the canton).
166. See Interview with Carl Baudenbacher, Professor of Law, St. Gallen,
Switzerland, Judge, EFTA Court of the European Union (July 1999). This reality is
evidenced by the fact that the largest law firm in Switzerland is ATAG Ernst &
Young. See Daly, Reporter's Notes, supra note 11, at n.11.
167. See Thomas 0. Verhoeven, Summary of Testimony Before the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Nov. 13, 1999) (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cprl
verhoeven1198.htm1>).
168. See New York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report, supra note
22, at 195-96.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 197-200.
17L See Marc J. Bartel & Bradford W. Hildebrandt, Memo to Managing Partners:
Start Worrying About Europe, 20 Am. Law. 69 (Nov. 1998) (examining the different
affiliations and mergers between accounting firms and European law firms); John
Leubsdorf, The Independenceof the Bar in France:Learning From Comparative Legal
Ethics, in Lawyers' Practice and Ideals, supra note 151, at 275, 292.
172- See ABA Commission, BackgroundPaper,supra note 14, at pt. I. That a law
firm is "captive" does not mean that it works exclusively for clients of the accounting
firm. The law firm may do much of its work for accounting firm clients, but may also
have clients who are not clients of the accounting firm. See Neil Cochran, Statement
Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) (available
at <http.//www.abanet.org/cpr/cochranl.html>) (discussing his law firm's association
with Arthur Andersen in Scotland and explaining that his firm has clients who are not
Arthur Andersen clients).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

non-lawyers.13 A deregulation of the English legal profession in the
mid-1980s, however, was designed to allow close relationships
between solicitors and non-lawyers. 4 This change was designed in
part to allow solicitors to broaden their scope of services offered to
clients and to compete with the tax and real estate advice being
provided by accounting professionals.175 The availability of a
"package price" was designed to allow formation of alliances between
lawyers and non-lawyers without explicitly permitting co-ownership or
fee-sharing. Thus, accounting firms have initiated the creation of
"captive" law firms that serve the clients of the accounting firms
exclusively. 6 Recently, however, there has been a movement to
change the rules to allow the creation of "legal practice plus" and
"linked partnerships.""
These new practice concepts will allow
solicitors to join with non-lawyer partners and allow the formation of
stronger alliances than are currently permitted.
There are many other interesting pro-multidisciplinary practice
developments taking place around the world.178 An international
practice committee of the Canadian Bar Association has embraced
ownership and fee-sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers in
MDPs, and recommends adoption of rules consistent with
encouraging MDPs. 179 New South Wales, Australia, is considering
allowing law firms to incorporate, to share legal fees with non-lawyers,
and to participate in passive investment on the Australian Stock
Exchange.' °
173. See Alison Crawley, The Law Society of England and Wales, Written

Remarks to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (1999) (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/crawley.html>) (providing extensive citations to the
English rules prohibiting non-lawyer partnerships with lawyers and fee-sharing with
non-lawyers).
174. See id. (describing recent deregulation of the legal profession).
175. See id. The barrister/solicitor distinction left solicitors at a competitive
disadvantage with accountants and tax advisers. Thus, the changes were designed in
part to let solicitors offer comprehensive services to clients.
176. Arthur Andersen affiliated with the "captive" firm Garrett & Co., and
PricewaterhouseCoopers affiliated with the "captive" firm Arnheim, Tite, and Lewis.
177. See Lucy Hickman, LawSoc Votes for MDPs After 10-Year Wait, The Lawyer,

Oct. 18, 1999, at 2.
178. Because of space constraints, this Article's coverage of international
developments concerning MDPs is necessarily selective. Accordingly, an exhaustive
examination of the legal professions around the world and their positions on MDPs is
beyond the scope of this Article.
179. See Canadian Bar Association International Practice of Law Committee,
Striking a Balance: The Report of the International Practice of Law Committee on
Multi-Disciplinary Practices and the Legal Profession 31-37 (1999). Similarly, a
Committee of the Federation of Law Societies in Canada has embraced the concept

of MDPs. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, National Multi-Disciplinary
Partnership Committee, Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships: Report to the Delegates

(Aug. 1999) (available at <http://www.flsc.ca/english/
committees/mdp/reports/reportdelegatesaugustl999.html>).
180. See Professional Regulation Task Force Report, Structure of Law Firms (May

1997)

(available

at
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These developments should not be read to suggest that legal
professions around the world are completely embracing MDPs. The
reactions are varied and complex. In some countries, the rules already
permit alliances between lawyers and non-lawyers and the status quo
is not easy to change; thus, it would be difficult for lawyers in such
countries to prevent the growth of MDPs. In other countries, the
rules are being changed to allow lawyers to compete with the
accounting firms. Yet, in still other countries, the legal professions
seek to become a center of world legal commerce and believe that
MDPs offer the best chance for accomplishing that goal. Although
many foreign bars still oppose MDPs,1 it is likely that a majority of
countries in the world will eventually accommodate some form of
partnering between lawyers and non-lawyers to enable clients to
receive integrated professional services.
II. THE BENEFITS OF AND DEMAND FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY
SERVICES

This part of the Article discusses the benefits of multidisciplinary
services and why there is a growing demand for such services by the
consumer.
Ultimately, it is this consumer demand for
multidisciplinary services that will determine the direction of the
debate concerning multidisciplinary practice.
First, the major benefit of multidisciplinary services is the delivery
of an integrated team approach to serving client interests-in other
words, providing clients with a "one-stop shopping" approach for
problems requiring services in different fields.,, When individuals
<http:/Ilawsocnsw.asn.au/about/papersregulationsiregs13.htm#Heading23>); Andrew
Burrell, Shackles Removed for Law Firms, Austl. Fin. Rev. 1 (Sept. 3, 1999). For the
view that passive investment should be allowed in U.S. law firms, see Adams &
Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?, supra note 75, at 30-37, and infra text
accompanying notes 493-504. Since 1993, the accounting firms have been able to offer
legal services from their accounting entity in South Wales, Australia. Other
Australian states are also beginning to follow this lead to allow the accounting firms
to deliver legal services.
181. See Molvig, supra note 11, at 45 (noting that Finland and Denmark oppose the
combination of legal and non-legal advice in an MDP).
182. See Robert G. Evans & Alan D. Wolfson, Cui Bono-Who Benefits From
Improved Access to Legal Services?, in Lawyers and the Consumer Interest:
Regulating the Market for Legal Services 3, 14, 24 (Robert G. Evans & Michael J.
Trebilcock eds., 1982) [hereinafter Lawyers and the Consumer Interest]; Letter from
Damain Gisbert to Sherwin Simmons, Chair of the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(May
12,
1999)
(available
at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gisberLhtml>) (Financial Director of Kellogg's Espana
describes the use of MDPs around the world to represent it in the global
marketplace); Levinson, Independent Law Firms, supra note 24, at 242; Letter from
Jose MS Marti to Sherwin Simmons, Chairman, ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(May
12,
1999)
(available
at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/marti.html>) (European Financial Manager of NALCO
described the need to obtain a broad range of services from an MDP in the global
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work together on a regular basis, they provide a synergy that is simply
not present when an individual works alone. The synergy is more
likely to produce higher quality service for a client requiring both
legal and non-legal representation."
Without multidisciplinary
services, some clients will choose not to involve other non-law
professionals even though it would benefit them to do so.", Even
when they do choose a quasi-multidisciplinary approach, the difficulty
in coordinating several sources of services has the potential to both
reduce the quality and increase the cost of the representation clients
receive. The liberalization of multidisciplinary services is necessary to
give consumers full choice in accessing various professional services,
including legal services. 1 5
A second major benefit of multidisciplinary services is the resultant
efficiency that translates into savings of time or money, and ensures
the delivery of a higher quality product to the client with lower
transaction costs. 18 6 Thus, a client with legal and non-legal problems
marketplace); Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's
Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1299-1300; see also Hon. Phyllis W. Beck,
Foreword:New Roles, No Rules? Redefining Lawyers' Work, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 777,
779 (1999); Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 753-54; Louis M. Brown,
Emerging Changes in the Practiceof Law, 1978 Utah L. Rev. 599, 609-10; Carson,
supra note 23, at 602; Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 275, 282; Fischel,
MDPs,supra note 33, at 972; James M. Fischer, Why Can't Lawyers Split Fees? Why
Ask Why, Ask When!, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 33 (1992); Michael Paul, Law Firms
Shouldn't Be for Lawyers Only, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A18; Ted Schneyer,
Reputational Bonding, Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The Economist as
Storyteller, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1777, 1792 (1998) [hereinafter Schneyer, Economist as
Storyteller]; Wolfram, MultidisciplinaryPartnerships,supra note 156, at 309, 344.
183. A good analogy to describe the synergy is the difference between an all-star
team in a sport versus a group of talented professionals on one team that works
together. The constant interaction between the members of the same team produces
a synergy that is not possible on the all-star team.
184. A general counsel of a Fortune 100 company recently discussed this issue with
one of the authors of this article. He stated that his company had employed a team of
in-house professionals from different disciplines who each occupy a different but
coordinated role in examining corporate decision making that in the past was driven
by lawyers. Economists, mathematicians, individuals with MBA degrees, and
marketing experts team together to offer the corporation a complete and very
sophisticated approach to decision making. He stated that he could not imagine
doing business in today's world any other way and that he thought that companies
without the benefit of this multifaceted approach were at a significant disadvantage.
185. See Jim Conran, President, Consumers First, Written Testimony to the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 1, 1999) (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/conran.html>) (advocating consumer choice in legal
service providers); David A. Swankin, President, Citizen Advocacy Center, Written
Testimony to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 24, 1999)
(available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/swankin.html>)
(examining right of
consumer choice in context of potential harm to the public and concluding that issues
of loss of attorney-client privilege, loss of independence, and possibility of conflicts of
interest could be minimized through the arrangement); see also Evans & Wolfson,
supra note 182, at 14.
186. See The Consumer Alliance, Written Remarks to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(Mar.
31,
1999)
(available
at
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does not need to schedule appointments with several service providers
who may or may not have worked together before. Eliminated
transaction costs may include duplication of effort, the need for the
professionals to consult each other in costly conferences or meetings,
and the need for each provider to bill a sufficient dollar amount to

ensure that the transaction is viable from a business and liability
perspective. After all, few service providers will want to undertake
joint liability when the financial reward of the representation is likely
to be small. Other reduced costs include search costs, contracting

costs, coordination costs, monitoring costs, and information costs."
MDPs are also likely to employ persons of varying skills and billing
rates. This way, a person doing routine tasks, such as basic
mathematical calculations, is billed at a lower rate than a more skilled
professional who performs a mathematical calculation incident to the
performance of his or her services. Specifically, a consumer of
professional services may realize the benefit of reduced consumptionrelated costs when dealing with an integrated professional services
firm that is in a position to offer a variety of services and specialists in
one location.188
<http:llwww.abanet.org/cpr/consumer.html>)
(advocating
development
of
multidisciplinary services to offer consumers more choices and cost-effective
solutions); Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 972; Morello, supra note 151, at 239. One
commentator argues, in effect, that the fact that MDPs help achieve a more efficient
market for legal services would be detrimental: there would be a reallocation of
resources to the most profitable practice areas and geographical locations, thus
depriving less profitable practice areas and geographical locations of needed legal
representation. See Levinson, Independent Law Firms,supra note 24, at 243, 247. If
this is a serious problem, however, the solution is not to impede the efficient delivery
of legal services through MDPs, but instead, to provide incentives for MDPs to
provide services in less profitable practice areas and geographical locations.
187. See generally Michael Trebilcock & Lilla Csorgo, Multi-Disciplinary
ProfessionalPractices:A Consumer Welfare Perspective (Aug. 4, 1999) (available at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/canada.html>) (study commissioned by Big Five
accounting firms in Canada); see also Andrews, supra note 71, at 623-24; John Quinn,
Multidisciplinary Legal Services and Preventive Regulation, in Lawyers and the
Consumer Interest, supra note 182, at 329, 334, 342 [hereinafter Quinn, Preventive
Regulation]. "Search costs" are the costs of looking for professionals in each of the
service areas and geographical locations in which professional services are needed to
complete the consumer's project. Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra, at 3. "Contracting
costs" are the costs of contracting with each professional performing services that are
needed on the project. See id. "Coordination costs" are the costs of coordinating the
tasks performed by each of the professionals and relaying information between the
professionals. See id. "Monitoring costs" are the costs of verifying the quality of tasks
performed by each of the professionals on the project. See id.
If one integrated MDP provides various professional services to the consumer, the
consumer could either monitor the different services randomly and impute the
verified quality to the MDP, or rely on the substantial reputational capital that the
MDP would lose if it failed to deliver on its promised quality. See id.
188. Low- and middle-income individuals as well as small and medium sized
business enterprises who rarely engage in activities requiring professional services are
more likely to resort to an integrated provider of professional services. See generally
Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187. It is usually not worthwhile for such consumers
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Third, producers of multidisciplinary services may realize the
benefit of reduced production-related costs that result from delegating
a function within the firm rather than purchasing it on the open
market or leaving it to the client to purchase that function
elsewhere.189 These reduced production-related costs comprise two
types: economies of scope and economies of scale. 190
Economies of scope occur when the total cost of producing a group
of products or services is less when those products or services are
produced by a single integrated firm than when produced by a set of
independent firms.'
In this context, MDPs "may facilitate the
coordination and collaboration between a tax accountant.., tax
lawyer," and economist. ' 9 This co-ordination and collaboration
results in cost savings not only to the producers of the services, but
also to the client. 93
Economies of scale occur when the average cost of producing a
service decreases with increased production of the service. 194 In the
multidisciplinary practice context, economies of scale are relevant if
one assumes that the introduction of an MDP will result in increased
demand for the firm. 95 With the increase in firm demand, an MDP
may be able to justify the hiring of more specialized employees who
are likely to be able to perform necessary tasks more efficiently and
competently than someone who is not an expert in the area. 96 This
allows the MDP to reallocate tasks among various employees in such
a way as to decrease the average cost of providing services and to
increase the quality of the specialized services provided. 97 Moreover,
the increase in firm demand may also allow the MDP to invest in
technologies that could not otherwise be justified under a cost/benefit
analysis, or that, in the absence of the MDP, would have resulted in
to pay to assemble a team of separate service providers and to incur the resulting
higher search and monitoring costs. See id. at 3.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.; see also Quinn, Preventive Regulation,supra note 187, at 333-34.
192. Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187 at 3; see also Quinn, Preventive
Regulation,supra note 187, at 333-34.
193. See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 3; see also Quinn, Preventive
Regulation, supra note 187, at 333-34; Donald H. Rivkin, Paris Forum on
Transnational Practicefor the Legal Profession: Discussion PaperPresented by the
American Bar Association Section for InternationalLaw and Practice, 18 Dick. J. Int'l
L. 55,73 (1999).
194. See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 3.
195. See id.; Wolfram, MultidisciplinaryPartnerships,supra note 156, at 318 ("[T]he
overriding economic factor in the growth of MDPs is that service is the fastestgrowing sector in the global economy.").
196. See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 3.
197. See id.; see also Bower, MultidisciplinaryPractices,supra note 122, at 160-62;
Evans & Wolfson, supra note 182, at 14; cf. Fabian Dixon & Peter Levy, ParisForum
on Transnational Practice for the Legal Profession: Additional Discussion Paper
Presented by the Law Council of Australia, 18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 137, 142 (1999).
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two parties incurring duplicative costs in developing the same
technologies. 19s
The clients of MDPs would benefit directly from the reduced
production-related costs in three ways. First, the consumer will
benefit through the increase in quality of the services that MDPs can
provide, i.e., the greater specialized skills of the professional
personnel in the MDP and the improved technological capabilities.1 9
Second, the consumer will benefit from being served in markets in

which he or she had not previously been served.'
Finally, in a
competitive market for professional services, greater production
efficiencies should translate into lower prices.?'
Because
establishment of MDPs will not decrease the number of professional
service firms competing for client business, but instead will expand
product offerings, the introduction of multidisciplinary services is
more likely to increase rather than decrease competition in the
market for professional services.2'
Additionally, an MDP is more likely to identify both legal and nonlegal issues than would an entity comprised of personnel with the
same professional specialty (law or non-law). 203 Working together in a
team approach, lawyers and non-lawyers will be more sensitive to
their respective issues and are likely to formulate and promote a more
comprehensive definition of client problems.2 Clients will thereby be
19& See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 3-4; see also Bower,
MultidisciplinaryPractices,supra note 122, at 161; cf Larry E. Ribstein, EthicalRules,
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1707, 1716-17 (1998) (stating
that large law firms are better able than small law firms to handle sophisticated work
requiring non-legal services and technological investments).
199. See Evans & Wolfson, supra note 182, at 25; Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note
187, at 4.
200. See Evans & Wolfson, supra note 182, at 24; Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note
187, at 4; see also Shigeru Kobori, ParisForum on TransnationalPracticefor the Legal
Profession: Discussion PaperPresented by the Japan Federationof Bar Associations,
18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 109, 111 (1999) ("An integrated firm with a worldwide network
opens up the possibility of receiving specialized country to country service.").
201. See Evans & Wolfson, supra note 182, at 25; Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note
187, at 4; Wolfram, MultidisciplinaryPartnerships,supra note 156, at 309 (client will
"often" receive a lower price "because of the greater efficiencies possible in providing
seamless, coordinated services"), 344-45; see also Bower, Multidisciplinary Practices,
supra note 122, at 167 (one response of law firms to competition from MDPs could be
to streamline processes in order to directly compete with MDPs on price, efficiency,
and responsiveness to client demands).
202- See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 4; see also Evans & Wolfson,
supra note 182, at 14; Gary A. Munneke, Lawyers, Accountants, and the Battle to Own
Professional Services, 20 Pace L. Rev. 73 (1999) (examining the competition between
the accounting and legal professions).
203. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 623; Mark K. Philger, President, Americans for
Competitive Telecommunications, Written Testimony to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(Feb.
3,
1999)
(available
at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/philger.html>) (detailing the ways in which bundling of
services benefits consumers).
204. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 623; Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note
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given a choice whether to engage the professional service provider to

address other related issues during the representation. The result is a
higher quality work product, which includes integrated and balanced
solutions to all issues relevant to a matter. 20 5 As stated by two
commentators:
Lawyers and non-lawyers working together may also complement
each other by bringing different problem-solving techniques to bear
on an issue. As professionals become more specialized in order to
satisfy complex client needs, a collaboration of professionals
is more
20 6
likely to result in optimal problem-solving approaches.

Moreover, the multidisciplinary firm can counteract the problem of
lawyers doing the wrong type of specialized work for a client. This
problem, if not corrected, results in clients consuming too much of the
type of legal services performed by those lawyers and consuming too
little of the types of services performed by lawyers with other
specialities or by non-law professionals. 207 Because the MDP offers
more than one type of service, it is more likely to steer the client into
using the optimal amount of each available service." 8

There are several other benefits of diversification that an MDP
provides for both the producer of professional services and the
consumers of those services. A diversified MDP can leverage its
187, at 333-34.
205. See Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 334 ("[M]ultidisciplinary
organization of legal and related services should confer substantial benefits on those
client groups whose complex and multi-faceted problems require the attention of
interdisciplinary specialist teams.").
206. Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 3 (quoting John Quinn,
Multidisciplinary Services: Organizational Innovation in Professional Services
Markets 50 (1978) (Working Paper No. 7), prepared for The Professional
Organizations Committee). For a thoughtful discussion of the evolving role of lawyer
as problem solver and how current ethical rules and professional liability standards do
not adequately take this role into account, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer
as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in
Lawyering, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 785 (1999). See also Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 811 (1999); Howard Lesnick,
Personal Fulfillment in the Changing World of Law Practice: Opportunities and
Obstacles, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 1011 (1999); Bennett G. Picker, ADR: New Challenges,
New Roles, and New Opportunities,72 Temp. L. Rev. 833 (1999).
207. See Ribstein, supra note 198, at 1711; Schneyer, Economist as Storyteller,supra
note 182, at 1792; Schneyer, Perilsof Professionalism,supra note 25, at 375-77.
208. See Ribstein, supra note 198, at 1725; see also Robert G. Evans, Professionals
and the Production Function: Can Competition Policy Improve Efficiency in the
Licensed Professions?, in Occupational Licensure and Regulation 225, 247-59 (Simon
Rottenberg ed., 1980); Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 960-62. In addition, an MDP
"may permit the realization of efficiencies through the allocation of task
responsibilities on the basis of comparative advantages in aptitude or experience
which may not be reflected in the existing statutory definitions of the professional
groups' licensed functions." Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 331.
MDPs "can mitigate the rigidities of the licensure system because they facilitate an
efficient allocation of functions and specific tasks within a framework of systematic
collaboration between legal and non-legal specialists." Id.
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reputation across a number of professional specialties, thereby
increasing the economic return derived from its investment in
establishing that reputation.2 9 The clients of the MDP benefit from
this diversification by receiving "the benefit of a single trusted
intermediary with an established reputation to handle all of the
client's needs. '210 In addition, a diversified MDP is in a better
position to survive economic downturns within a particular
professional specialty or sub-specialty because it does not look to a
single specialty as the sole source of its income. This, in turn,
enhances the continuity and value of the firm's reputation.21'
The global economy and the Internet communication system place

demands on professionals that can be met only in a teaming approach.
A law firm, even one with offices in a dozen U.S. cities, has difficulty
providing services to a company seeking to go abroad. Many
international MDPs are likely to provide superior services to such a
client on all of the facets of the decision to go abroad.2 12 A marketing
study may be performed, different strategies may be employed in
different regions of the world, and once a decision is made on the
course of action, the MDP would be able to deliver the legal services.
If the United States decides to isolate the practice of law from
multidisciplinary services, the world's MDPs will surpass the quality of
services delivered by professional service providers in the United
States.
The demand for multidisciplinary services exists -' and many clients
209. See Ribstein, supra note 198, at 1717.
210. Id
211. See id. at 1717-18.

212. See also William Hannay, Chair of ABA Section of International Law and
Practice, Remarks Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar.
11, 1999) (available at <http./wvww.abanet.orgtcpr/hannayl.html>) (asking the
Commission to take into account international implications of the debate on MDPs).
213. Letters and testimony provided to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice offered significant insight into such demand. There are many letters from
consumer groups citing demand by their members for integrated services. Also, many
small- and medium-sized business owners wrote to the ABA Commission about their
needs for multidisciplinary services. In the words of the representative from the Los
Angeles County Bar Association, "the question is not if there will be MDP's, but
rather, when, what theirstructure will be and how they will be regulated." Letter from

Samuel L. Bufford to Arthur Garwin, Staff Counsel to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(Apr.
1999)
(available
at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/lacba.html>); see also Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note
60, at 274-75 (discussing testimony before the ABA Commission by consumer groups,
business clients, and ABA entities supporting amendments to the Model Rules to
permit lawyers to share fees and partner with non-lawyers); Jones, Focusing the MDP
Debate, supra note 79, at 993-95 (describing the wide-ranging client demand for
integrated professional services provided by MDPs); Abraham C. Reich, Scott L.
Vernick & Joshua Horn, Screening Mechanisms: A Broader Application? Balancing
Economic Realities and Ethical Obligations, 72 Temp. L Rev. 1023, 1029 (1999).

Moreover, according to a survey conducted by random sample for the Financial
Times, more than one-half of large corporate buyers of legal services in the United
Kingdom and the United States (and 75 percent of U.S. financial organizations)
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will continue to seek such services elsewhere abroad and domestically
if the U.S. ethical rules do not allow lawyers to participate in
delivering them.214 In a growing number of cases, multinational
corporations are sending international legal business abroad because
they find that the European MDP delivers higher quality services.2 5
That trend will continue. If the American legal profession refuses to
accommodate this client demand, it is likely that one or more
European cities will emerge as centers of international legal
commerce for international transactions. 6
Domestically, the

situation may lead to more and more legal work being done by
lawyers in non-law firms.2 17 Those entities would simply tell clients
that the final stages of memorialization of legal documents require the
use of an outside lawyer. Thus, technically, the non-law entity would
not offer legal services and the outside lawyer would be a captive legal
provider for that non-law professional.
This form of civil
disobedience of the unauthorized-practice rules would significantly
undercut the U.S. regulatory system that has developed for protecting

the public in the delivery of legal services.
Further, legal rules and constructs increasingly rely on non-law
factors such as economics, quantitative analysis, and sociology. For
would be willing to use a professional firm that combined lawyers and accountants.
See Jean Eaglesham, Financial Groups Support Multi-Disciplinary FirmsProfessional and Legal Services Most Corporate Buyers Would Use Organisation
Combining Lawyers and Accountants, Financial Times (London), Sept. 6, 1999, at 8.
Two-thirds of those questioned, however, preferred the traditional method of
purchasing legal services. See id. In addition, according to a poll conducted by the
Marist Institute on Public Opinion for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Corporate Counsel Association, 70% of Americans support changing the
rules to allow MDPs. See 5 No. 12 Law Firm Partnership & Benefits Rep. 2 (Jan.
2000). For a discussion of these surveys and other matters relating to MDPs, see
Stratton, UnauthorizedPracticeSaber,supra note 9.
214. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, "Golden Age" is Over, supra note 29 (suggesting
that international practice will shift abroad if the United States does not
accommodate multidisciplinary services); Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 974; James
W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Vahles: A "Radical"
Proposalto Extend the Model Rules to ChangingForms of Legal Practice,84 Minn. L.
Rev. 1159, 1183-84 (2000); Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's
Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1274, 1298-99 ("[W]ith the growth of nonlawyer
firms, and the inability to control the unauthorized practice of law, the legal
profession is facing severe competition in the relevant marketplace."); Morello, supra
note 151, at 252 ("[I]t is pivotal that ethics guidelines prohibiting nonlawyer
ownership of legal service providers give way to provisions permitting and regulating
MDPs so that U.S. firms may best serve clients and compete with foreign firms.");
Wolfram, Multidisciplinary Partnerships,supra note 156, at 318 ("If MDPs make
business sense, multinational companies can be expected to move legal business to
those countries where MDPs flourish and make their services available.").
215. Cf. Wade Lambert, Lawyers and Clients, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at B8.
216. See Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's
Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1300-01.
217. Cf. Andrews, supra note 71, at 632-36 (discussing practice of law by accounting

firms).
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example, the IRS employs economists to determine whether
transactions have economic substance, and to develop safe harbor
rules for taxpayers in areas such as intercompany pricing under
Section 482.18 If the IRS employs economists to establish legal
norms, taxpayers must similarly employ non-law professionals to
inform their legal advice. Thus, a tax practice that properly informs
its clients on intercompany transfer pricing issues must include the
services of an economist to ensure that the client receives the highest
quality representation.
Those economists and other non-law
professionals who participate in the delivery of professional services
to the client understandably want to be able to obtain ownership
interests in the firm that employs them, and that fact, in turn, leads to
the formation of MDPs.
As an added benefit, non-lawyer partners of an MDP are likely to
bring to the firm more efficient management techniques, which should
result in lower operating costs and, hence, lower professional fees to
clients.219
Stated differently, non-lawyer partners who bring
professional management skills to the MDP will often be better than
lawyer partners at determining how the firm may deliver quality legal
and other professional services to the consumer in the most efficient
fashion and at the lowest possible cost.2 In addition, "centralized
managerial control over related service functions may also reduce the
risks of error and improve overall service quality."''
More importantly, if the organized bar accommodates
multidisciplinary services, organizations that perform legal services,
including law firms, are likely to have access to new sources of capital.
Like other business and professional organizations, legal service
organizations need new capital for expansion into new geographic and
product (i.e., practice) areas, technological innovation, employee
training, and various other business needs.' The effects will be to
better serve the needs of the clients of the legal service organization
and enhance competition in the legal services market.22' If the bar
21& See Steven Alan Bennett, Former General Counsel of Banc One Corporation,
Remarks Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Nov. 13, 1999)
(available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/bennett.html>) (arguing that "pure[ly] legal
problems no longer exist," that "lawyers are not the source of the necessary
expertise," and that "the size or character of many problems facing American
business demands a multidisciplinary approach"); Al Sterman, Written Comments to
the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 26. 1999) (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/sterman.html>) (arguing that "few... problems are solely
legal in nature").
219. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 627-28; Carson, supra note 23, at 602-03; cf
Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 331-32.
220. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 628.
221. Quinn, PreventiveRegulation, supra note 187, at 333.
222. See Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's
Recommendations,supra note 126, at 1301.
223. See id.
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permits passive investment in law firms and MDPs, as this Article
later proposes, 4 lawyers will have access to the equity markets, a
potentially major source of new capital.' Even if passive investment
in law firms and MDPs is not allowed, permitting lawyers to enter into
partnerships with non-lawyers will permit those non-lawyers to
contribute capital to the firm. 2 6 Moreover, it may be easier for an
MDP to borrow money in the debt markets and to borrow at a lower
rate of interest than would be available to a professional firm
operating separately in a small firm or solo practitioner structure.227
Finally, there is one other significant cost to society if the organized
bar does not accommodate multidisciplinary services. Low- and
middle-income individuals and small businesses, who are excellent
candidates for receiving multidisciplinary services, are likely not to
obtain professional legal and non-legal services in the ordering of
their personal and business matters.'
Family mediation clinics,229
small business consulting practices, environmental services firms, and
gerontological services firms will all be casualties of a failure to move
towards an acceptance of MDPs. The public deserves the opportunity
to receive services from such providers, and society is likely to be
worse off if these clients do not receive multidisciplinary services. 210
Moreover, in smaller towns, there may not be sufficient demand for
legal services to keep lawyers engaged full-time in a legal practice.
Accordingly, if lawyers are permitted to diversify and engage in other
professional activities in addition to law practice and to enter into
partnerships with other non-lawyer professionals, they can make
224. See infra Part IV.D.5.

225. See

Matheson

& Adams,

Reflecting

on

the ABA

Commission's

Recommendations,supra note 126, at 1301.
226. See, e.g., Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 282.
227. See id.
228. For examples of small business owners who would be advantaged by MDPs,
see Letter from Michael H. Homer to Arthur Garwin, Staff Counsel to the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 19, 1999) (available at

<http://www.abanet.orglcprl
horner.html>) (discussing his need for multidisciplinary services in a small business
context); Letter from Scott Hart to Arthur Garwin, Staff Counsel to the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 22, 1999) (available at

<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
hart.html>) (discussing the benefits of obtaining legal services from his accounting
firm in the business context); see also Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 274-75,
282.
229. See Letter from Mama S. Tucker to Sherwin Simmons, Chair of the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Apr. 7, 1999) (available at

<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/tucker3.html>)

(discussing in detail

the

potential

consumer demand for multidisciplinary services in the family law context).
230. See Al Sterman, Written Comments to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(Mar.
26,
1999)
(available
at
<http://www.abanet.orglcpr/sterman.html>) (noting that alternative ways of delivering
legal services will make consumers more comfortable with lawyers and thus more
likely to obtain legal services).
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sufficient total profits to stay in business. This means that the clients
in these smaller towns will have access to legal services that they
might not have had otherwise.21
In addition, many low- and middle-income clients might be best
served by allowing a major retailer such as Sears or H & R Block to
hire lawyers and offer legal services at a reasonable cost.m This
vehicle for delivery of legal services would probably work best for
routine legal problems. Thus, the current ethical rules prohibiting
lawyers from working in such organizations block a potentially
important source of legal services for the portion of the population
most under-served by lawyers.
III. THE ORGANIZED BAR'S RESPONSE TO THE MARKET DEMAND
FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY SERVICES

A. Formationof the ABA Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice
In August of 1998, then ABA President Phillip Anderson appointed
a commission to study the concept of multidisciplinary services and
what changes, if any, should be made to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The official directive to the commission was to
"study and report on the extent to which and the manner in which
are
professional service firms operated by accountants and others who
'' 3
not lawyers are seeking to provide legal services to the public. 1
The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (the "Commission")
was chaired by Sherwin Simmons, a prominent senior tax lawyer and a
former member of the ABA Board of Governors.? It was very fitting
to have such an experienced tax lawyer lead the study of MDPs
because he knew about the practice of accounting firms in the tax area
and had ready access to many lawyers who had left law firms for Big
Five accounting firms in recent years. The other members of the
Commission included two judges,2-5 two law professors,' one law
231. Cf.Gary A. Munneke, Dances With Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law
Firm Diversification, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 559, 568 (1992) [hereinafter Munneke,
Dances With Nonlawyers] (discussing this as an argument in favor of permitting
lawyers to engage in ancillary business activities).
232- Cf.Stephen K. Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code of
ProfessionalStandards,57 N.C. L. Rev. 559,580 (1979).
233. ABA News Release, supra note 13 (statement of then ABA President Philip
S. Anderson appointing Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice).

234. Sherwin Simmons is the chair of the tax section of the Florida law firm of
Steel, Hector & Davis, and a past chair of the ABA Section on Taxation. See
Members of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited July 22, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicommembers.html>.
235. Judge Paul Friedman is a federal district judge for the District of Columbia
and did play a role in the District of Columbia's consideration of non-lawyer partners
in D.C. Rules Rule 5.4. Judge Carl Bradford is a judge on the Maine Supreme Court.

See id
236. Professor Phoebe Haddon is a professor at Temple University School of Law.
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school dean,

7

one general counsel of a corporation,238 one general

counsel of an investment banking firm,239 and four partners of law
firms around the country.24
The Commission's members had
242
experience in drafting ethics rules,241 international legal practice,
corporate and business law,243 and legal services for the poor.2 " The
Reporter to the Commission was Mary Daly, a law professor at
Fordham University who is an expert in legal ethics in the corporate
and international areas. 245 The Commission also had two liaisons to
the ABA Board of Governors, 246 and two members of the ABA

Center

for

Professionalism

who

served as

counsel

to the

Commission.247
In addition to studying the extent to which non-lawyers seek to

deliver legal services to the public in the United States, the
Commission had four broader tasks.248 First, the Commission was
asked to study the experience that domestic and international clients
have had with the delivery of legal services from multidisciplinary
professional service firms. 249 Second, it was asked to examine federal
Professor Geoffrey Hazard is a professor at the University of Pennsylvania School of
Law and Director of the American Law Institute. See id.
237. Dean Burnele Powell is the dean of the law school at the University of
Missouri at Kansas City. See id.
238. At the time of the formation of the Commission, Roberta Katz was a senior
vice president, general counsel, and secretary of Netscape Communications Corp.
She is now the Chief Executive Officer at the Technology Network in Palo Alto,
California. See id.
239. At the time of the formation of the Commission, Robert Mundheim was a
senior executive vice president and the general counsel of Solomon Smith Barney
Holdings, Inc. He is currently a partner at Shearman & Sterling in New York City.
See id.
240. Carolyn Lamm is a partner at White & Case (Washington, D.C.) and a
member of the ABA House of Delegates. Steven Nelson is a partner at Dorsey &
Whitney (Minneapolis, Minnesota). Michael Traynor is a member of the law firm of
Cooley Godward (San Francisco, California). Herbert Wander is a partner at Katten,
Muchen & Zavis (Chicago). See id.
241. Professor Hazard was the Reporter for the Model Rules and is currently a
member of the ABA Commission on Ethics 2000. See id.
242. Steven Nelson is a past chair of the ABA Section of International Law and
Practice. See id.
243. Herbert Wander is a past chair of the ABA Section of Business Law. See id.
244. Judge Paul Friedman is a past chair of the ABA Commission on
Homelessness and Poverty. See id.
245. Professor Mary Daly is also a director of the Fordham Law School's Stein
Institute of Law & Ethics. See id.
246. Joanne Garvey is a partner at Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe (San
Francisco, California) and Seth Rosner is Of Counsel to Jacobs, Persinger & Parker
(New York, New York).
247. Arthur Garwin was the designated staff counsel to the Commission and Carol
Weiss also assisted with the work of the Commission.
248. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited July 22, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html>.
249. See id. Implicit in this question is the factual assumption that domestic clients
may be receiving legal services from non-law firm entities in violation of the current
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and state laws that may permit multidisciplinary professional service
firms to deliver legal services, and to consider whether changes should
be made to these legal frameworks.' 0 Third, the Commission was
asked to study the effect of the delivery of legal services by non-law
professionals on the attorney-client privilege and on conflicts of
interest. 51 Finally, the Commission was asked to study the current
ethics rules and determine whether they need to be modified to
protect the public. 2
B. ABA Commission's Activities and Recommendations
The Commission used an extremely open and deliberative process
for studying multidisciplinary services. The Commission established a
web site and posted on that web site its own memoranda of opinions
and questions for comment, all submissions from third parties, and the
submissions and presentations in the various hearings held over a
period of a year and a half.23 The web site made a wealth of
information about the multidisciplinary services issue available to
anyone with web access, and invited the public to submit comments to
the Commission. 2
From its formation, the Commission had the almost impossible task
of presenting a recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates
within one calendar year. It held one set of hearings in November of
1998,1 and subsequently issued a report entitled, Background Paper
on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments (the
"Background Paper")- 6 The Background Paper provided detailed
background information about multidisciplinary services outside of
the United States, as well as information about the efforts of
accounting firms and other service providers to form partnerships with

unauthorized-practice-of-law rules, a factual assumption that is probably correct.

250. See id For example, federal and state tax regulatory regimes preempt certain
state bar regulation concerning the delivery of legal services in the tax area. See supra
Part I.A.4.
251. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 248. During the

Commission's study of multidisciplinary services, this inquiry was reformulated and
broadened in an effort to protect the core values of the legal profession. For a
discussion of the effect of multidisciplinary practice on the core values of the legal
profession, see infra Part IV.D.
252. See Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice,supra note 248.

253. See id..
254. The ABA and the members of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
should be commended for using technology so effectively to keep everyone

completely informed as to their deliberations. This experience should serve as a
model for future ABA work and for deliberative processes generally.
255. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Schedule for November
Hearings (visited July 22,2000) <http//%vwv.abanet.org/cpr/multicomsched.html>.
256. See ABA Commission, BackgroundPaper,supra note 14.
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lawyers. 7 It also examined the current ethics rules and how they
limited the development of multidisciplinary services.2 8
In January of 1999, the Commission limited its inquiry to the
following four questions: (1) the benefit and harm of allowing lawyers
to partner and share fees with non-lawyers; (2) the effect of such
partnering or fee-sharing on professional independence;259 (3) the
difference between the professional rules governing lawyers and
accountants; and (4) if lawyers were permitted to deliver legal services
as employees or partners of non-law firms, what changes should be
made to (i) the confidentiality rules,2" (ii) the conflicts-of-interest
principle of imputed disqualification,26' (iii) the ethics rules imposing
responsibility upon partners or supervisory lawyers, 26 2 (iv) the ethics
264
rules on unauthorized practice,263 (v) the ethics rules on advertising,
(vi) the extent of disciplinary reach of the state bars upon such nonlaw firms,265 and (vii) any other areas.

From the list of questions asked, it was clear that the Commission
was concerned with identifying all benefits and harms that would
result from multidisciplinary practice, and that it focused on which
rules of the profession would need to be amended to minimize or
eliminate the potential harms to the public. This inquiry was to center
on the extent to which professional regulation of accountants and
lawyers differed, and possibly the extent to which such regulation
should be harmonized. Overall, however, the Commission seemed
very receptive to the concept that multidisciplinary practice should be
accommodated in some fashion.
Subsequently, the ABA Commission held two hearings, one in Los
Angeles in February of 1999, and the other in Washington, D.C., in
March of 1999.26
The Commission also received significant
commentary from the general public about multidisciplinary practice.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See Model Rules Rule 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer).

260. See id. Rules 1.6 (confidentiality of information), 3.3 (candor toward the
tribunal).
261. See id. Rule 1.10 (imputed disqualification).

262. See id. Rules 5.1 (responsibilities of partner or supervisory lawyers), 5.2
(responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer), 5.3 (responsibilities regarding nonlawyer
assistants).
263. See id. Rule 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law).
264. See id. Rule 7.1-.5 (advertising and solicitation rules).

265. See id. Rules 8.5(a) (disciplinary authority), 8.5(b) (choice of law for multijurisdictional practice of law).

266. The proceedings of both of these hearings were placed on the Commission's
web site. One of the authors made a presentation at the Los Angeles meeting in
February and submitted a written paper responding to the Commission's questions.
See Professor John S. Dzienkowski, University of Texas School of Law, Statement
Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter
Statement
of
Dzienkowski]
(available
at

<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/dzienkowskil.html>).
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The hearings were balanced with speakers who were for and against
multidisciplinary practices, as well as speakers who simply presented
their observations. The results of this deliberative process produced a
formal Commission document, Hypotheticals and Models.'
The Hypotheticals and Models redirected the Commission's inquiry
away from the general questions contained in the Background Paper
to the more specific question of how the American legal profession
should accommodate the need for multidisciplinary services. The
Commission most likely had decided that some form of
multidisciplinary services should be accommodated; now, it was
turning to determining how to modify the current system for
regulating lawyers.3
The Hypotheticals and Models focused on how Model Rule 5.4
should be amended, and if amended, whether the imputation rules
should apply to the entire professional services firm, or just the
lawyers in a department. It proceeded to offer five alternative
models. The first model-the "cooperation" model-retained the
status quo and allowed cooperation between lawyers and non-lawyers
in offering different professional services, but did not allow nonlawyer ownership in a law firm or the sharing of legal fees between
lawyers and non-lawyers. The second model-the "command and
control" model-adopted the District of Columbia's version of Model
Rule 5.4. Lawyers could allow non-lawyers to become owners in a law
firm-the sole purpose of which is to offer legal services to clientsbut lawyers had to ensure that the non-lawyers followed the rules of
ethics.

9

The third model-the "ancillary business" model-relied

upon Model Rule 5.7 to permit lawyers to offer clients ancillary
business services. Under this model, both lawyers and non-lawyers
could own the non-law ancillary business, but the lawyers could not
share legal fees with the non-lawyers or allow the non-lawyers to be
owners in the law firm. The fourth model-the "contract" modelwould allow a contractual affiliation between a law firm and a non-law
entity. The contours of such a relationship were left undefined by the
ABA Commission.27
Perhaps they could advertise together, or
perhaps they would be able to refer clients to each other or share
certain overhead. The fifth and final model-the "fully integrated"
model-would allow lawyers and non-lawyers to practice in a single
professional services entity. Lawyers would provide legal services to
267. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Hypotheticals and
Models [hereinafter ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and Models] (available at

<http:/Iwww.abanet.orglcpr/multicomhypos.html>).
268. Cf id. Introduction ("Both the ABA Taxation Section and the ABA General

Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section have formally endorsed the concept of
multidisciplinary practices.").
269. See D.C. Rules Rule 5.4.
270. An important issue that would need to be addressed in such an affiliation is
whether lawyers and non-lawyers could share fees with each other.
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some, but not all, clients of the entity, and non-legal services might or
might not be part of the legal services engagement.
The Commission's issuance of the Hypotheticals and Models
signaled that the Commission was seriously considering adopting
some framework for allowing lawyers and non-lawyers to practice
together. In addition to the five models described above, the
document also presented a number of hypotheticals-involving
conflicts and confidentiality-and asked for public comment on how
they should be resolved by the Commission.2 71 The Commission
received comments from a variety of sources and posted them on its
web site as a form of public distribution.
The ABA Commission issued its Final Report on June 8, 1999, as
part of a submission to the ABA House of Delegates for the August
1999 meeting. 72 The Commission recommended that the ABA
House of Delegates amend the Model Rules to permit lawyers to offer
legal services through an MDP. 73 The Report ultimately suggested

that the ABA not constrain the type of entity that lawyers could use in

offering multidisciplinary services. 274 In other words, lawyers could

offer legal services through any of the five models, even in the form of
a fully integrated MDP. The Commission acknowledged, however,
that the delivery of legal services through an MDP could threaten the
core values of the legal profession.275 Thus, if the Commission's
recommendations were adopted, MDPs would be required to follow
the same rules that law firms followed and would have to certify their
compliance with that requirement to the state bar.276 MDPs
controlled by non-lawyers would be subject to an annual state bar
audit to determine whether the certification was in fact true.277
Failure to comply with the certification could result in the firm's
disbarment from MDP status.2 78 Moreover, non-lawyer controlled
MDPs would have to pay the cost of the annual state bar audit. 279 In
addition, the Report recommended that the definition of an MDP be
expanded to include any entity that employs lawyers for providing
legal services. 2 Thus, under the Commission's recommendations, in
271. ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 267.
272. The 1999 Final Report contained a Recommendation to the House of
Delegates, a General Information document, a Report, Appendix A with Possible
Illustrations on Proposed Changes to the Model Rules, Appendix B with the names of
witnesses who appeared or submitted information to the Commission, and Appendix
C, the Reporter's Background Notes to the Report. See ABA Commission, 1999 Final
Report, supra note 8.

273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.

276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.

280. See id.
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exchange for permission to deliver legal services through an MDP, all
entities hiring lawyers for the performance of quasi-legal services
would have to agree to be bound by the lawyer's rules of conduct and
to be subject to a state bar audit.38
In many ways, the ABA Commission's Report was very progressive
in its approach to multidisciplinary services. It recognized the public
demand for such services and the desire within various professions to
offer such integrated services. It embraced the need for change in
order to meet these market forces by allowing lawyers to practice in
various types of multidisciplinary firms. As a political compromise
with those opposing MDPs, however, the Commission proposed the
creation of a special regulatory scheme that would apply only to
MDPs controlled by non-lawyers (i.e., the annual certification and
state bar audit requirements for which the non-lawyer controlled
MDPs would have to bear the cost). Thus, under this proposal, lawyer
controlled MDPs would have had both a less regulated atmosphere in
which to operate and a less costly form of doing business than would
non-lawyer controlled MDPs. In other words, the Commission's
proposal would have provided lawyer controlled MDPs with an
unwarranted competitive advantage, thus undermining consumer
welfare by interfering with the market for professional services.'
The Commission should be commended for recognizing the
widespread client demand for integrated professional services and the
potential efficiencies that it may produce. The Commission's Report
meticulously documented the international development of MDPs
and the reasons why the U.S. legal system should implement rules that
foster a market-based system of regulating MDPs. Although that is
the reasoning behind the Commission's proposals, the Commission's
recommendations unfortunately lapsed back into a regulatory
structure that discriminated between lawyer controlled MDPs and
non-lawyer controlled MDPs. - Moreover, the Report attempted to

281. See Burnele V. Powell, Flightfrom the Center:Is It Just or Just About Money?,
84 Minn. L. Rev. 1439, 1439-49 (2000) (examining whether the Commission's
positions have achieved the proper balance between accommodating multidisciplinary
practice and regulating the delivery of professional services so as to protect client and

judicial processes).

282. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, ABA's Definition of Practice
Flawed,Nat'l LJ., July 26, 1999, at A27 (arguing that selective application of the audit
requirement would discourage formation of non-lawyer controlled MDPs).
283. The Commission recommended that if non-lawyers control an MDP, it must
subject itself to a state bar audit. See ABA Commission, 1999 Final Report,supra note
8. Imposing an audit requirement on non-lawyer controlled MDPs and not on lawyer
controlled MDPs or law firms in general obviously discourages the formation of nonlawyer controlled MDPs. The Commission cited no evidence that non-lawyer
controlled MDPs are more likely to violate the ethical rules or to harm the public.
There is little justification for imposing an audit requirement solely on non-lawyer
controlled MDPs. See infra Part IV.E.
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bring into the system of bar regulation an entire group of professional
services that previously have not been treated as the practice of law.28
Proponents of MDPs applauded the Report for its progressive
attitude towards integrating legal and non-legal services. 285 They
correctly criticized, however, the Commission's attempt to expand the
definition of the practice of law-thus, giving lawyers and the state bars
a greater monopoly power over non-law entities currently employing
lawyers for management consulting, lobbying efforts, and perhaps
even tax services. Opponents of MDPs viewed the Report as a major
step towards losing control over the delivery of legal services to the
Big Five accounting firms. 6 The issuance of the Report brought the
284. In a little-noticed but controversial move, the Commission redefined the
practice of law for MDPs. An MDP, for purposes of its regulation, constituted any
entity "that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its
purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that
holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services." ABA
Commission, 1999 FinalReport, supra note 8. The Commission then redefined the
practice of law to include "[pireparing or expressing legal opinions [and] [a]ppearing
or acting as [a lawyer] in any tribunal," and preparing documents of any kind
"containing legal argument or interpretation of [the] law, for filing in any...
administrative agency or other tribunal." Id. Under this definition, every lobbying
firm with licensed lawyers would be an MDP, and every Big Five accounting firm with
licensed lawyers that does tax, ERISA, lobbying, and management consulting would
be an MDP even though those entities today arguably are not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law under the traditional definition of that term. Lobbying
traditionally has been excluded from the practice of law. Tax and ERISA practice is
authorized under federal and state statutes and regulatory schemes and thus
accounting firms can provide such services (including arguing cases before the Tax
Court) without subjecting the entire firm to state bar regulation. Thus, any attempt to
expand bar regulation over these areas may, in many instances, be preempted by
other federal or state law.
Furthermore, this proposal could be viewed as a guild-motivated attempt to
dramatically expand the regulatory reach of the ABA and state bars. The effect of
this proposal could force accounting firms with licensed lawyers to subject themselves
to regulation as MDPs, or give up their tax opinion, consulting, and IRS
representation practices. This result would have a very significant anti-competitive
effect and would be injurious to the public who has relied on non-lawyer entities for
these services. The increased regulation proposed by the Commission was being done
without empirical proof that these lobbying and accounting firms impose harms on
the public not found in law firms. If this proposal were adopted by the ABA and
state bars, many, if not all, lawyers in such entities could (and many probably would)
give up their licenses and thus forgo state regulation, but that should not be necessary.
The Commission's redefinition of the practice of law to include such services was
conceptually troubling and not in the public interest.
285. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, MultidisciplinaryPractice:An Idea Whose Times
Has
Come
(visited
June
17,
2000)
<http://www.fedsoc.org/multidisciplinaryprofv3i2.html> (commenting on the progressive nature of the
1999 ABA Report).
286. The legal profession's fear of competition from the accounting firms is not
hard to understand: "At a minimum, they can boast of twelve competitive advantages
over even the largest of law firms: an institutional client base, cross-marketing
opportunities, size, leverage, availability of capital, brand name recognition,
institutional advertising, sophisticated marketing, cutting edge technology, substantial
research and development, and international capabilities." Daly, Choosing Wisely,
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issue of MDPs to the forefront of debates over the future of the legal
profession.
C. The Opponents' Case Against MDPs and the Commission's Report
The Commission's 1999 Report to the ABA House of Delegates
caught the state bar constituencies by surprise. They had not
expected so much change in so little time from a small commission
comprised of many traditional ABA-type lawyers. The argument for
change had come from within and it prompted many lawyers to
mobilize an attack on the ABA Commission's Report.
A principal spokesperson for the opposition to MDPs was
Lawrence Fox, a former chair of the ABA Section of Litigation. Mr.
Fox had been criticizing MDPs from the inception of the
Commission's mandate, but no one seemed to be listening. He
delivered impassioned speeches to the Commission and to various bar
groups around the country in an effort to fight what he viewed as the
further commercialization of the practice of law. He delivered the "I
had a Nightmare" speech to the ABA House of Delegates in which he
envisioned a world where lawyers answered to non-lawyers, where
professionalism had given way to the bottom line, where pro bono
services and client loyalty were disbanded, and where law had become
a product sold by multinational accounting firms and corporations.'
Opponents of MDPs present several arguments why the organized
bar should reject any efforts to accommodate partnering and feesharing between lawyers and non-lawyers. These arguments can be
summarized into three broad categories. First, there is no demand for
multidisciplinary services; the perceived demand is completely
manufactured by the Big Five accounting firms. Second, if lawyers are
allowed to practice with non-lawyers, the core values of the legal
profession will be destroyed. Finally, law is a profession and not a
business and it must remain within the sole control of lawyers so as to
guarantee the profession's commitment to pro bono work, to
improvement of the legal system, and to the public in general.
The opponents are convinced that the demand for integrated
professional services is largely manufactured by the excellent
marketing efforts of the Big Five accounting firms.2 Their view is
supra note 60, at 233.

Professor Daly outlines the Big Five accounting firm's

strategies for expanding their presence in the legal marketplace. See id. at 234-36.
287. See Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Proceedings on the

Multidisciplinary Practice Debate [hereinafter Unedited Transcript of ABA House of
Delegates Proceedings] (available at <http'//wvw.abanet.org/cpr/mdphouse.html>).

For a description by one commentator of the experience of waking up during Larry
Fox's nightmare, see Russell G. Pearce, A CautionaryTale from the Multidisciplinary
PracticeDebate: How the TraditionalistsLost Professionalism,72 Temp. L Rev. 985

(1999).
288. See Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They
Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84
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that the general public is largely satisfied with the current modes of

delivery of legal services, and cherishes the fact that lawyers remain in
control of the practice of law.

9

Opponents of MDPs claim that, to

the extent that some clients need integrated services, the cooperative
Minn. L. Rev. 1097, 1107-08 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Ruminations on MDPs];see also
New York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report, supra note 22, at 384
(stating that evidence of demand for integration of legal services with other
professional services is "equivocal at best"). For example, Steven C. Krane, a partner
at Proskauer Rose LLP and a member of the Executive Committee of the New York
State Bar Association, opined in testimony before the ABA Commission:
Why are we looking at this issue at all? Why has MDP suddenly been thrust
upon the legal profession as an issue with which it must grapple? Is there
any validity to the mantra of providing clients with the opportunity for "onestop shopping," to which we repeatedly hear MDP proponents refer as the
principal justification for permitting lawyers to form professional
partnerships with nonlawyers.
The mantra, which assumes certain
efficiencies arising out of integration of efforts on behalf of clients, is
incanted chiefly by accounting firms and traditionally anti-lawyer
organizations. It is incanted by a self-selected sampling of organizations
which purport to represent the interests of consumers of legal services and
insist that there is client demand for MDPs. At bottom, the reason the legal
profession feels itself pressed to deal with the MDP issue at all is because the
issue is being forced upon the profession mainly by nonlawyers who would
like to add legal services as an additional profit center for their
organizations, and by lawyers who see MDP as a means of enhancing their
bottom line.
Steven C. Krane, Written Testimony to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Aug. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Written Testimony of Krane] (available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/krane.html>).
289. See Carl Bevernage, Paris Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal
Profession: Discussion PaperPresented by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies
of the European Community, 18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 89, 96-97 (1999). The ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice did, however, note the difficulty in
determining, through empirical research, the level of client demand for
multidisciplinary services:
In response to the House of Delegate's [sic] August 1999 Resolution, the
Commission also sought the assistance of the American Bar Foundation
(ABF). The ABF asked two top economists about the "utility of conducting
market research about the demand" and was advised that "questions about
services in the abstract would not be effective in telling what people might
actually do," and "that there is only one way to find out if there is a demand,
and that is to see if there turns out to be a market." Thus, making the
services available would not only determine demand, but also, the public's
perception, as evidenced by that demand, of the maintenance of
independence and loyalty. The Commission believes that the testimony it
heard and the written comments it received demonstrate some public
support for allowing MDPs, which would translate into demand if the
services were available.
ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report, supra note 19 (footnote omitted). In a
footnote to this excerpt, the ABA Commission further noted: "The ABF's response
also made the telling historical observation that there was a lack of demand for
business litigation (except defense work and the collection of debts) and business
consulting until these services became available, at which time a dramatic increase in
demand occurred." Id. at n.18 (citing Letter from Bryant G. Garth, Director,
American Bar Foundation, to Arthur Garwin, Staff Counsel to the ABA Commission
(Mar. 28, 2000)).
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model fulfills this need. Moreover, the opponents of MDPs point out
that many clients develop the non-law expertise in-house with non-law
professionals.
As discussed above, however, there is ample evidence that the
demand for multidisciplinary services is coming from clients of all
types, including low- and middle-income clients.2" It seems clear that
a change in the bar's ethical rules to facilitate lawyer participation in
MDPs will benefit clients at all income levels by providing them with
the advantages of MDPs discussed above.29
Further, opponents of MDPs often focus on the allegedly
detrimental effect that multidisciplinary practice will have on the core
values of the profession. The ABA Commission initially identified
the three core values as (1) independence of judgment, (2)
confidentiality, and (3) loyalty. 292 It subsequently identified another
core value, (4) competence, when opponents began to question the
effect of MDPs on competence in legal services. 3
The opponents of MDPs argue that lawyers' participation in
multidisciplinary practice raises serious concerns about each of the
core ethical values of the legal profession.? They argue that non290. See supra text accompanying notes 228-32.
291. See supra Part H.
292- See ABA Commission, Background Paper,supra note 14.
293. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, UpdatedBackgroundand
InformationalReport and Request for Comments (posted Dec. 15, 1999) [hereinafter
ABA
Commission,
Updated
Background
Paper]
(available
at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>).
294. See Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 757-64; see also Andrews,
supra note 71, at 605-16; Bevemage, supra note 289, at 96-98. As discussed later in
this Article, see infra text accompanying note 335, in August of 1999, the ABA House
of Delegates directed the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to conduct
further study to determine whether allowing MDPs would compromise lawyer
independence and the legal profession's tradition of client loyalty. In response, the
ABA Commission stated the following in its report issued in 2000:
In response to the Resolution [the ABA House of Delegates' August 1999
Resolution], the Commission endeavored to obtain expert assistance
regarding the nature, organization, and implementation of such a study. The
responses it received expressed significant reservations about the study's
feasibility. The Commission consulted with The Institute for Social
Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan, the nation's longest-standing
laboratory for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences. The ISR
advised the Commission that "public interest", "independence", "loyalty",
or "conflict of interest" were, as a practical matter, incapable of definition in
a manner that was independent of perception. It suggested, but was not
certain, that it might be possible to frame an inquiry to determine client
perceptions about how business and ethical considerations currently affect
the resolution of conflicts of interest in law firms and how those
considerations would likely affect the conflicts' resolution if lawyers were
permitted to deliver legal services in a multidisciplinary practice setting. The
value of such an inquiry into "client perceptions" is not at all clear.
Furthermore, the Commission's current Recommendation requires that the
lawyers in an MDP must have the control and authority necessary to assure
lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services. Accordingly, the
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independent professional judgment.2 9 Lawyers affiliated with nonlaw businesses who provide legal services to a client will not be able to
exercise independent judgment.296 For example, if an MDP is
providing legal and real estate services to the same client, the profit
that its real estate division makes from a transaction may affect the
legal advice given to the client on whether to enter into the

transaction.
The problem may be further accentuated if the
professional services firm is owned solely or primarily by the nonlawyers and the lawyer is only an employee. 297 Moreover, the
opponents of MDPs point to the failure of the accounting profession
to observe their already existing independence obligations under SEC
rules as a prediction of the future in a professional world dominated
by accountant-controlled MDPs.298

weighing of such considerations in an MDP, would, by definition, be the
same as in a law firm.
ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report, supra note 19.
295. See, e.g., Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 765-67; Carson, supra
note 23, at 611-12; Levinson, Independent Law Firms, supra note 24, at 242-43;
Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's Recommendations, supra
note 126, at 1302-04; Morello, supra note 151, at 245; New York State Bar Association
Special Committee, Report, supra note 22, at 322-24; Quinn, Preventive Regulation,
supra note 187, at 339-40; Terry, MDP Primer, supra note 113, at 891-92; see also
David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 839, 855 (1999) (noting
that incentives in MDP and in-house lawyering will make it more difficult to maintain
lawyer independence).
296. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 605-11; Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra
note 25, at 765-67.
297. As noted by one leading commentator, Daniel Fischel, this independence
argument is often made without opponents of MDPs providing any definition of what
"independence" means in this context or why it should matter. See Fischel, MDPs,
supra note 33, at 954-56.
298. See Fox, Ruminations on MDPs, supra note 288, at 1100-01. The SEC alleged
that PricewaterhouseCoopers' partners and staffers had engaged in widespread
violations of the SEC independence rules that prohibit investment in audit clients.
There were over 8,000 violations, 45% of which were committed by auditing partners.
See Elizabeth MacDonald & Michael Schroeder, Report by SEC Says Pricewaterhouse
Violated Rules on Conflicts of Interest, Wall St. J., Jan 7, 2000, at A3.
PricewaterhouseCoopers responded to these allegations in a somewhat defensive
manner, although a firm representative did say that the firm was making "sweeping
changes to our processes." See id. (quoting firm representatives). The SEC
recommended that 52 corporations replace PricewaterhouseCoopers with another
auditing firm. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Accountant Faces Salvo from SEC, Wall St.
J., Feb. 28, 2000, at A3. Various commentators predicted that this incident was likely
to lead to further developments by the SEC and accounting industry groups in this
area. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Top Accounting Industry Group Sets Conflictof-Interest Compliance Rules, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 2000, at B2. In June of 2000, the
SEC proposed new rules regarding when an auditor is regarded as independent for
purposes of the SEC rules requiring that public companies' financial statements be
audited by an independent auditor. With regard to financial relationships, this
proposal would narrow the categories of people within an auditing firm whose
investments in or employment relationships with the audited company trigger
independence concerns. The proposed rule would focus on investments by those
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This argument is without any significant evidentiary basis. As
recommended later in this Article, lawyers working in MDPs should

be bound by the same ethical rules that apply to other lawyers,
including the duty to exercise independent judgment on behalf of
clients. 299 There is no evidence that lawyers working in MDPs will be
any less likely to fulfill their ethical duties than lawyers working in
traditional law firms.3°° Even under the current ethical rules, many
lawyers work in organizations under the command and control of non-

lawyers, such as corporations, government entities, trade associations
and other not-for-profit organizations. There is no evidence that
these lawyers fail to exercise independent judgment to any greater
extent than lawyers working in law firms."' The substantial financial
pressures placed on lawyer independence are a serious concern in
traditional law firms as well as organizations controlled by nonlawyers. Lawyers in law firms are under strong pressure to obtain and
retain clients and to bill hours, and the exercise of independent
judgment may sometimes anger the client and jeopardize the law firm
lawyer's source of income.
Thus, the concern about lawyer
independence, although a justifiable concern, is not a concern that
should be directed solely at lawyers practicing law in MDPs, and is not
a valid basis for prohibiting lawyers from partnering with non-

lawyers. 3 2

people in the auditing firm involved in the audit or in a position to influence the audit,
or members of their immediate family. See Rachel Witmer, SEC Proposes to Update
Rules Governing Auditor Independence, BNA Sec. Reg. & L Rep., July 3, 2000, at
890-91. Other aspects of this SEC proposal are discussed later in this Article. See
infra note 474.
299. See infra Part IV.D.
300. Organizations made up entirely of lawyer-owners may be more likely to
provide an institutional support system and environment to encourage its lawyeremployees to follow the ethical rules of the legal profession than would organizations
in which both lawyers and non-lawyers are owners. See Jones & Manning, supra note
214, at 1203-04. Nevertheless, this issue can be addressed without prohibiting lawyers
from practicing law in MDPs. See id.
301. See Jones, Focusing tire MDP Debate, supra note 79, at 997; Schneyer,
Economist as Storyteller,supra note 182, at 1791 ("[T]he legal profession has learned
to live with many outside influences that could affect a lawyer's judgment, and it is
hard to see why the influence of non-lawyer owners would be different in kind.").
302. As stated by one commentator.
There is no evidence that an ownership interest by nonlawyers in a law firm
will lead to unethical practices. Attorneys are required to exercise
independent judgment on behalf of clients, and complete fidelity is owed to
the client irrespective of how or by whom the attorney is compensated.
There is no necessary relationship between attorney independence in serving
clients and financial arrangements for the payment of services or the manner
in which payments are subsequently divided.... The duty of fidelity to
individual clients is a valid and important principle, but it can be retained
without regard to who shares the profits generated by a law practice.
Huber, supra note 232, at 580 (footnotes omitted). But see Quinn, Preventive
Regulation, supra note 187, at 340 ("It is at least plausible that non-lawyer
entrepreneurs will be more likely than their lawyer counterparts to exploit consumer
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Opponents of multidisciplinary services also argue that nonlawyers, such as accountants, have a different concept of loyalty to
clients than lawyers do.3 3 These non-legal professions view loyalty as
an individual matter and as entirely subjective, whereas the legal
profession views loyalty as a firm-wide matter and one to be judged
objectively. 3 4 Thus, these opponents argue that allowing non-lawyer
professionals to own interests in an entity that practices law will
compromise the legal profession's notions of loyalty.
Similarly, opponents of multidisciplinary services argue that nonlawyers do not have the same incentive to protect confidential
information of a client, particularly if that information can be used for
many other clients.305 They argue that if non-lawyers enter the legal
services market, they will lobby to change the confidentiality and
conflicts-of-interest rules so that they can represent more clients. In
the alternative, they will accept clients only if the clients contractually
waive their rights to demand confidentiality or loyalty. Thus, the
infusion of non-lawyer owned entities who deliver legal services will
degrade the high standards of confidentiality and loyalty that are now
maintained in the legal profession but are not currently maintained by
accounting professionals. Moreover, opponents of MDPs argue that
allowing lawyers, (whose communications with clients are covered by
the attorney-client evidentiary privilege) to partner with other
professionals (whose communications are either not covered by any
privilege or covered by a narrower privilege) will confuse clients'
understanding of whether their communications with personnel of the
MDP are privileged. This effect might lead to disadvantageous
waivers of the attorney-client privilege." 6

ignorance because they have not been trained to resolve conflicts between the
interests of their clients and their own interests in an altruistic way.").
303. See, e.g., Fox, Ruminations on MDPs, supra note 288, at 1102-03; see also
Bower, Multidisciplinary Practices, supra note 122, at 164; Eleanor W. Myers,
ExaminingIndependence and Loyalty, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 857, 859-61 (1999).
304. See, e.g., Fox, Ruminations on MDPs, supra note 288, at 1102-03.
305. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 71, at 614-16; David Kairys, Some Concerns
About Context and Concentration of Power, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 1019, 1019-20 (1999).
Of course, opponents of the attorney confidentiality rules might view this as an
argument in favor of MDPs. For a provocative article that takes the view that
confidentiality rules primarily benefit lawyers and not clients or society in general, see
Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality,65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
306. See, e.g., Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's
Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1307-08; see also Bower, Multidisciplinary
Practices,supra note 122, at 163-64. This problem is exacerbated by the relatively
new tax practitioner-client privilege in 26 U.S.C. § 7525, enacted as part of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 3411, 112 Stat. 685. The tax practitioner-client privilege is considerably
narrower than the attorney-client privilege and its contours will not be fully defined
until courts have had the opportunity to interpret and apply the new privilege. See
supra note 144.

2000]

MDPs AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

As discussed later in this Article, however, the concerns about
attorney loyalty and confidentiality can be dealt with through careful
regulation of MDPs, including enforcement of existing ethical rules
concerning attorney supervisory responsibility for the conduct of nonlawyer employees.3' 7 It is therefore not a valid justification for
prohibiting lawyers from practicing law in MDPs.
Further, opponents of MDPs argue that as attorneys become
actively involved in other business activities, the quality of their legal
work declines.30 Thus, they argue that the movement toward lawyer
participation in MDPs will undermine the core value of
competence. 3
To the extent that this is a problem, however, it is a problem with
existing law firms as well. Lawyers are under pressure to bring in
clients, bill hours, and take care of the administrative matters of the
practice. There are not enough hours in the day to do all of these
things; thus, without additional staffing, work will suffer.
Opponents of MDPs express concern that MDPs will steer law
clients to non-lawyer professionals within the MDP for non-legal
problems, even if a more qualified non-lawyer professional could be
found outside the MDP. 310 The implication is that the MDP will
assign unqualified professionals to do the job in order to keep all of
the work (including the legal work) within the MDP. A related
concern is that the MDP will attempt to persuade the client to
purchase non-legal professional services that are unnecessary.3
MDPs likely would not, however, pursue such a client-losing
strategy. If the MDP assigns unqualified professionals to do the work
or encourages the client to purchase unnecessary non-legal
professional services, the result will be a lower quality, higher cost
product for the client."' In the long run, such conduct by the MDP
would result in a major loss of client business. In fact, the MDP, like
other business firms, has a strong economic interest in carefully
monitoring the work of its employees in order to build and preserve
its reputation in the marketplace, an important intangible business
would be a significant
asset.3 n Thus, the discipline of the 3marketplace
14
restraining force on such behavior.
307. See infra Part IV.D.1.

308. See Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 767-68; Levinson,
Independent Law Firms, supra note 24, at 242; Morello, supra note 151, at 246.

309. See Written Remarks of Wolfman, supra note 28.
310. See, eg., Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 342-44; Morello,
supra note 151, at 242; Schneyer, Economist as Storyteller, supra note 182, at 1792
n.78; Schneyer, Perils of Professionalism, supra note 25, at 375-77; Wolfram,
Multidisciplinary Partnerships, supra note 156, at 347-48; cf. Fox, Preserving
ProfessionalIndependence,supra note 126, at 977.

311. See eg., Quinn, PreventiveRegulation, supra note 187,342-44.
312. See Fischel, MDPs,supra note 33, at 960-62, 973.
313. See id. Dean Fischel also argues that MDPs, which often are large in size,
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Opponents of MDPs further argue that the practice of law is a

unique profession and the organized bar should resist efforts to
commercialize it. This argument maintains that non-lawyers, unlike
lawyers, are driven solely by a profit-maximization objective and
therefore will further push the legal profession in the direction of
merely being another business activity (instead of a profession).315 A
slight variation transforms this "lawyers are a profession" argument
into an argument that "lawyers are special." During the ABA House

of Delegates debate in August of 1999, Jack Dunbar, a delegate from
Mississippi, gave a speech based on the notion that lawyers are special
in some way.316 The argument reflects the observation that lawyers
are not like accountants, MBAs, or investment bankers. Attorneys
are officers of the court; they hold in trust the fabric of society.

Therefore, this unique role of lawyers in our society is inconsistent
with deal-making, because a non-lawyer controlled entity that must
respond to the demands of clients is less likely to care about the needs
of society.
This argument suffers from several flaws. Most law firms, whether
large or small, are run like a business-there is nothing unique about
MDPs in this regard.317 There is simply no reason to assume that
lawyers in law firms are any less inclined to seek profit-maximization
for their legal services than are non-lawyers for their non-law
businesses; 318 the fact that law is a profession does not mean that law is
"will be more vigilant in monitoring acts that damage [their] reputation" (such as
unqualified personnel working on a client matter) than will smaller firms. Id. at 973.
He further argues that MDPs, because they offer integrated services, "have greater
incentive to provide clients with unbiased advice regarding what services they need."
Id. By contrast, a professional service firm that performs only one type of service has
an incentive to promote that service to the client and downplay other types of
services, although concerns about the firm's reputation in the marketplace will serve
as a counterweight to this incentive. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes
207-10.
314. See, e.g., Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 343 (stating "the
risks to consumers of multidisciplinary services should be mitigated by the presence of
structurally competitive markets where complementary services could be purchased
separately," but noting that "it seems rather optimistic to suggest that the average
client will possess sufficient sophistication to pursue a careful comparison between the
characteristics of complementary services and those offered separately by other
firms"); Wolfram, MultidisciplinaryPartnerships,supra note 156, at 348.
315. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 601-03; Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 957;
Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's Recommendations, supra
note 126, at 1303-04, 1308-11; see also Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at
754-57: Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 Vand. L. Rev.
741, 745-46 (1988); Levinson, Independent Law Firms, supra note 24, at 231-39; L.
Harold Levinson, Making Society's Legal System Accessible to Society: The Lawyer's
Role and Its Implications, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 789, 803-05 (1988).
316. See Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegate Proceedings, supra note
287.
317. See Fischel, MDPs,supra note 33, at 957.
318. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 601-03; Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the
ABA Commission's Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1304.
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not also a profit-oriented business activity.3 19 Furthermore, this
argument is based on an arrogant assumption by lawyers that nonlawyers are motivated only by profit maximization and do not care
about other values, an assumption that is not correct.'"
Also, it is not clear why lawyers desiring to maximize their profits
(whether they work in MDPs or some other type of organization) is a
bad thing for their clients or for society in general. -' Lawyers who are
motivated by economic gain are likely to work the hardest and
perform the most ably for their clients.- The profit motive is also
likely to lead firms to innovate with organizational structures so as to
serve their clients more effectively. ' Moreover, this argument by
opponents of MDPs presumes that a profit motive inevitably leads to
a failure to observe ethical standards, a presumption for which there is
scant empirical support. 4
Some of the arguments against MDPs are based on the view that
lawyers' increasing involvement in non-law business activities has
resulted in financial scandals and related criminal, civil, and
disciplinary proceedings, which, in turn, have undercut the reputation
of the legal profession.31 Opponents of MDPs argue that this
negative trend in the profession will be accentuated if lawyers can
practice with non-lawyers in the same firm. These arguments are
strained at best. Most lawyers are law-abiding and ethical, whether
they work in law firms or non-law organizations. Some lawyers do fail
in their ethical duties, but many of these scandals occur in the context
of lawyers practicing in law firms, e.g., defrauding clients through false
expense statements or padded legal bills, assisting clients in a fraud or
319. See generally Hany S. Brollesy, Current Developments: The Tension Between
Law as a Business and as a Profession, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1111 (1993); Jones,
Focusing the MDP Debate, supra note 79; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism
ParadigmShift. Why DiscardingProfessionalIdeology Will Inprove the Conduct and
Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229 (1995); Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300:
The Demise of Law as a Profession, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 485 (1992); Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Valtes of Professionalism, 13
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1999). On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that the occupation of a practicing law yer is somehow above the
law and different from other occupations. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down the state bar's restrictions on attorney advertising as a
violation of attorneys' First Amendment rights, and rejecting the state bar's argument
that the practice of law's status as a profession requires that the Court uphold the
constitutionality of the advertising restrictions); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975) (holding that state bar's minimum-fee schedule constituted price
fixing in violation of the antitrust laws and rejecting the state bar's argument that the
practice of law's status as a profession exempted it from antitrust scrutiny).
320. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 71, at 601-03.
321. See id. at 602; Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 957; Matheson & Adams,
Reflecting on the ABA Commission's Recommendations,supra note 126, at 1303-04.
322. See Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 957.
323. See id.
324. See Andrews, supra note 71, at 601-03.
325. See Block, Warren & Meierhofer, supra note 25, at 768-69.
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crime, or incompetent or neglectful representation. There is simply
no causal connection between a lawyer's ethical behavior, or lack
thereof, and the type of organization in which the lawyer performs her
services.
Opponents of MDPs additionally argue that lawyers' involvement
in non-law activities will lead to the profession's loss of selfregulation.3 6 It would be difficult for a state bar to regulate a Big Five
accounting firm with 20,000 employees worldwide. The loss of selfregulation might consequently lead to detrimental changes in the bar's
efforts to provide pro bono services to persons of limited means, to
improve the legal system, and to protect the public interest.
These pressures on the state-by-state system for regulating lawyers
existed before the multidisciplinary practice movement arose. The
increased globalization of law and business and the change in the
structure of many law firms into large, multi-jurisdictional
organizations have already placed great stress on the state-by-state
system for regulating lawyers. Given the increasingly international
focus of the business world, the current state-by-state system for
regulating lawyers is in need of a major overhaul.327 Thus, this
argument about the stresses placed on the current self-regulation
system for lawyers is not so much an argument against MDPs as it is
an argument that the time for re-evaluating and restructuring the
system for regulating lawyers in the United States is long overdue.328
Opponents of MDPs also contend that relaxing current restrictions
will lead to a proliferation in the unauthorized practice of law, and will
place lawyers who work in MDPs at risk of violating ethical rules by
assisting non-lawyers engaged in such conduct. 329 As one example of
this, the opponents point to the fact that clients of MDPs may ask
non-lawyer partners of the MDP for advice that constitutes legal
advice, perhaps without either party realizing that legal advice was
326. See id. at 773-77. This argument assumes, of course, that because the practice
of law is a profession, it is entitled to special treatment in our society, including selfregulation.
327. See Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 286-87.

328. An interesting problem arises when a foreign law firm with multidisciplinary
ties abroad acquires a U.S. law firm, such as the entry of Clifford Chance into the
United States by acquiring the New York law firm of Rogers & Wells. First, some of
the profits of the firm end up back in the foreign office of the law firm and may end
up shared in some way with non-lawyers. Second, regulation of such a relationship is
problematic. It will be difficult for a state bar to gain access to the factual information
concerning how the firm's professionals, both in the United States and outside the
United States, offer legal and non-legal services, particularly to clients outside the

United States. Finally, can the current state bar system of regulation effectively
prohibit this firm from offering integrated services by using foreign professionals
abroad?
329. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 23, at 615-17; Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on
the ABA Commission's Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1311-12; Morello, supra
note 151, at 230.
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involved.3"
This concern, however, can be remedied without
prohibiting lawyers from practicing in MDPs.33' Lawyers in MDPs
will be subject to all of the ethical rules, including the duty to
supervise non-lawyer assistants and the duty not to assist non-lawyers
in the practice of law, and can be disciplined for violating those rules.
Moreover, under the proposal presented in this Article, only lawyers
in an MDP would be permitted to practice law; non-lawyers who do so
would be subject to the normal unauthorized-practice-of-law
proscriptions and penalties.3" Thus, allowing lawyers to practice law
in MDPs should not result in any change in the enforcement of the
unauthorized-practice restrictions against non-lawyers.
Finally, opponents of MDPs express concern that lawyers working
in MDPs will be less willing to provide pro bono services and engage
in law reform activities than are lawyers working in traditional law
firms. Thus, they argue that allowing lawyers to practice law in an
MDP will lead to a decline in support for the pro bono ideal.33 There
is, however, no sound basis for this argument. First, if the organized
bar should decide to impose pro bono obligations on attorneys in the
future, those obligations could and should be imposed on all members
of the bar, regardless of the type of organization in which they work.
Second, because pro bono activities can actually be lucrative for firms,
profit-maximizing MDPs are likely to continue to support pro bono
activities, if for no other reason than that support is in their economic
interest.3M Third, there is no reason to think that lawyers who work in
MDPs will be any less likely than lawyers who work in law firms to do
pro bono work. The desire to give something back to society and to
help someone less fortunate should be no less prevalent in a lawyer
who works for an MDP than one who works for a law firm.
Moreover, much as a lawyer who works for a law firm, the lawyer who
works for an MDP will also want to obtain the benefits of an
interesting work experience derived from a pro bono project.

330. See Morello, supra note 151, at 230.
331. Cf Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 337 (noting that costs
imposed by existing rules exceed the consumer protection benefits they provide).
332- See infra Conclusion.

333. See Fox, Ruminations on MDPs, supra note 288, at 1112-13; see also Daly,
Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 279. Because under current ethical rules there is

no requirement of mandatory pro bono service by members of the bar, this ideal is
not a core value of the legal profession of the same magnitude as the core values of
independence, confidentiality, and loyalty. See Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note 60,
at 279.
334. See Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 957-58 (citing Richard A. Posner,
Overcoming Law 61 (1995)); cf Jonathan FL Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort
for the Pooror Welfarefor the Rich?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1115 (1992).
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D. The ABA House of Delegates
The vigorous debate at the August 1999 ABA meeting led the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to withdraw its proposal
and to support further study. The ABA House of Delegates adopted
a resolution proposed initially by the Florida delegates. Although the
Florida Bar's resolution was read by some as a deferral of the issue for
more study, it seemed to be a strong rejection of the concept of
MDPs:
Resolved, that the American Bar Association make no change,
addition or amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
which permits a lawyer to offer legal services through a
multidisciplinary practice unless and until additional study
demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest
without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the
legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients.335
The ABA President gave the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice one additional year to study the issue and to report back to
the House of Delegates.
The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice was very busy after
the August 1999 meeting of the ABA House of Delegates. Its
members traveled around the country explaining its positions and
receiving additional public comment. In December of 1999, the
Commission issued a report entitled Updated Background and
Informational Report and Request for Comments.336 This report
updated developments concerning MDPs in the United States and
around the world. It then responded to some of the criticisms that
had been leveled against its proposal and requested additional
commentary. It also examined the arguments for and against the
various models that the Commission had presented in its earlier
report.
At the ABA Meeting in February of 2000, the House of Delegates
adopted a resolution of the Ohio State Bar encouraging state and
local bars to investigate and prosecute unauthorized-practice-of-law
claims.337 In March of 2000, the Commission issued recommendations
335. See ABA Commission, Updated BackgroundPaper,supra note 293.
336. See id.
337. Stratton, Unauthorized Practice Saber, supra note 9, at 1057 ("Nonetheless,
the perception of most state and local bars looking at the MDP issue is that current

professional rules need to be enforced rather than relaxed, Cheryl Niro [president of
the Illinois State Bar Association] said at the MDP Commission meeting."). The
resolution also required the ABA to set up a national reporting mechanism for MDPs
for the state bars to access. For commentary arguing that the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice should develop two definitions of the "practice of law," one
for lawyers and one for non-lawyers, and that the bar should concentrate its initial
efforts in this area on regulating lawyers who practice in non-law firm organizations,
see Linda Galler, "Practiceof Law" in the New Millennium: New Roles, New Rules,
But No Definitions,72 Temp. L. Rev. 1001 (1999).
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to the House of Delegates,3" scaling back its 1999 recommendations
to the following:
1. Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with
nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and
nonlegal professional services (Multidisciplinary Practice), provided
that the lawyers have the control and authority necessary to assure
lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services. "Nonlawyer
professionals" means members of recognized professions or other
disciplines that are governed by ethical standards.
2. This Recommendation must be implemented in a manner that
protects the public and preserves the core values of the legal
profession, including competence, independence of professional
judgment, protection of confidential client information, loyalty to
the client through the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and pro
bono publico obligations.
3. To protect the public interest, regulatory authorities should
enforce existing rules and adopt such additional enforcement
procedures as are needed to implement the principles identified in
this Recommendation.
4. This Recommendation does not alter the prohibition on
nonlawyers delivering legal services and the obligations of all
lawyers to observe the rules of professional conduct. Nor3 9does it
authorize passive investment in a Multidisciplinary Practice. 3
The ABA Commission presented this recommendation to the
House of Delegates in July of 2000, and the House of Delegates
rejected it. However, several state and local bars offered a counter-

proposal that was based in significant part on the report issued by the

New York State Bar Association. 3 The proposal boldly stated that
sharing legal fees with non-lawyers and allowing non-lawyers to
become partners in layx firms was incompatible with the professional
obligations of the legal profession.311 Thus, the proposal called for a
338. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Draft of a Possible
Recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates (Mar. 2000) (available at

<http:llwww.abanet.org/cpr/marchrec.html>).
339. Id.
340. See New York State Bar Association Special Committee, Report, supra note
22. This proposal was sponsored by the Florida Bar, the state bar associations of
Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and New York, and the bar associations of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, and Erie County, Pennsylvania. See Recommendation 1OF, Presented
to the ABA House of Delegates (July 2000) [hereinafter Recommendation 101]
(available at <http://www.abanet.orgfcpr/mdprecomlOF.html>).
Some delegates
attributed the momentum in favor of this proposal to the persuasive nature of the
New York State Bar Association's report and the strong reputation of the chair of the
Committee that authored the report, Robert MacCrate, the influential New York City
attorney. See Wendy Davis, ABA Emphatically Rejects MDPs, Nat'l L.J., July 24,

2000, at A5.

341. See Recommendation 10F,supra note 340.
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complete rejection of MDPs in the American legal profession and a
disbanding of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. 42
The Colorado bar offered a compromise proposal to refer the matter
for further study.34 Despite the pleas by the incoming President of
the ABA for adoption of the Colorado compromise proposal, the
ABA House of Delegates, with barely one hour of debate, adopted
the proposal to completely reject accommodation of MDPs by the
ABA and disband the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice. 3'
These actions illustrate politics as usual in the ABA House of
Delegates. How could otherwise intelligent lawyers in the ABA
believe that they could make this problem go away by simply voting
the matter out of its realm of study? Will the entities that are
currently offering multidisciplinary services in this country somehow
disappear from the scene? Will accounting firms discharge the
attorneys that they have hired over the years, which include some of
the best tax attorneys in the country? Will the accounting firms refuse
to refer their American clients to their lawyers abroad when those
American clients seek to do business abroad? Will foreign law firms
stop acquiring U.S. law firms? Will the lobbying, investment banking,
and international consulting firms stop performing integrated services
that include a component bordering on the practice of law in disregard
of the unauthorized-practice-of-law proscriptions? The answer to all
of these questions is, of course not. Moreover, it is highly unlikely
342. See id. Recommendation 1OF reads in part:
FURTHER RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends
that in jurisdictions that permit lawyers and law firms to own and operate
nonlegal businesses, no nonlawyer or nonlegal entity involved in the
provision of such services should own or control the practice of law by a
lawyer or law firm or otherwise be permitted to direct or regulate the
professional judgment of the lawyer or law firm in rendering legal services to
any person.
Id. The Recommendation further resolves that "the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice be discharged with the Association's gratitude for the Commission's hard
work and with commendation for its substantial contributions to the profession." Id.
343. The Colorado Bar's proposal reads:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association take no actions that in any
way discourage further discussion of Multi-Disciplinary Practice ("MDP")
until a more substantial number of state and local bar associations and ABA
entities currently studying MDP have had an opportunity to consider those
reports.
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the subject of MDP be included within the
jurisdiction of the ABA Committee on Research into the Future of the
Legal Profession.
Recommendation 1OJ, Presented to the ABA House of Delegates (July 2000)
(available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation7-OO.html>).
344. See Davis, supra note 340; James P. Schaller, Opting Out of the Debate on
MDPs, Legal Times, Aug. 7, 2000, at 23; Stratton & Sheppard, supra note 21; see also
Geanne Rosenberg, Accounting Legal Affiliates CriticizeABA's Proposalto Restrict
MDPs, Nat'l L.J., July 31, 2000, at B6.
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that the state bars will begin unauthorized-practice-of-law actions
against the Big Five accounting firms, investment banking houses,
lobbying firms, or international consulting firms. If they did so, the
likely result would be the evisceration of the unauthorized-practiceof-law rules by court decision or legislative enactment.
Thus, the ABA has implicitly sanctioned civil disobedience by these
professional service providers and others who seek to provide
multidisciplinary services to clients who want such services. This
action by the ABA will benefit large multinational corporations who
will continue to receive multidisciplinary services, and disadvantage
low- and middle-income clients who will be unable to readily gain
access to such services. Such a two-track system, which perpetuates
the status quo, is the clear result of the action of the House of
Delegates. It is difficult to see how the intelligent lawyers who
advanced this result could think that they had won a great victory for
the legal profession. By this vote, the ABA has abdicated its role of
leadership on the ethical issues relating to MDPs and effectively
"voted itself into irrelevance."' 5
Given the actions of the ABA House of Delegates, the ABA is not
likely to modify the Model Rules to accommodate MDPs or to
recommend state accommodation of such practices in the immediate
future. Thus, the question becomes how change can be implemented
in the American legal profession with respect to this issue. There are
many potential avenues for change.
It is important to realize that the ABA is a voluntary group of
lawyers, and that the ABA has designated itself as the official body
that promulgates rules of ethics for the legal profession. Those rules
do not carry with them the force of law. The ABA depends upon
state bars to adopt the ABA Models as their local codes of ethics.
Many years ago, the ABA had great influence with the states. For
example, the ABA Canons and the ABA Model Code were replicated
by many states without significant changes. -" Since 1983, however,
the ABA's Model Rules have not been treated so deferentially. Most
states have modified the Model Rules to reflect state practices and
prior law.3 California and New York continue to promulgate their
own unique sets of ethics codes.319 Thus, the ABA is not as influential
as it once was and is unlikely to regain that influence in the future. In
345. Stratton & Sheppard, supra note 21.
346. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 34-35.
347. See id. at 55-58.
348. See, e-g., Professional Responsibility: Standards, Rules & Statutes, 1999-2000
Edition 143-44 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1999).
349. See California Rules of Professional Conduct (not based on the Model Code
or the Model Rules); New York Code of Professional Responsibility, N.Y. Comp.
Codes R.& Regs. tit. 22, § 1200 (2000) (based loosely on the Model Code, but with
many significant variations, including the insertion of some provisions of the Model
Rules).
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fact, the Commission of Chief Justices of the State Courts has
appointed a committee to formulate recommendations concerning
MDPs.350 This forum is likely to have more significant influence on
the way in which state bars approach the multidisciplinary practice
issue."'

Many state and local bar associations have begun their own studies
The
of the issues concerning multidisciplinary practice. 352
multidisciplinary practice concept is likely to be embraced by a few
353
progressive states that wish to experiment with integrated services.

Public sentiment is in favor of MDPs, and the demand for such
services seems to be growing. Once one or two states adopt rules
favorable to formation of or experimentation with MDPs, it is likely
that others will soon follow suit. Although it is too early to tell which
states will become the first to actually promulgate bar rules favorable
to MDPs, at the present time, a number of state bars have issued
promising recommendations.'
Two city bar associations have also
355
published reports in favor of adopting rules accommodating MDPs.
Some proponents of MDPs have suggested that Congress pass a
national system for implementing and regulating MDPs. 3 56 Although
350. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Postscript to February
2000 Midyear Meeting (available at <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/postscript.html>)
(discussing appointment of Committee to study MDPs by the Commission of Chief
Justices).
351. In many states, the highest court in the state directly controls the state bar and
the adoption of ethics rules. In other states, the highest court has significant influence
on the regulation of lawyers within the state. See generally Wolfram, supra note 7, at §
2.2 (discussing the role of the highest court in a state in regulating lawyers admitted in
the state).
352. See Links to Bar Association MDP Committtees and Reports (visited July 22,
2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdplinks.html> (links to the various state and
foreign web sites devoted to multidisciplinary practice).
353. Individual states may embrace MDPs for many different reasons. For
example, a state with significant foreign trade may wish to foster greater trade with
the world and thus encourage integrated services for their business base.
Alternatively, a state may wish to foster the development of multidisciplinary services
for low- and middle-income individuals. The family mediation clinic or the
gerontological counseling center may solve needs of the general public. Alternatively,
a state might simply prefer to regulate the development of MDPs rather than see
them proliferate without any regulatory input from the state. States that decide
instead to continue using the present set of rules may attempt to undertake more
stringent enforcement of the unauthorized-practice-of-law rules. The Federal Trade
Commission or Department of Justice Antitrust Division, however, could view such
enforcement as anti-competitive behavior by the bar that violates the antitrust laws.
354. For a comprehensive summary of developments at the state level, see Mona L.
Hymel, MultidisciplinaryPractice: The States Weigh In, 88 Tax Notes 261 (2000).
355. See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Statement of Position
on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(July
20,
1999)
(available
at
<http://www.abcny.org/mdprep.html>);
Philadelphia
Bar
Association
Multidisciplinary Practice Task Force, Report and Recommendation (Mar. 10, 2000)
(available at <http://www.philadelphiabar.org/>).
356. Such a proposal was presented to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice by Jim Holden, a partner at the Washington, D.C., law firm of Steptoe and
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such a plan poses many challenges for implementation, it is not out of
the realm of possibility that Congress may become involved in the
legal profession's turf war with non-lawyers.3
Ultimately, any
attempts by state bars to prevent lawyers from working in MDPs may

provoke a serious movement for a national bar in this country."'
Thus, the consideration of MDPs assumes significance in the broader
debate over federalizing the licensure of lawyers. Moreover,
international developments under world trade agreements, such as the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and regional trade
agreements such as the European Union, may play a significant role in

shaping the legal landscape applicable to MDPs.35 9

Johnson, and advocated by several other commentators. See James P. Holden,
Written Remarks to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Nov. 12,
1999) (available at <http://abanet.org/cpr/holden.html>). A federal solution to the
regulation of MDPs is probably not feasible at the present time. The process for
enacting federal legislation and creating new regulatory structures is fraught with
political difficulty and any federal solution to the issue of MDPs would probably take
years, if not decades, to devise. One can imagine the intense lobbying that would
accompany such a congressional legislative effort. Nevertheless, a strong argument
can be made that a federal system for regulating MDPs is the more efficient approach
given that many of such entities will operate across state and possibly international
borders. Of course, the major concern about a federal approach is whether it would
be effective in enforcing rules that overlay a state-by-state system of regulating
lawyers. At a minimum, some form of decentralized enforcement would probably be
necessary to implement any federal structure for regulating MDPs. See also Daly,
Choosing Wisely, supra note 60, at 286-87 (suggesting that a new system of regulation
of lawyers needs to be designed in light of the increasingly national nature of law
practice).
357. One does not need to look beyond the federal systems in taxation, employee
benefits, patent protection, and securities practice to see that Congress views certain
areas of practice to be important enough for federal control and regulation. If one
were to view MDPs as integral to the national and international economies, one could
see congressional interest in preventing undue state burdens on such interstate and
international commerce.
Even if Congress did not show an interest in federalizing this area of law, the current
administration of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission has shown an interest in encouraging competition in the legal services
market. Moreover, the American Antitrust Institute has opined that if the ABA and
the states constrain competition in the professional services markets through their
multidisciplinary practice rules, such action may be a violation of the antitrust laws.
See American Antitrust Institute, Comments Regarding Recommendations of the
ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (July 23, 1999) (available at
<http:llwww.abanet.org/cpr/aai2.html>); see generally American Antitrust Institute,
Converging ProfessionalServices: Lawyers Against the MultidisciplinaryTide (Feb. 9,
2000) (available at <http'//www.antitrustinstitute.orgbooksmultidisc.cfm>).
358. See generally Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at ch. 2 (discussing the
regulation of the legal profession); Chesterfield Smith, Time for a National Practice
of Law Act, 64 A.B.A. J. 557 (1978) (arguing for adoption of a national practice of law
act by states under which all states would give full reciprocal recognition to lawyers
admitted in other states).
359. In the European Union ("EU"), the trade agreement expressly covers trade in
professional services. Thus, the EU is developing rules for how each member state
can control the practice of law within its borders. Although the accommodation of
free trade in services is more complicated than free trade in goods, it is likely that
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IV. INTEGRATING MDPs INTO THE MODERN LEGAL PROFESSION

A. Overview
As discussed in Part III of this Article, the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice devoted significant effort to studying the
delivery of legal services by non-law entities in the United States and
throughout the world. The Commission gathered significant evidence
about the consequences of allowing lawyers to partner with nonlawyers, and it proposed a system for allowing MDPs to develop in the
United States. Unfortunately, the debate in the ABA House of
Delegates devolved into a general attack on the concept of MDPs.3 6
What was lacking in the ABA House of Delegates' consideration of
the multidisciplinary practice issue was a thoughtful analysis of how
the legal profession could accommodate the integration of legal and
non-legal services but still preserve its core values. 6' Professor
Robert Gordon aptly characterizes the bar's position:
Historically, the sad if hardly surprising fact has been that the
organized bar's resistance to new modes of practice, though often
clothed in the high-minded rhetoric of protecting the ethical
standards and independent judgment of the legal profession, has
been to a considerable extent motivated by far less elevated desires
to protect the incomes of lawyers from economic competition or
their status from erosion by groups perceived as interlopers. Given
this history of protectionist and factional motives, it is reasonablewithout for a moment questioning the sincerity and good faith of the
critics of multi-disciplinary practice-to treat resistance to
organizational innovation with some skepticism and to ask whether
support for such resistance is more likely to stem from
concern for
3 62
the incomes rather than the independence of lawyers.
Despite the enlightened views of many members of the ABA, the
House of Delegates chose a path of self-protection and disregard of
client demand and the public interest.
these developments and the evolution of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") will have an impact on the regulation of cross-border legal service
transactions and thus the regulation of MDPs. See Daly, Choosing Wisely, supra note
60, at 287-88.
360. See Rocco Cammarere, ABA Panel's MDP Plan Hit as Sellout, N.J. Law.,

June 14, 1999, at 1 ("The issue of MDPs focuses as much on a turf war-lawyers
protecting their profession and income-as it does on the disputed cost-saving
benefits to clients and the conflicting ethical guidelines between lawyers and other
professionals.").
361. It is clear that the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice had to
tailor its various recommendations and findings to the political climate in the ABA
House of Delegates. Ultimately, its recommendations were significantly watered
down versions of the findings and thoughts in the substantive documents.
362. Letter from Robert Gordon, Fred A. Johnston Professor of Law, Yale Law
School, to Sherwin Simmons, Chair of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (May 21, 1999) (available at <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/gordon.html>).

2000]

MDPs AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

For the reasons discussed in Part II of this Article, a
multidisciplinary approach to problem solving is desirable and
necessary for many client problems. A significant and growing
demand for multidisciplinary services exists in a diverse spectrum of
clients, from multinational corporations to small businesses and
individuals. 363 Given that the ABA has chosen to remove itself from
the development of reasonable ethical rules concerning MDPs, the
issue then is how the state bars can accommodate multidisciplinary
practice while protecting clients and the core values of the legal
profession. Stated differently, the important questions are what forms
of practice structure involving multidisciplinary services should be
permitted, and what rules should govern the practice of law in these
organizations. This part provides a methodical examination of the
different ways in which the organized bar could accommodate joint
work between lawyers and non-lawyers in delivering multidisciplinary
services to clients.
B. Examinationof the Different Models for DeliveringIntegrated
Services
The debate concerning MDPs has produced six distinct models for
delivering integrated services: (1) the "cooperation" or "status quo"
model, (2) the "ancillary business services" model, (3) the "command
and control" model, (4) the "contract" model, (5) the "joint venture"
model, and (6) the "fully integrated MDP" model. This part describes
these models in detail and examines their benefits and detriments.
1. The "Cooperation" or "Status Quo" Model'
The "cooperation" or "status quo" model allows law firms to offer
multidisciplinary services by cooperating with non-lawyer
professionals and entities through an independent contractor or an
employee arrangement. Thus, under this model, a law firm has two
basic choices:
non-lawyers as employees or non-lawyers as
independent contractors.
To illustrate the current system, assume that a client in the United
States sought advice concerning which method of distributing
products is most desirable for entering the European Union
marketplace. A full evaluation of this problem would require
knowledge of international transactional law, the law of cross-border
trading, the domestic and European Union rules regarding protection
of intellectual property rights, the business climate in the European
363. See supra Part II.
364. This model is Model 1 in the ABA Commission's Hypotheticals and Models.
See ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 267. This model

assumes that the current rules against fee-sharing and joint ownership remain in
place.
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Union, and the estimated expenses and revenue of the venture. The
client could approach a U.S. law firm and ask it to consider only the
legal implications of an international business venture, and then could
enlist a professional consulting firm to perform the business and
financial modeling aspects. As an alternative, the corporation could
satisfy the need for one or both of these services with in-house
professionals.365 If, however, the client wanted a full-service team
approach from one or more outside professional service providers,
current law would permit the following arrangements.
The law firm could hire, as employees, a management consultant
and an accountant who specialized in the European Union business
climate. The non-legal services would be bundled with the legal
services, and the non-lawyers could participate in the firm's profits.366
The non-lawyers could not, however, be owners of the law firm or
share directly in the legal fees.367 If the law firm chooses to hire the
non-lawyers as employees, it could advertise the full-service nature of
its international consulting practice. Thus, if a law firm had or
anticipated having a sufficient client base to offer integrated services,
it could do so through non-lawyer employees.
In theory, the ban on ownership by non-lawyer employees in law
firms should not completely deter law firms from offering integrated
services. Therefore, it is counterintuitive that law firms do not hire
non-lawyers in order to meet the client need for integrated services.
The explanation is based partly on economics, partly on the scope of
lawyers' knowledge, and partly on the current rules of professional
conduct. If a lawyer hires a non-lawyer to perform a non-legal
service, under the current rules the lawyer is required to supervise the
work of the non-lawyer even though it does not involve legal services.
That supervision extends to the lawyer-supervisor requiring that the
non-lawyer follow the rules of the legal profession in performing this
non-legal work. The lawyer-supervisor must also ensure that the nonlawyer's work is conducted with a minimum level of competence even
though the lawyer-supervisor has no expertise in the non-legal area of
work. The requirement that the non-lawyer follow the legal
profession's rules in performing non-legal services might degrade
365. Of course, corporations can develop integrated services in-house and allow
lawyers and non-lawyers to cooperate and join together in servicing the corporation's
needs. Cf. Charles W. Wolfram, In-House MDPs?, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 6, 2000, at B6.
Many corporations have been using non-lawyers, such as MBAs, economists and
computer modeling experts to inform their legal and business decision making.
366. See Model Rules Rule 5.4(a).
367. See id. Rule 5.4(a)(3). In theory, law firms may not directly share legal fees
with non-lawyer employees; in practice, however, "profit sharing" means gross profits
minus expenses equals net profits, which may be shared with the non-lawyer
employees. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsisbility, Informal
Op. 1440 (1979) (interpreting profits to mean sharing in net profits rather than in
particular legal fees received by a law firm).
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work-quality or needlessly increase the cost of providing services.
Lawyers usually are not trained in other, non-law disciplines, and thus
would need to hire managers who could monitor the non-lawyer's
performance.
In the illustration, it would be difficult for the law firm to hire just
one expert on the European Union in order to claim an expertise in
that area of the world. The law firm would need to hire several
professionals before being able to legitimately claim expertise. This
would require the law firm to incur a significant expenditure to offer a
full complement of multidisciplinary services to clients. A law firm
would need to attract sufficient demand to justify the expenditure.
Also, it is unclear whether the non-lawyer could offer non-legal
services apart from the law firm and advertise those services to obtain
those clients.3"

Thus, under the current ethical rules, most or all of

the non-lawyer employee's work would have to be performed for
clients of the law firm.
There is one other aspect of the current rules that may influence the
desire of non-lawyer professionals to become employees of a law firm.
Although these employees can share in the profits of the firm, they
cannot be partners of the lawyers in the firm. Many non-lawyers may
find such an arrangement demeaning or "without merit. '"" This
opinion may be a significant reason why some non-lawyers will not
wish to cooperate in offering integrated services to clients in a law
firm setting.
Alternatively, a law firm could instead hire non-lawyers as
independent contractors to serve the law firm's client base. The nonlawyer independent contractors could not share legal fees with the law
firm, and they would need to charge clients under the normal rate
structure permitted in their professions. 311 Under the current system,
a lawyer cannot ask an independent contractor to defer all payment
unless and until the transaction is completed. This would be
tantamount to sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. Thus, the lawyer
could enter into a contingent fee arrangement with the client and pay
the independent contractor regardless of the outcome, or the client
itself could agree to do so.
The independent contractor relationship suffers from the weakness
that it somewhat impairs the ability of lawyers and non-lawyers to
develop synergies that result from years of cooperation. In order to
368. It is also unclear whether the non-lawyer employees of a law firm may offer
non-legal services to the general public. One could view the non-lawyer employee's
work for the general public as inconsistent with the general purpose of the law firm to
practice law. Also, even if the non-lawyer employees could offer services to the
general public, the lawyers would need to supervise the work and most likely the rules
of the legal profession would apply to all aspects of the non-law matters.
369. Cf Hazard, Foreword,supra note 96, at 1088 (referring to the difficulty of

attracting top talent when they must be "second class citizens").
370. See Model Rules Rule 5.4(a); Model Code DR 3-102(A).
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create such synergies, the lawyers and non-lawyers would need a
client base that justified constant cooperation. This would require
advertising the arrangement, which would be somewhat questionable
under current advertising rules. The law firm could list the possible
availability of non-legal services through independent contractors, but
the advertisements would need to disclose properly the extent and
nature of such relationships. Before a lawyer could involve a nonlawyer, client consent would be necessary because the non-lawyer
independent contractor is an outside entity for the purposes of
confidentiality and conflict-of-interest principles. The advertisements
for the law firm and independent contractor services may also raise
questions about whether the arrangement involves the sharing of legal
fees or an impermissible referral arrangement between a law firm and
a non-lawyer. Although the threat of disciplinary action may be
slight, the arrangement may pose too much risk for a lawyer or nonlaw professional to undertake.371
To the extent that law firms have offered integrated services under
the current ethical rules, they have done so primarily with large clients
in the business consulting area. Such integrated services have not
proliferated in professional practices concentrated on the delivery of
services to low- and middle-income clients.372 Under the status quo, it
is difficult for a law firm to offer integrated services to middle- and
low-income persons. The detrimental effect of the status quo on lowand middle-income clients is significant. Many categories of clients,
including the elderly, would benefit from MDPs. 373 Family mediation
clinics cannot have lawyer and non-lawyer partners, thus a lawyer
typically must provide legal services to clients on an independent
contractor, case-by-case basis. The employee and independent
contractor models have produced few elder law clinics or family
mediation centers, entities which provide legal services to low- and
371. The threat of sanction against a lawyer for sharing a legal fee with a non-

lawyer is greater than the threat of sanction against a non-lawyer entity, such as an
investment banking firm, that offers services bordering on the practice of law.
372. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice held hearings on October

9, 1999, during a meeting of the ABA Section on General, Solo and Small Firm
Practice. During that meeting, the debate centered on how MDPs could help the
practices of small law firms. See Sheryl Stratton, Lawyers Debate Divisive MDP Issue,
Tax Notes Today, Doc. 1999-33135 (Oct. 13, 1999). The participants examined the

following types of arrangements: (1) a lawyer, an accountant, and an insurance agent
offering financial planning, including retirement and estate practice work; and (2) a
lawyer, a clinical psychologist, and a child development specialist focusing on serving
the needs of disabled children and their parents or guardians. See id.
373. See Letter from Wayne Moore, Director, Legal Advocacy Group, to the
Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association (July 27, 1999)

(available at <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/aarp.html>) (arguing that the formation of
MDPs would be more convenient and cost effective for the elderly); Theodore Debro,

Statement Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 12,2000)
(available at <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/debro2html>) (arguing that low- and middle-

income clients are the income groups that need the services of MDPs the most).
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middle-income clients. 374 Legal services are only a small part of the

array of professional services that low- and middle-income clients may
typically need. Thus, under the status quo, it is not in the economic
interest of lawyers to offer integrated services of which the largest
component is non-legal services. This would potentially expose the
lawyer to significant liability, and would not be in the interest of nonlawyer employee professionals. Accordingly, under current law, the
most likely structure for cooperation would be the "independent
contractor" model. Lawyers, however, are hesitant to cooperate with
other professionals in providing services to low- and middle-income
clients. These clients are more likely to complain to authorities than
are large corporate clients, and state regulatory structures are more
likely to provide them protection. These realities render the
"independent contractor" model an unlikely solution to the
multidisciplinary practice dilemma.
An analysis of the status quo must consider not just the ethical rules
of the legal profession, but what is actually taking place in practice.
As discussed in Part II, many non-law professional service entities
have begun to offer legal services as part of their non-legal services.
The state bars have largely chosen not to enforce the unauthorizedpractice-of-law rules in this context, and, thus, corporate clients have
at least some avenue for obtaining integrated professional services.
Investment banking, management consulting, public relations, and
lobbying firms are increasingly meeting client demands for
multidisciplinary services in the corporate business area? 6 This
reality threatens the integrity of the entire system of unauthorizedpractice-of-law rules and regulation of lawyers.3n It also places law
firms at a significant competitive disadvantage in the market for
integrated professional services because these non-law entities are not
bound by the restrictions imposed upon attorneys.
2. The "Ancillary Business Services" Model'7
The "ancillary business services" model is based on Model Rule 5.7
of current law. 9 It involves lawyers and non-lawyers owning ancillary
374. Cf. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to OrdinaryAmericans, 44
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 564-78 (1994) (Model Rule 5.4 contributes to the lack of
competition in the delivery of legal services).
375. See supra Part I.A.3.
376. See it
377. This concern has led leaders in some state bar associations to demand greater
enforcement of the unauthorized-practice-of-law rules. See supra text accompanying
note 337.
378. This model is Model 3 in the ABA Commission's Hypotheticals and Models.
See ABA Commission, Hypotheticalsand Models, supra note 267.
379. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice presented two
hypotheticals involving the ancillary business model: Hypothetical 3.1 and
Hypothetical 3.2. See id
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businesses together and the law firm sending clients to these
businesses for non-legal services. As discussed above,"' Model Rule
5.7 has a troubled past largely due to various customary practices that
currently exist in the states with respect to title companies and other
businesses owned by lawyers.381
Although this model for
multidisciplinary practice has some initial appeal, it also has many
problems that make it ineffective as a means for fostering the
development of MDPs.
Model Rule 5.7 is not designed to regulate the delivery of
multidisciplinary services; instead, it is a rule addressing lawyer
investment in a law-related ancillary business such as a title company,
document production service, or real estate brokerage company. If
the client receives services that are not distinguishable from legal
services, the lawyers must ensure that both the law firm and the nonlaw ancillary business firm comply with the Model Rules.3 1 By
contrast, if the lawyers make it clear that the law-related services are
not legal in nature, but are separate and distinct from traditional legal
services, then the ancillary business need not comply with the Model
Rules.
Under Model Rule 5.7, lawyers must be in total control of the
delivery of legal services; a lawyer and a non-lawyer can, however, coown an ancillary business (that is not engaged in delivering legal
services) available to clients. For example, a lawyer and a non-lawyer
could co-own a copying service. Clients of the law firm could be
encouraged to use the copy service business, but legal fees could not
be shared with the non-lawyer and the copy service business could not
deliver legal services to the client. These prohibitions most likely
mean that integrated professional services could not be characterized
as an ancillary business unless controlled by the lawyers, with nonlawyers working as employees. The practical outcome is thus similar
to that of the "status quo" model under Model Rule 5.4.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 83-95.
381. See generally Munneke, Dances With Nonlawyers, supra note 231; Schneyer,
Perils of Professionalism,supra note 25.
382. See ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 267. Questions
of imputation between the law firm and the ancillary business arise under the
"ancillary business" model. If the law firm and the ancillary business provide
integrated services, which by definition carry the protection of the ethics rules, all
joint work for clients should be imputed back to the firm and would require
compliance with the conflict-of-interest rules. Even if the law firm invokes the aspect
of Model Rule 5.7 that removes the protection of the rules from the non-legal service,
to the extent that there is overlap with the legal work, the client would receive
protection from the ethics rules. Also, because the law firm is providing both legal
and non-legal services to the same client in the same matter, a conflict of interest
exists under Model Rule 1.7(b). The law firm must examine this conflict and its effect
and resolve it. If the non-law entity performed solely non-legal work for a client,
however, then the non-law representation should not be imputed to the law firm and
its clients.
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In other words, under Model Rule 5.7, a law firm could form a
European Union business-consulting subsidiary. If that subsidiary
were to provide fully integrated services to law clients, however, it is
difficult to see how that entity could have non-lawyer owners without
violating Model Rule 5.4. Otherwise, lawyers today could form
ancillary businesses in most non-law specialties and then compensate
the non-lawyers by making them partners, thus avoiding the
ownership and fee-sharing rules of the profession. Given that Model
Rule 5.7 requires that lawyers must own and control entities
delivering integrated services, it offers little advantage over the
"status quo" model. Therefore, Model Rule 5.7, in its present form, is
not the appropriate framework for regulating the delivery of
multidisciplinary services by the American legal profession.
3. The "Command and Control" Model"
The "command and control" model is based on the District of
Columbia's Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (D.C. Rule 5.4),
which allows law firms to make non-lawyers partners and managers in
law firms.3 The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in the
United States that permits fee-sharing and partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers.3 Under D.C. Rule 5.4, the sole purpose of
any partnership between a lawyer and a non-lawyer must be to
provide legal services to clients.' All non-lawyers in the partnership
must abide by the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, and the
lawyers in the partnership are responsible for ensuring that the nonlawyers do so.' Fee-sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers is
allowed only through such partnerships and not with non-lawyers
outside the law firm.- Only a few firms have taken advantage of this
rule, in part because the ABA has opined that no firm with offices
outside of the District of Columbia may use the non-lawyer partner
option.?s9
D.C. Rule 5.4 is not designed to foster integrated services and thus
it is not an appropriate model for regulating the development of
MDPs. The rule limits the services that a law firm may provide: a
firm must solely offer legal services, and all non-lawyers must follow
383. This model is Model 2 in the ABA Commission's Hypotheticals and Models.
See ABA Commission, Hypotheticalsand Models, supra note 267.
384. See D.C. Rules Rule 5.4.
385. See Irwin L. Treiger & William J. Lipton, Written Remarks to the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Written
at
(available
Lipton]
&
Treiger
of
Remarks
<http:ll/www.abanet.orglcpr/treigerl.html>).
386. See D.C. Rules Rule 5.4(b).
387. See id. Rule 5.4(b)(2).
388. See id. Rule 5.4(a)(4).
389. See ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 91-360 (1991); see
also ABA Commission, BackgroundPaper,supra note 14, at 14-15.
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the rules of professional conduct. 3 ° These requirements essentially
preclude the use of the D.C. Rule as a rule to foster multidisciplinary
practice for consumers.
The requirement that law firms alone can bring in non-lawyer
partners means that only law firms can provide multidisciplinary
services in which one service is the practice of law. Under this model,
mediation centers, estate planning and family wealth firms, and
management consulting firms could not add practicing lawyers to their
partnerships and integrated teams of professionals. Under the
"command and control" model, all of these non-legal services would
have to be offered to consumers under the umbrella of a law firm.
It is difficult to justify a rule that permits lawyers in law firms to
practice with non-lawyers, but does not permit lawyers to practice
with non-lawyers in other types of business structures. Such a rule
could only be justified by showing either that harm would result to the
public if non-law firms offered such services, or that law firms would
provide such superior multidisciplinary services that society should
preclude non-law firms from doing the same. The proponents of such
a rule would need to demonstrate probable harm to the client if
multidisciplinary services were offered by non-law firms, and
impairment to the core values of the legal profession if lawyers did not
control the delivery of such services. 391 Lawyers have practiced in
many non-law entities such as government agencies, corporations, and
insurance companies, without a demonstration of client harm. In the
light of this reality, and considering the anti-competitive effect of such
a rule, our society should reject the notion that law firms should be
the sole providers of multidisciplinary services.392
The second requirement that non-lawyers can join lawyers as
partners in a law firm solely for the purpose of offering legal services
by its terms restricts the delivery of multidisciplinary services.
Consumers today increasingly face multi-faceted problems with
interrelated legal, financial, and business components.3
These
390. For a contrary view concerning D.C. Rule 5.4, which supports the rule as a

reasonable, middle-ground approach on partnerships consisting of lawyers and non-

lawyers, see Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 23.
391. The questions that must be asked are whether non-law entities are likely to
pose unacceptable risks for the delivery of legal services, and what effects those risks
might have on the core values of the legal profession.
392. See National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants,
Analysis of ABA "Models" and Questions [hereinafter National Conference of
Lawyers
and
CPAs,
Analysis
of
ABA
Models]
(available
at

<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/nclcpa2.html>).
393. See Stefan Tucker, Written Remarks to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Written Remarks of Tucker]

(available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/tuckerl.html>) ("Multidisciplinary practice
has not developed in a vacuum. It is the product of a rapidly growing, consumerdriven, global economy. We see ever more sophisticated clients seeking advice on

increasingly complex matters, often involving an inextricable mix of finance,
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consumers want to retain professionals with the necessary sklls to
solve these problems, and do not care about what the professionals
call themselves or where they practice. There are many examples of
client problems that would benefit greatly from a multidisciplinary
problem-solving approach. Most of these examples fail the "solely the
practice of law" requirement."l
A strict interpretation of this
requirement would therefore severely inhibit the formation of
MDPs.395
The final requirement in D.C. Rule 5.4 is that law partners in a law
firm must ensure that non-lawyer partners and managers follow the
rules of ethics. 396 The rules of ethics would apply to non-lawyers in
every aspect of their activities. It is not controversial to assume that
when a client is just receiving legal services from lawyers and nonlawyers working together in the same firm, the non-lawyers would
need to comply with the legal ethics rules. When the client is just
receiving non-legal services from the firm, however, it is not clear why
the ethics rules of the legal profession should apply to a non-lawyer's
activities.39 In the context of a limited "command and control" model
adopted by the District of Columbia Bar, which contains a "solely the
practice of law" requirement, the application of legal ethics rules to
non-lawyers makes sense. This requirement would need to be
reexamined, however, if one were to attempt to broaden D.C. Rule
5.4 to foster the development of multidisciplinary services.
It is clear that the the approach illustrated by D.C. Rule 5.4 is
designed to allow law firms to provide ancillary business services
closely related to the firm's legal services and to let non-lawyers who
accounting, law and other disciplines.").
394. There is one modification that could be made to D.C. Rule 5.4 that would
improve its use as an approach for fostering the delivery of multidisciplinary services.
If the rule did not limit the function of a law firm offering non-legal services solely to
the practice of law, that would open the possibility of true multidisciplinary practice
services coming from a law firm. The non-lawyer partner could be hired to provide
non-legal services to clients of the law firm and thus integrated services could result.
D.C. Rule 5.4, however, would still prohibit a non-lawyer controlled firm from
providing legal services to clients.
395. Of course, if one were to interpret loosely the "solely the practice of law"
requirement of D.C. Rule 5.4, then perhaps it would not be an obstacle to a more
broad-based development of integrated services. No authorities, however, have
interpreted D.C. Rule 5.4 to mean anything other than the law firm must be engaged
only in law practice. Indeed, the use of the term "solely" does not seem to leave
much room for argument.
396. This is why this model is referred to as the "command and control" model-it
retains the distribution of legal services in traditional law firms and allows a law firm
to admit non-lawyer partners.
397. See D.C. Rules Rule 5.4(b)(3). Should a client of an MDP who seeks only web
design services receive the protection of the attorney-client rules? Stated differently,
the question is whether a non-lawyer who provides only non-legal advice concerning
web design should be subject to all of the legal ethics rules merely because the nonlawyer is a partner or manager in an entity that also practices law as one of its major
activities.
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work in the firm become partners. D.C. Rule 5.4 is not designed to
foster the development of MDPs. By reason of its requirements and
limitations, the "command and control" model would inhibit the
development of multidisciplinary service providers.398
If the organized bar were to adopt D.C. Rule 5.4 as its model for
integrating multidisciplinary services into the legal profession, it is
likely that its consequences in the District of Columbia would be
replicated throughout the country. Some law firms would consider
adding non-lawyer partners. For the most part, however, the rule
would not change current practice and would not adequately
encourage the development of firms providing multidisciplinary
services.399 If one removed the requirement that a firm with nonlawyer partners must be engaged solely in the practice of law, it would
expand the types of functions that a law firm with non-lawyers could
perform. Although such modification of D.C. Rule 5.4 would be
better than the status quo in facilitating the delivery of
multidisciplinary services in the United States, it would unnecessarily
restrict non-law entities' participation in offering such services, and
would also restrict the types of services that these entities could
provide.'

398. See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 18:
[R]estricting multi-disciplinary partnerships to the provision of legal services
is, in a fundamental sense, something of an oxymoron. The defining
characteristic of MDPs is that the services provided do not fall within the
exclusive competence of members of one profession. The essence of the
advantages from a client perspective of integrated professional service
provision ... is largely negated by attempting to confine MDPs to singledisciplinary practices-an obvious contradiction in terms..
399. One major reason why Washington, D.C., firms have not rushed out to add
non-lawyer partners is that these partners often perform non-legal services and do not
want to be bound by the D.C. legal ethics rules with respect to these non-legal
services. For example, a non-lawyer who performs lobbying services does not
understand why she should be bound by the legal ethics rules when she is already
regulated by congressional lobbying rules.
400. The criticisms of D.C. Rule 5.4 here relate only to the manner in which this
rule would affect multidisciplinary services in the United States; they have no bearing
on the rule as a provision affecting lawyer and non-lawyer partners providing legal
services. Although it is unlikely that this rule will work as the model for a more
broad-based approach for facilitating multidisciplinary practice, D.C. Rule 5.4 is
considerably better than the status quo because it encourages lawyers to bring in nonlawyers as partners in an effort to deliver quality legal services to clients.
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4. The "Contract" Model "
Under the "contract" model of multidisciplinary services, a law firm
may agree to an advertising affiliation with a professional services
firm, agree to refer clients to that entity on a nonexclusive basis, or
agree to purchase or exchange services from that firm. This affiliation
or arrangement is initiated with a contract identifying what each
separate firm will contribute to the contractual arrangement. When
most authorities describe a contractual arrangement, they presume
that no direct sharing of legal fees is implicated in the affiliation.
Many contractual arrangements, however, do provide for some form
of exchange of information, services, or support. Thus, indirectly,
services and/or funds may change hands between the law firm and the
non-legal service provider.
The reason why two entities would enter into such a contractual
affiliation relates to the services that each contributes to the client and
the image that such an arrangement projects to the public.
Frequently, the most important aspect of the contractual MDP
involves advertising.'
Two separate service providers often
undertake a publicity campaign to attract clients who seek integrated
services. Often, one provider is seeking to bolster a weak aspect of
their practice, perhaps by adding a new area of service or a new
geographic region.
A second dimension of the contractual MDP relates to the sharing
of information and support on a particular matter. At one level, a
contractual MDP could be a "highly touted" formalized referral
arrangement. For example, a law firm that does tax litigation but no
transactional work could refer cases to another entity for the
transactional work in exchange for referrals of litigation cases. At
another level, the two professional service firms could serve as second
chair on each other's cases or local counsel in out-of-state cases. Such
sharing of services works only if both sides benefit roughly equally
and the firms' clients are satisfied with the arrangement.
A final purpose for a contractual affiliation relates to services that
each party needs from the other party. The relationship is premised
upon an exchange-of-services rationale. A law firm that needed, for
example, a restructuring of its telecommunications system or
computer support system could exchange services with an accounting
401. This model is Model 4 in the ABA Commission's Hypolheticals and Models.
See ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 267. This Article's
description of the "contract" model is based on the ABA Commission's description of
the model, in which no mention is made of the sharing of fees or costs between the
law and non-law entities. Thus, it is assumed that the "contract" model, as described
by the ABA Commission, differs substantially from the model described in the next
subpart of the Article, called the "joint venture" model.
402. This is similar to the benefit derived from the advertising of a specialty. See
Model Rules Rule 7.4.
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firm needing legal assistance in, for example, drafting agreements for
its clients. Such an exchange of legal services for "back office"
support occurs in many European countries. In the French legal
profession, many of these arrangements lead to a "captive" law firm,
which is a firm available primarily to the clients of the affiliated entity,
in most instances, a Big Five accounting firm."°
A limited version of the contractual MDP is permissible under the
current rules of professional responsibility, and some law firms have
created such contractual affiliations.4" The major restrictions on such
an affiliation involve an inability to share fees and a need to keep
formal lines of authority within each profession. For example, the
association of the Miller & Chevalier law firm with
PricewaterhouseCoopers several years ago seems to fit this model. 05
Law firms have established affiliations with other professional service
providers in many countries outside of the United States.4°6 These
affiliations take many forms, depending on the regulatory structure of
the country. For example, a Scottish law firm, Dundas & Wilson,
formed a relationship with Arthur Andersen whereby Arthur
Andersen provides office support services to the law firm, including
telephone and computer system maintenance, and the law firm and
Arthur Andersen team together to offer services to clients. 40 As
another example, KPMG formed an alliance with Morrison &
Foerster and certain other law firms that are members of SALTNET,
a network of lawyers engaged in the practice of state and local tax
law. 40s
403. For an example of a "captive" law firm arrangement involving Ernst & Young
and a Washington, D.C., law firm, see infra text accompanying notes 409-12.
404. See National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs, Analysis of ABA Models,
supra note 392 (noting that the contract model is possible under the current rules).
405. See Press Release, Price Waterhouse and Miller & Chevalier to Provide
Coordinated Tax Controversy Service (Feb. 5, 1997) [hereinafter PW and M&C
Release] (available at <http://www.millerchevalier.com/pr/pwAlliance.html>); see also
Tax Report-Price Waterhouse and Miller & Chevalier Join Forces to Handle Tax
Issues, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at Al. This press release describes the affiliation
between the law firm and the Big Five accounting firm as a "strategic alliance to offer
coordinated United States tax controversy services to domestic corporate taxpayers
and foreign corporate taxpayers doing business in the United States." PW and M&C
Release, supra. The relationship is not clearly defined but it seems that IRS audit
controversy work will be done by PricewaterhouseCoopers, and the litigation work
will be done by Miller & Chevalier in a seamless and coordinated manner.
406. This phenomenon was explored in the Commission's Background Paper. See
ABA Commission, Background Paper,supra note 14.
407. The ABA Commission heard testimony at its hearings by Mr. Neil Cochran, a
lawyer in the Scottish firm of Dundas & Wilson, regarding this arrangement. See Neil
Cochran, Testimony Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb
4, 1999) (available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cochran2.html>).
408. See, e.g., Brenda Sandburg, MoFo Allies With Accounting Giant, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 9, 1999, at 2. Yet another example of a contractual alliance between a law firm
and a non-law professional firm is the recent alliance between the law firm of
Bingham Dana LLP and the investment firm of Legg Mason Inc. to offer
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A more aggressive form of this "contract" model approach was
recently undertaken by Ernst & Young. In the District of Columbia,
Ernst & Young has opened the "captive" law firm of McKee Nelson
Ernst & Young with four major tax partners formerly with the D.C.
branch of the law firm of King & Spalding.w By choosing this
jurisdiction, Ernst & Young took advantage of the more liberal rules
of the District of Columbia Bar regarding trade names. In one
respect, one could view much of the work performed by this law firm
as within the purview of federal tax law. It is important to note,
however, that these lawyers are holding themselves out as legal

counsel able to draft agreements and represent clients in all courts
(not just the Tax Court). Ernst & Young claims not to be sharing in
the legal fees of the law firm; instead, it has provided a non-recourse
loan to the firm and offers "back office" support 1 The partners of
the law firm have agreed to be bound by the independence rules that
apply to partners of Ernst & Young; under those rules, which are
applied on a firm-wide basis, neither a partner nor a partner's spouse
may own stock of an Ernst & Young auditing client.' Presumably,
the law firm will use Ernst & Young on all controversy work and
sophisticated investment advice. See, e.g., Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Law and Finance
Under One Roof,Nat'l LJ., Nov. 15, 1999, at A21.
409. See generally Jonathan Groner & Siobhan Roth, Envisoning a Big 5 Law
Firm: Ernst & Young Positioningto Offer Full Legal Services, Legal Times, Oct. 25,
1999, at 1. This firm is the first U.S. law firm with the name of a Big Five accounting
firm in its law firm name. Professor Geoffrey Hazard describes this arrangement as
follows:
The names of people who were not lawyers have been tacked on pursuant to
a rule in the District of Columbia that permits a law firm to use a trade
name. Thus, lawyers have the trade name as a subscript to their
identification, and Ernst & Young has held out their affiliation with the law
firm. I have it from a reliable source that Ernst & Young chose to include
their name in the firm's name in defiance of the organized bar, challenging
the bar to try to suppress the arrangement. There was an additional reason
they wanted to include Ernst & Young in the firm name-that designation
permitted the accountants to advertise the relationship particularly to their
European clients, in effect saying that they had special access to super
American tax lawyers who will be able to help out. Under the current rules,
at least in the District of Columbia, there is nothing wrong with including
Ernst & Young in the firm's name.
Hazard, Foreword,supra note 96, at 1086.
410. See, eg., Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will Finance Launch of Law Firm in
Special Arrangement, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B10. Some leading commentators,
including Professor Bernard Wolfman of the Harvard Law School, have questioned
whether this purported debt arrangement is in substance an equity interest by Ernst &
Young in the law firm. See Sheryl Stratton, Ernst & Young Law Firm Financing
Questionedat ABA Meetings, 86 Tax Notes 1060 (2000).
411. See Sheryl Stratton, Ethics Lawyers, E&Y Partner Debate Multidisciplinary
Practice, 87 Tax Notes 1451 (2000). It is unclear, however, whether the Ernst &
Young law firm has adopted a similar approach for testing conflicts of interest. Id. at
1451-52. As discussed earlier in this Article, see supra note 298, in June of 2000, the
SEC proposed revisions to its auditor independence rules regarding stock ownership
interests of auditing firm personnel in audit clients.
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other matters that accountants may legally perform. The precise
details of this arrangement are not fully known except to the parties
involved.412
It may not be immediately apparent why this "contract" approach
would not be sufficient to meet client needs for multidisciplinary
services. Although law firms could enter into such an arrangement in
virtually all states under current law, very few have done so with other
professional services firms or with other law firms in so-called "law
firm networks. '413 In fact, many law firms prefer the option of
merging with another law firm in lieu of forming a contractual
network. It would be possible to obtain most of these advantages by
closely integrating the separate firms.414
Various reasons may explain why many American law firms are
seeking to merge with London firms to create a single firm with a
global presence, or are enlarging the size and number of their branch
offices. 415 First, U.S. law firms recognize that a common partnership
fosters a shared culture and produces consistently high-quality work
product with uniform attention to professional standards. A unified
firm creates a fabric of mutual dependence, teamwork, and
collaborative effort, rather than an ad hoc approach to client
problems. The motivation driving law firms to merge is the desire to
create one firm culture with numerous lawyers trained in multiple
specialties that can provide both a wide-range of legal services and
clear accountability to clients.416
Two firms with separate
methodologies and technologies, including different policies and
procedures, may produce an uneven work product.417 The "contract"
model fails to address this problem adequately.
412. For a critique of this arrangement, see Lawrence J. Fox, New Firm: Wolf in
Sheep's Clothing?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at A23.
413. A few law firm networks have been formed. See, e.g., Legal Netlink (visited
July 22, 2000) <http://www.legalnetlink.com> (loosely affiliated network of lawyers in
small and medium size law firms in the United States and throughout the world); Lex
Mundi (visited July 22, 2000) <http://www.lexmundi.org/AboutLM/statement.html>

("Lex Mundi is an organization of independent law firms providing for the exchange
of professional information about the local and global practice and development of
law" and comprising "158 members, with 375 offices and 12,500 attorneys in over 90
countries.").
414. For example, the District of Columbia office of Ernst & Young could be
affiliated closely with the law firm of McKee Nelson Ernst & Young. See supra text
accompanying notes 409-12.
415. See Paul M. Barrett, Drive to Go Global Spurs Law-Firm Merger Talk, Wall
St. J., Mar. 18, 1999, at Bi.
416. Another reason for law firm merger may be that, ultimately, law firms fear

that the current prohibition against partnerships with multidisciplinary firms may
place them at a competitive disadvantage with their European counterparts, who are
able to provide clients with integrated, comprehensive services. See Kathryn A.
Oberly, Statement Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb.

4,
1999)
[hereinafter
Statement
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/oberlyl.html>).

of

417. -See Trebilcock & Csorgo, supra note 187, at 5:

Oberly]

(available

at
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Further, the contractual arrangement often fails to result in added
revenue or business for a service provider. In fact, many contractual
affiliations have the potential to foster competition instead of
collaboration between firms. When a service provider sends a client
and matter to another service provider, there is a risk that the client
may prefer the second service provider's work and that the referral
may lead to the eventual loss of a client. Although fostering
competition and client choice are worthy values, the accompanying
risks deter many firms from referring clients to other professional
service entities.
In addition, use of the "contract" model in the United States would
not avoid the regulatory battle with the organized bar. As long as the
legal profession embraces the prohibition against fee-sharing with
non-lawyers, these contractual arrangements will lead to numerous
complaints that the cost-sharing contracts amount to fee-sharing with
a non-lawyer. Further, to the extent that the non-lawyers provide
"back office support" to the law firm, this could be viewed as either a
subsidization of the law firm or a sharing of profits between the law
firm and the non-lawyers. 48 Thus, these arrangements would provide
the participants with little comfort that they are adhering to the rules
prohibiting fee-sharing and the payment of referral fees to nonlawyers.
Moreover, the "contract" model may, as a practical matter,
preclude the joint offering of services to those clients whose demand is
most acute-the individual or small firm client. The solo and small
firm practitioners who service such clients may find it too complicated
or cumbersome to contract with other professionals, or may be fearful
that doing so will increase their exposure to liability without a
concomitant sharing of benefits. For the small firm or solo
practitioner considering a possible multidisciplinary arrangement, a
fully integrated structure simply makes more economic sense because
the risks and costs of such a venture are more easily spread among the
various participants.4"

When a client is unable to distinguish the quality of the legal advice from the

quality of the accounting advice contained in a product jointly produced by
both entities, the incentives to provide a quality product are distorted. Each
firm bears only part of the cost in reputation of any reduction in quality.

Should a client complain with respect to the joint product, each firm's
position may be to blame the other for the product's shortcomings.
418. On one hand, "back office support" and exchange of services can replicate any

profits-sharing system and thus avoid the rules against sharing legal fees with nonlawyers. On the other hand, the non-law firm does not have a direct interest in a
client fee.
419. See George
Multidisciplinary

Abbott,
Practice

Statement
(Feb

Before
12,

the ABA
2000)

Commission
(available

on
at

<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/abbott.html>) (stating that MDPs offer small business
owners the advantages of choice, convenience, and cost-effectiveness).
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5. "Joint Venture" Model4 20
The "contract" model described above does not permit the sharing
of fees between the law firm and the non-law entity. An extension of
that model is the "joint venture" model,421 which would allow two
separate firms to affiliate through a contractual relationship. Such a
relationship has the following characteristics: (1) the creation of a
joint venture entity which performs multidisciplinary services separate
and apart from both the law firm and the non-law entity; (2) the
sharing of legal and non-legal fees for work done in the joint venture
that can be distributed to the law firm and the non-law firm entities;
and (3) the advertising of a joint entity that offers legal and non-legal
services.
The first feature of the joint venture MDP is that the law firm and
the non-law firm entity remain separate and distinct. Each entity
continues to perform the traditional work done for its own clients.
The rules of each entity's respective professions continue to govern
the conduct of each entity's professionals. For the purposes of
providing integrated services, however, the law firm and the non-law
firm form a joint venture to provide integrated services. The joint
venture could be formed informally through a contract describing the
manner in which the venture operates-called a "contractual joint
venture." 4" Alternatively, it could be formed in a more formal
manner through the 4creation of a jointly owned entity-called an
"entity joint venture." " In either form, the joint venture would have
a management structure and have operational guidelines for accepting
clients and for performing integrated services. In some instances,
clients would be served by the joint venture through the delivery of
legal and non-legal services. In other instances, clients could be
referred to one of the separate companies; there, the services would
not be integrated. A potential client could also be referred out to an
unrelated firm. The purpose of the joint venture is to create a synergy
among the legal and non-legal disciplines to provide clients with the
highest quality professional services.
To facilitate the use of the joint venture MDP, the legal profession
420. This model is an extension and variation of Model 4 in the ABA
Commission's Hypotheticals and Models. See ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and
Models, supra note 267.
421. In business transactions, joint ventures can be structured as a contractual
relationship or an entity relationship.
422. In a contractual joint venture, the relationship between the parties is defined
by the terms of the contract. The parties must work out more of the details before
entering into one of these engagements because, unlike the "entity joint venture," see
infra note 423, they cannot rely on default rules provided by entity law to fill in the
details.
423. In an entity joint venture, the articles of incorporation in the case of a
corporation, or the agreement in the case of a partnership, govern control and the
sharing of profits.
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needs to relax the prohibition against the sharing of legal fees. Each
separate firm will contribute assets and labor to the joint venture. The
participants should be given the freedom to allocate profit and loss in
any way they see fit as long as the fees are earned by the joint
venture.424 This is the major difference between the "contract" model
and the "joint venture" model. The "contract" model, as interpreted
by most authorities, does not provide for the direct sharing of fees.
The "joint venture" model presumes that each participant will share
fees. The sharing of fees is very important for the viability of the
MDP as a concept. If professionals cannot share fees with each other,
they will be less likely to enter into any cooperative venture to
provide integrated services to clients. Economic ties are the best way
to foster cooperation and teamwork, rather than competition.
Moreover, the prohibition against sharing of fees leads to a potential
risk of sanctions from regulators, and encourages efforts to mask the
transfer of funds through indirect arrangements.
Additionally, the creation of a contractual or entity joint venture
allows the MDP to hold itself out as an MDP and to advertise to
potential clients. The ability to advertise integrated services delivered
through the jointly owned entity gives this form of MDP a significant
advantage over the "ancillary business" or pure "contract" model.
Advertising combined with a trade name enables the entity to attract
clients and establish brand loyalty."h
Lastly, for purposes of state bar regulation, the "joint venture"
model is easier to regulate than is the "contract" model. The "joint
venture" model separates the joint activities of legal practice and nonlegal practice into one source. With the "contract" model, state bars
will often have difficulty determining how business is referred
424. Of course, a general ban on sharing legal fees with non-lawyers outside of the
joint venture could continue and lawyers could be prohibited from paying referral or
forwarding fees to non-lawyers. See Model Rules Rule 7.2(c); Ohio S. Ct. Bd. Of
Comm. on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-1 (Feb. 11, 2000); AttorneysConflicts of Interest: Ohio Attorneys May Not Receive Fee for Referring Clients to
FinancialGroup, 68 U.S.L.W. 2549 (Mar. 21, 2000) (discussing a decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in which it

stated that a lawyer could not take a referral fee for directing a client to a financial
services firm because this would impair the lawyer's professional independence). This
Article does not take a position on how the ethical rules should treat pure referral
fees between lawyers and non-lawyers.
425. As noted in the discussion of the "contract" model, there may be a greater
tendency in such a model for the professionals to compete with each other and blame
each other for failures. When you share fees, as in the "joint venture" model, the
failures of one partner in the venture will have an economic effect on all the
participants in the venture, and the successes will benefit everyone.
426. PricewaterhouseCoopers seems to have unified all of its lawyers into a legal
network called "Landwell" for the purposes of creating brand recognition and to
attempt to become one of the top five law firms in the world. See Terry, MDP Primer,

supra note 113, at 879 (discussing the formation of the Landwell international legal
network).
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between the entities and what financial arrangement has been made.
The "joint venture" model narrows the scope of the inquiry and will
make it easier for a state bar to determine whether the non-legal
services in some way have compromised the core values of the legal
profession.
The joint venture MDP does have some disadvantages. First, the
requirement that both entities remain separate imposes a fictional
structure on the MDP that may inhibit true teamwork and synergy
with little added protection for the public. Ultimately, a spirit of
competition may pervade the culture of the arrangement. To the
extent work is profitable, one entity may seek to keep it out of the
joint entity and retain all the profit for itself. Thus, the benefits of
MDPs may not be fully realized.
Second, although the joint venture MDP may work well for
multidisciplinary arrangements between a large accounting firm and a
law firm, it will inhibit creation of small MDPs that focus on low- and
middle-income clients. It is difficult to imagine that a family law
mediation clinic or a gerontology law clinic would work as well as a
joint venture MDP because these types of clinics often require the
partnering and close working relationship that a single entity, fully
integrated MDP could provide.
Finally, unless the joint venture relationship results in significant
increases in profit to both the non-law and law entities, it is likely that
the potential joint liability would discourage the formation of such
entities. A professional services firm would not expose itself to
liability if the current and future rewards from the venture did not
justify the risk. Despite these disadvantages, the joint venture MDP
would be a significant improvement over current law, particularly if
the ABA and state bars are not yet ready fully to embrace
multidisciplinary services in the form of the fully integrated MDP.
6. The "Fully Integrated MDP" Model427
The final model, the fully integrated MDP, involves a fully
integrated partnership or professional corporation with lawyer and
non-lawyer owners offering client services.428 In this model, lawyers
can practice in law firms and non-law firms and non-lawyers can be
co-owners of non-law entities or law firms delivering legal services.
The fully integrated MDP is an entity where the individual lawyers
427. This model is Model 5 in the ABA Commission's Hypotheticals and Models.
See ABA Commission, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 267. It is referred to in
this Article variously as the "fully integrated" model, the "fully integrated services"
model, and the "fully integrated MDP" model.
428. An example of this type of MDP is the Netherlands' PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP. See Sam DiPiazza, Jr., Oral Testimony Before the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Oral Testimony of DiPiazza]
(available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/dipiazzal.html>).
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and non-lawyers can determine the extent to which they own the firm,
share in profits, manage the decisions of the firm, and provide legal
and non-legal services. Thus, this model provides the greatest
flexibility to the lawyer and non-lawyer participants in structuring
their arrangement.
The benefits of allowing fully integrated MDPs are significant.
First, it is this model which permits the most efficient and coordinated
delivery of services from professionals in multiple disciplines. The
premise in allowing a single entity MDP is that professionals should
be free to structure the entity in whatever way best serves client
interests. This freedom allows innovation. Innovation in the delivery
of legal and non-legal professional services is necessary because the
needs of clients change as the ways of conducting business change.
The single entity MDP offers the best opportunity for professional
service firms to experiment with new ways of delivering professional
services to clients.
Second, the "fully integrated" model is most likely to foster
teamwork and cooperation in delivering integrated services.
Multidisciplinary firms can fully share knowledge and intellectual
capital to provide integrated solutions to client problems. These firms
can support the communication networks and common strategies that
are vital to delivering client services. A fully integrated MDP allows
the market to provide the most efficient delivery of legal and nonlegal services to clients.
Third, fee-sharing and allocation of income and expenses are
integral to a fully integrated MDP. Thus, although a joint venture
allows some economic ties that are likely to produce cooperation
among professionals, a fully integrated MDP is the best model for
achieving that cooperation. The participants in a fully integrated
MDP will act to maximize profits and minimize the risk of mistake
because it is in their joint economic self-interests to do so.
Finally, the single entity MDP is most likely to be the model used to
deliver integrated services to low- and middle-income clients. As
discussed earlier in this Article, large corporations will have access to
integrated professional services under the status quo.4 -9 These large
entities can obtain integrated services in-house, from de facto MDPs,
or from foreign MDPs. Low- and middle-income clients do not have
the same opportunities for obtaining integrated services under current
law. It is the formation of single entity, fully integrated MDPs that
offers the best chance of making integrated professional services
available to this category of clients.

429. See supra Part I.A.3.
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C. Which Model Should the ABA and State Bars Adopt?
The "cooperation" model ("status quo" model) has not in the past
and will not in the future foster the development of integrated
services. The incentives for cooperation do not exist once there are
no opportunities for ownership in the venture or for sharing of fees
with non-law professionals. Law firms are not able to hire all non-law
professionals as independent contractors or as employees. The
conclusion is similar for the "ancillary business" model. Model Rule
5.7 was not designed to facilitate the delivery of integrated services.
Thus, what is left for consideration are the "command and control"
model, the "contract" model, the "joint venture" model, and the "fully
integrated services" model.
The "command and control" model as discussed by the ABA
Commission clearly embraces the D.C. version of Rule 5.4. In this
form, the requirements that services fall within the practice of law,
that all non-lawyers follow the rules of professional conduct, and that
activities take place only in a law firm make the rule very unattractive
for fostering multidisciplinary services. The fact that, under this
model, multidisciplinary services must take place only in a law firm
seems to be unjustified given that lawyers frequently practice with
non-lawyers in non-law entities such as government agencies and
corporations.
Under any version of the "command and control" model, law firms
must control multidisciplinary services if any part of the service
involves the practice of law. Lawyers naturally would find comfort in
such an approach because it places them at the controls of most
business venture MDPs. One should question, however, whether such
a requirement is necessary to preserve the core values of the
profession.
It is clear that there are less restrictive means to protect the core
values of the legal profession. There are cooperative legal and nonlegal professional service arrangements in which legal services would
be a small or minor part of the services delivered to the client. Family
mediation centers, disabled children clinics, and gerontological
services centers are all examples in which the legal service component
is likely to be a small part of the services delivered to the client. Thus,
in a bar jurisdiction that decides to adopt the "command and control"
model, these types of MDPs would be unlikely to develop.43 ° Also,
many non-lawyers will be hesitant to join an MDP controlled and
majority owned by lawyers. Therefore, the "command and control"
model would hinder the formation of MDPs that are directed toward
middle- and low-income clients.
430. Lawyers may decline to participate in such arrangements because of lack of
substantive knowledge of the other field, because of the potential liability, or because
the non-lawyer professionals may demand too large a share of the compensation.
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The purpose underlying the requirements of the "command and
control" model is that lawyers are more likely to follow the rules of
the legal profession and more likely to protect the client's interests
especially in matters of attorney-client privilege and conflicts of
interest. Of course, the bar would always prefer to impose rules and
an enforcement scheme upon its own members over which it has
considerable power. That does not mean, however, that a similar
system of regulation and enforcement cannot be designed for legal
services in a non-law firm. There are no serious arguments under the
current ethical rules that corporations should not be able to hire inhouse lawyers or that lawyers who work in non-law firm settings are
violating the rules of ethics and injuring client interests.
The "contract" model and the "joint venture" model both allow the
MDPs to be formed separately from the participating entities. The
major difference between the two models involves whether legal fees
can be shared with non-lawyers. As stated before, each professional
entity must keep its fees and cost structure separate. Thus, the pure
"contract" model does not provide the direct incentives for
cooperation and synergy that result from the delivery of integrated
services. The exchange of services or back office support does,
however, provide the entities with the opportunity to mirror the
economic effect created by sharing legal fees. Therefore, as between
the two models, there are very few reasons to prefer the "contract"
model to the joint venture MDP. The "joint venture" model has the
benefit of keeping the professional entities separate while allowing the
joint venture to act more as a separate entity which has the capability
of offering true multidisciplinary services.
Thus, what remains for consideration are the joint venture MDP
and the fully integrated MDP. Close scrutiny reveals that the fully
integrated multidisciplinary firm is optimal because it would best
satisfy the strong demand for integrated services. This model could be
regulated so that the core values of the legal profession would not be
endangered. It would best satisfy the needs of individual and small
business clients and the small firms and solo practitioners that service
them. The "fully integrated MDP" model, together with appropriate
bar regulation to protect clients and the core values of the legal
profession, allows the market in legal services to function without
unnecessary restrictions.4 1 As long as client interests and the core
431. A more acceptable approach from a political perspective could be to adopt a
rule permitting fully integrated MDPs only if they are lawyer controlled, but
permitting joint venture MDPs without the command-and-control requirement. This
intermediate approach could be more acceptable from a political perspective because
firms that deliver legal services with lawyer and non-lawyer partners would remain
under the control of lawyers. If a non-law firm wanted to deliver legal services,
however, it could do so through a joint venture with a group of lawyers, and each
party (the law firm and the non-law firm) could share legal fees. The authors do not
endorse this approach other than to point out its political appeal.
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values of the profession are properly protected, it is unreasonable to
prohibit this form of multidisciplinary practice.
As a compromise alternative to the fully integrated MDP, the "joint
venture" model accommodates many, but not all, forms of
multidisciplinary practice. A system that would allow lawyers and
non-lawyers to form a joint venture, either contractual or entity,
would foster the development of integrated services. Law firms and
non-law firms would have an incentive to cooperate in a venture
because of the opportunity for enhanced marketing efforts.
Moreover, for most clients, the joint venture would produce
integrated solutions to their problems. The potential downsides of the
joint venture MDP are that it may unnecessarily limit innovation in
the delivery of integrated services, and that it may have a negative
impact on MDPs aimed at middle- and low-income clients. Doctors,
lawyers, and medicare-claims specialists would be less likely to
operate through jointly owned entities than through entities in which
they could be partners. Thus, at a minimum, the ABA and state bars
should amend their rules to permit liberal contractual affiliations
between law firms and non-law firms aiming to provide
multidisciplinary services to the public.
D. Regulating MultidisciplinaryPracticeto Protect the Core Values of
the Legal Profession
Opponents of MDPs raise serious concerns that integrated firms
offering legal services could threaten certain core values of the legal
profession. 32 In particular, they argue that MDPs will undermine four
specific core values of the profession: (1) independence of judgment,
(2) confidentiality, (3) loyalty, and (4) competence. These concerns
are legitimate but should not lead the bar to categorically prohibit
MDPs. Instead, the bar should deal forthrightly with these difficult
and important issues, and fashion specific, narrow rules to preserve
the core values of the legal profession.4 33
A primary issue that arises with respect to the regulation of MDPs
involves what set of rules the individual professionals should follow in
their practice. Most authorities reach the same conclusion. Lawyers
holding themselves out as lawyers engaged in the practice of law must
follow the rules of the legal profession." This conclusion is grounded
in theoretical and practical reasoning. Theoretically, when a client
hires a lawyer to perform legal services, the client has expectations
432. See, e.g., Sydney, M. Cone, III, Comments on ABA Commission Report
Released
June
8,
1999
(June
22,
1999)
(available
at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cone3.html>).
433. A discussion of the core values of the legal profession is complicated because
many of the problems are interrelated. In other words, often a criticism of an aspect
of an MDP will require analysis of several interrelated core values.
434. See Daly, Reporter's Notes, supra note 11.
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about the relationship that is formed. Practically, the law of attorneyclient privilege dictates that to preserve confidentiality a lawyer must
act in furtherance of the client's desire to obtain legal services.435
Because many clients seek the protection of the privilege, lawyers
delivering legal advice must structure the services in such a way as to
protect the privilege.
A question arises whether all individuals within an MDP would be
required to follow the rules of the legal profession. In the D.C. Rule
5.4 "command and control" model, the answer is easy. Because the
only services that a District of Columbia entity operating under the
rule may provide are legal in nature, non-lawyers working in the
entity would be required to follow the lawyer's professional
responsibility rules. One could argue that all individuals working in
any entity formed under the "command and control" model should be
required to follow legal ethics rules because the lawyers are in charge
of the entity. Just because the lawyers are in charge, however, does
not mean that the bar should impose the lawyer's rules on all nonlawyers in the firm. The imposition of rules should depend on the
work performed by non-lawyers and on whether the client and the
MDP choose to treat the work as primarily legal in nature.
Whether an MDP arises under the "command and control" model
or the "fully integrated MDP" model, the application of ethics rules
and the extent to which lawyers control a transaction depend on the
desires and reasonable expectations of the client and the nature of the
services delivered.4 36 When a client approaches an MDP, the
interview process must necessarily include an inquiry about the
services sought by the potential client. In some instances, the services
may be clearly non-legal, such as computer programming or product
testing. In other circumstances, however, the prospective services
may be clearly legal and such that the prospective client seeks the
protections afforded to an attorney-client relationship. In some
situations, the services may include both a non-legal and legal
component, such as taking a product abroad and establishing a web
presence in a foreign country. In that case, it would be up to the
prospective client whether the services were classified primarily as
legal services or primarily as non-legal services.4 An integral part of
435. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 251-53.
436. Note that the situation could arise where a lawyer decides that he or she does
not want to continue to practice law in an MDP. In such a case, if a licensed lawyer
works on non-legal matters and does not hold himself or herself out as a lawyer, the
rules of the legal profession should not attach to such non-legal work.
437. One might wonder why a potential client may choose the non-legal approach
to problems that may have both legal and non-legal components. If the attorneyclient privilege is not important to the client, and if most of the work is non-legal, then
choosing the legal approach would end up costing the client more money than
choosing the non-legal approach.

The legal approach would be more expensive

because lawyers would need to control the representation in order to protect the
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this discussion with the client would be a disclosure of the benefits4 and
8
detriments of characterizing the relationship as legal or non-legal. If
the potential client seeks the protection of attorney-client rules, then
lawyers and non-lawyers (directly and through lawyer supervision)
must follow the rules of the legal profession. If the potential client
seeks primarily a non-legal engagement, then the non-lawyers could
provide the services without following the rules of the legal profession
or without the supervision of the lawyers. 439 This result protects client
expectations and the legal profession's desire to regulate lawyers, yet
allows MDPs the flexibility to offer purely non-legal services.
The problem of applying the legal profession's rules may be
accentuated slightly in a fully integrated MDP because it may be
difficult to know when lawyers are delivering legal services and when
they are delivering non-legal services, such as business consulting.
Clients may have difficulty knowing the difference between legal
services and non-legal services and lines may become blurred within a
fully integrated entity. This confusion may lead to loss of attorneyclient confidentiality or imposition of unanticipated tort liability if a
disappointed client decides to pursue legal action against the MDP.
For these reasons, in a fully integrated MDP, lawyers holding
themselves out to clients as engaged in the practice of law should be
organized in a separate legal department within the MDP.
Grouping all practicing lawyers in a legal department would also
avoid client confusion about the nature of the services being provided
by the particular professional in the MDP. A client would know that
she is receiving legal services if a lawyer from the legal department
works on her engagement. 440 Lawyers in that department would
report to, and be supervised by, lawyers. Delivery of services by any
lawyer in the legal department, even services that involve a
combination of legal and business advice, would be governed by the
rules of professional responsibility." 1 Lawyers in the legal department
would be required to comply with the bar rules in the jurisdictions in
privilege.
438. This is similar to the informed consent and disclosure provided to a potential
client concerning the decision to accept one lawyer to represent multiple clients, or
when a conflict of interest arises under the Model Rules. See Model Rules Rule
1.7(b).
439. Note, however, that only lawyers could perform activities that involve the
practice of law and those lawyers would be subject to the legal ethics rules.
440. See Oral Testimony of DiPiazza, supra note 428 (suggesting that where there
are two types of lawyers in an MDP, grouping lawyers who hold themselves out as
practicing law into a separate legal department helps ensure that clients understand
the role of each type of lawyer).
441. See id. In his testimony, Mr. DiPiazza stated that a lawyer who is in a nonlegal service division within an integrated MDP would not be subject to the rules of
professional responsibility and that "care needs to be taken that no impression is
created, outside the legal services division, that the person at the table is there as a
lawyer." Id.
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which they are licensed, and would need to satisfy any continuing
legal education and pro bono requirements imposed in those
jurisdictions. As is the case today, lawyers in a legal department
would bear responsibility for the individuals that they supervise. A
single legal department would also make it easier for a local
disciplinary authority to regulate the practice of law in an MDP."2
Of course, not all individuals trained and licensed as lawyers will
elect to practice in a legal department. Today, accounting firms hire
individuals trained as lawyers to provide tax advice to clients, and
these individuals claim that they do not hold themselves out as
lawyers and do not create client expectations that they are practicing
as lawyers." 3 These individuals should be able to continue to provide
tax advice to clients without joining a legal department if and only if
they do not hold themselves out as lawyers, and do not create any
client expectations that the legal profession's rules apply. To ensure
that clients fully understand that lawyers practicing in a non-legal
department are not acting as lawyers, the rules governing MDPs
would need to require that the client be informed that the lawyer is
not practicing law and that none of the protections of the attorneyclient relationship applies. A client who seeks the protections of the
attorney-client relationship (including the attorney-client privilege)
would be well advised not to bring their tax law problems to an MDP
that does not have a separate legal department, such as a Big Five
accounting firm.
Even if the above suggestions are incorporated into a framework of
rules designed to foster MDPs, it is still necessary to address the effect
of MDPs on efforts to protect the core values of the legal profession.
1. Maintaining Confidences
Some commentators have expressed concern that client information
from a joint engagement would be shared between lawyers and nonlawyers in the firm, thus compromising the ethical duty of
confidentiality and destroying the protection of the attorney-client
privilege.4'
This concern rests, however, on the erroneous
442. The compliance issue led to the ABA Commission's recommendation that
non-lawyer controlled MDPs submit themselves to annual audits of their practices.
See Daly, Reporter's Notes, supra note 11. As discussed elsewhere, the authors do
not believe that an audit requirement directed only at non-lawyer controlled MDPs

sufficiently protects the public interest. See infra text accompanying notes 516-20. It is
difficult to justify the disparate treatment between lawyer controlled MDPs and those
controlled by non-lawyers.

443. See Statement of Oberly, supra note 416 (describing the role of lawyers in
accounting firms); Written Remarks of Treiger & Lipton, supra note 385 (describing
the organization of accounting firms). But see supra note 126 (criticizing the claim by

the accounting firms that they are not practicing law).
444. See eg., Gary T. Johnson, Unpublished Paper Presented to the Assembly of
the Michigan State Bar Association (Jan. 22,2000) [hereinafter Unpublished Johnson
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assumption that a lawyer can never share confidential client
information with a non-lawyer. Lawyers share such information all
the time-with secretaries, paralegals, experts, and others who assist
them in rendering legal advice to a client. Confidentiality and the
privilege are preserved because, under Model Rule 5.3, the lawyer
must instruct the non-lawyers with whom he or she works of the duty
not to disclose information relating to the representation of clients on
legal matters. This requirement has force because a lawyer can be
disciplined if his or her non-lawyer associates reveal confidential client
information.
The situation would be precisely the same for a lawyer working on
an engagement with non-lawyers in an integrated services firm.
Concerns about confidentiality are addressed at the outset of the
engagement. Thus, the question is whether a client's communication
with the lawyer is made to obtain legal advice, or whether the
communication was made to obtain non-legal services, such as
strategic financial advice. The key here is transparency: the client
must be informed from the start that the privilege may not attach to
communications with non-lawyers for the purpose of obtaining nonlegal advice. It is imperative that MDPs clearly explain whether or
not the client is obtaining legal services and whether or not the
privilege will apply to the services.
A recent decision highlights the confusion that can result when an
MDP performs both legal and non-legal services for the same client.
In United States v. Frederick,4 5 a professional who was both a lawyer
and an accountant provided services to a client. The professional
drafted a client's tax return and then participated in the defense of an
audit. The IRS issued a summons for hundreds of documents to
which the professional responded by asserting the attorney-client
privilege. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court decision that
the professional had served in a dual role for the client. He prepared
tax returns for the client, which is not the practice of law, and
represented the client in a controversy before the IRS, which may
constitute the practice of law. In fact, the professional knew when
preparing the returns that the IRS was conducting an audit of the
client. Judge Posner found that, in a dual-purpose representation, the
documents prepared by the lawyer-accountant both for use in
preparing tax returns and for use in litigation were not privileged.446
Paper] (available at <http://www.abanet.orglcpr/johnson2.html>); PreliminaryReport
of the New Jersey State Bar Association Ad Hoc Committee on Multidisciplinary

Practice (1999) [hereinafter
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
njsba.html>).

NJSBA

Preliminary Report]

(available

445. 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1157 (2000).

446. See id. at 501-03. Judge Posner stated:
[A] dual-purpose document-a document prepared for use in preparing tax
returns and for use in litigation-is not privileged; otherwise, people in or

at
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Frederick stands for the proposition that if taxpayers employ two
separate professionals in different firms, then the documents prepared
by the lawyer solely for use in litigation would be privileged and
would not be discoverable. The documents prepared by any
professional (whether an accountant or lawyer) for use in preparing
tax returns, however, would not be privileged and would be
discoverable through the summons. This case illustrates a potential
ambiguity in the law when both representations arise in the MDP, and
a need to fully inform the client of the scope of the privilege. This
case is very troublesome for MDPs seeking to do dual-purpose
representations in the tax area.
With the appropriate information, clients with confidentiality
concerns can decide whether to use lawyers in the MDP, or instead
retain a separate law firm and thereby protect the attorney-client
privilege. It is important that the client be fully informed both about
the nature of the professional relationship being performed by the
MDP (i.e., whether or not an attorney-client relationship is formed),
and about which communications between the client and professionals
in the MDP will be covered by the attorney-client privilege. In the
light of the severe damage that loss of confidentiality and privilege
could inflict on clients of an MDP, MDPs must put in place structures
that preserve client confidentiality in the delivery of legal services.
2. Independent Professional Judgment
A number of commentators have maintained that participation of
non-lawyers in organizations offering legal services would diminish
the independence of lawyers. 447 None of these commentators,
contemplating litigation would be able to invoke, in effect, an accountant's

privilege, provided that they used their lawyer to fill out their tax returns.
And likewise if a taxpayer involved in or contemplating litigation sat down
with his lawyer (who was also his tax preparer) to discuss both legal strategy
and the preparation of his tax returns, and in the course of the discussion
bandied about numbers related to both consultations: the taxpayer could not
shield these numbers from the Internal Revenue Service. This would be not
because they were numbers, but because, being intended (though that was
not the only intention) for use in connection with the preparation of tax
returns, they were an unprivileged category of numbers.
Id. at 501-02 (emphasis in original). The documents in this case also would likely not
be privileged under the federally authorized tax adviser privilege in 26 U.S.C. § 7525,
because that privilege applies only to communications that would be privileged had
they taken place between a client and an attorney. See id. at 502. For commentary on
the implications of the Frederickdecision, see Christopher S. Rizek, Question at Heart
of New Tax Adviser Priviledge-When is Tax Practice 'Legal', Legal Times, July 5,
1999, at S24.
447. See, e.g., Gary T. Johnson, Written Testimony to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Oct. 8,1999) (available at <httpJ/www.abanet.org/cpr/
johnson.html>) (arguing that professional independence will be jeopardized if
"individual professionals [within an MDP] march to the beat of their own ethical
drummers"); Unpublished Johnson Paper, supra note 444; Written Testimony of
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however, has offered any substantial evidence to support their
concern." 8 Professional independence is undoubtedly an important
value for clients. When a client seeks the professional advice of a
lawyer, the client justifiably expects to receive advice that is not
tainted by influence from a non-lawyer trying to increase firm profits,
seeking to sell a product, or seeking to peddle a non-legal service. 4 9 It
is important to note, however, that although the pressures on

professional independence already exist in today's legal profession as
law has become increasingly more competitive and attuned to the
bottom line, most lawyers are nonetheless able to deliver independent
professional advice.450 Thus, it remains to be seen whether the
presence of non-lawyers as partners/owners of the firm will in fact
451
jeopardize the independence of the lawyers providing legal services.
Although this Article favors no specific limit on the structure of the
MDP, this professional independence issue is of great concern, and
thus the regulation of MDPs should include rules that minimize the
potential for such interference with the lawyer's independent

professional judgment.
The requirement that, in fully integrated MDPs, lawyers who
practice law and hold themselves out to clients and the public as
offering legal services be placed together in a separate legal

department offers significant protection against such influence. It
mirrors the same protection that exists in corporate legal departments
when lawyers are grouped under a general counsel in a legal
department structure.4 "

Such a department should significantly

Krane, supra note 288; NJSBA PreliminaryReport, supra note 444.
448. The authors acknowledge that if it were in fact the case that professional
independence is impaired because of co-ownership of professional service
organization by lawyers and non-lawyers, it would be difficult to find evidence of that
impairment.
449. See Jones & Manning, supra note 214, at 1206-10 (proposing a new Model
Rule 1.18 on independence of professional judgement and a modified Model Rule 5.4
on lawyer participation in an MDP).
450. See generally Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional
Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principlein Legal Ethics, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1469
(2000) (examining in detail the profession's desire to implement "anti-interference"
rules to protect loyalty to a client).
451. Indeed, there exists significant experience to the contrary.
The legal
profession today regularly permits lawyers to be supervised by or subject to the
control of a non-lawyer. For example, in-house counsel, government lawyers, union
lawyers, and lawyers working for pre-paid legal service plans are often under the
supervision of non-lawyers. See id. at 1491-1525. There is no evidence that such nonlawyer supervision has resulted in lower-quality legal services being delivered to
lawyers' clients or that the professional independence of lawyers working in such
situations has been seriously undermined in the majority of representations.
452. Although the ethics rules do not require that a corporation place all lawyers in
a corporate legal department headed by a lawyer with reporting obligations to the
board of directors, many Fortune 500 corporations have imposed such a structure to
protect the independence of the lawyer and the advice. Such a structure by analogy
would benefit the independence of lawyers in an MDP and help protect the core

2000]

MDPs AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

reduce concern about interference by non-lawyers with the
professional independence of lawyers working in an MDP. It would
also help maintain a mentoring atmosphere in which less experienced
lawyers are trained by more experienced senior attorneys.
3. Rendering Conflict-Free Advice
Many commentators have expressed concerns about the conflictsof-interest issues that might arise in a fully integrated multidisciplinary
practice. 453 The opponents argue that accounting firms today do not
have the same conflicts-of-interest rules and that they use firewalls
and client consent to resolve many conflicts.4" A detailed discussion
of how the conflicts-of-interest rules should be reexamined for the
modern legal profession is beyond the scope of this Article.' 5 Many
of these issues, however, apply with equal force in a traditional law
firm. Most large firms with offices in different cities face similar issues
regarding conflicts of interest. Thus, when large firms in the
profession argue for increased use of (1) screening to allow
representations, (2) client consent including advance waivers, and (3)
different rules for sophisticated parties, such rules will benefit
providers of integrated services to large clients. This Article examines
three aspects of the conflicts-of-interest rules that affect MDPs.
Most of the discussion in this Article has focused on the delivery of
integrated services in the non-litigation context. Lawyers and nonlawyers can join together to offer clients a multidisciplinary approach
to their transactions and business problems. Although this point has
not been discussed extensively in the literature, nothing automatically
precludes considering a multidisciplinary approach to litigation.
values of the profession.
453. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Statement of Position on
Multidisciplinary Practice (July 20, 1999) [hereinafter Statement of New York City
Bar] (available at <http//wwv.abanet.org/cpr/abcny.html>) (arguing that conflicts
issues merit special attention in MDPs because they are likely to be more prevalent in
a fully integrated multidisciplinary practice); Unpublished Johnson Paper, supra note
444; Written Testimony of Krane, supra note 288; NJSBA PreliminaryReport, supra
note 444.
454. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Code of
Professional Conduct for certified public accountants takes the approach that the dual
representation of clients who are directly adverse to one another is prohibited.
Where there is only an indirect adverse interest between clients, the imputation rules
do not apply. See Sam DiPiazza, Jr., Written Remarks to the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Written Remarks of DiPiazza,
Jr.] (available at <http.//wwwv.abanet.org/cpr/dipiazza.html>) (describing the AICPA
Code's approach to directly adverse conflicts).
455. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts
of Interest, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1992) (arguing for bright line rules in conflicts of
interest to reduce transaction costs); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 Iowa L Rev. 965 (1997)
(tailoring conflict-of-interest rules to economic theory as gap-fillers to the attorneyclient contract).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Securities litigation often requires proof provided by other
disciplines. 6 Class actions are perfect candidates for management by
large accounting firms.
If one were to permit MDPs to litigate cases in court, the lawyers in
the MDP would need to be solely responsible for the execution and
supervision of the entire matter. This would help to ensure that the
obligations of lawyers to the tribunal as officers of the court are
fulfilled. The non-lawyers would simply help the lawyers in a manner
similar to how paralegals and other non-lawyers help litigation
attorneys. The major problem with allowing an MDP to do litigation
work involves potential conflicts with the MDP's other clients. One
could imagine the conflicts that a Big Five accounting firm would have
if its future legal department began to litigate cases.
To deal with these problems, it is tempting to establish a rule that
the legal services department of a single entity MDP should not be
able to represent clients in litigation in state and federal courts.457 A
litigation carve-out could be justified because of the unique role of
lawyers who appear in federal and state court proceedings. Litigation
is a public function of the judiciary and the judicial system needs to
maintain full control over all professionals who appear in the courts.
Further, it is important to maintain the role of lawyers as officers of
the court. 458 This litigation bar could ensure that the standards of
discovery practice and duties of candor to the court are properly
maintained. Ultimately, in litigation, the tasks and control of
litigation should remain with the legal profession. This "core of law
practice" exception could be justified by the special nature of
litigation and the importance of protecting the public and the judicial
system.
The litigation carve-out is, however, unnecessary. Nothing in any of
the models of MDPs, including the fully integrated MDP, gives nonlawyers the power to control litigation. Lawyers, regardless of the
model, must have authority and control over legal matters, including
litigation. Thus, a litigation carve-out is not needed to ensure that
litigation matters remain within the purview of lawyers. Moreover, in
applying a litigation carve-out, it would often be difficult to categorize
a matter as a litigation or non-litigation matter. For example, it is
unclear whether an administrative dispute with the IRS that has not
yet resulted in any court filings is a litigation matter or a non-litigation
matter. Similarly, an arbitration matter or other alternative dispute
resolution matter is not easily characterized. Matters that start out as
456. For example, accountants, computer-modeling experts, and MBAs all could
contribute valuable services to the litigation team.

457. One of the authors made this suggestion at the ABA Commission's hearings.
See Statement of Dzienkowski, supra note 266.
458. Cf Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39
(1989).
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non-litigation matters may over the course of time become litigation
matters-it is unclear when, if at all, the litigation bar on MDPs
performing such services would apply. 59 These issues would need to
be considered in the design of any litigation bar on MDPs. Of course,
as a practical matter, a large MDP that performs an array of different
types of legal and non-legal services for a large base of clients will
often be prevented from handling litigation matters because of the
conflicts-of-interest rules. Moreover, for major litigation cases, clients
may often prefer to hire traditional law firms whose work consists
largely of litigation matters because of the specialized expertise that
such firms develop.
A second important issue is how the conflicts-of-interest rules
should apply to the MDP. Under the status quo, the conflicts-ofinterest rules apply to each of the lawyer members of a law firm
directly and to each of the non-lawyer members indirectly. In other
words, the lawyers each have a duty of loyalty to their clients,' and
the supervisory and partner lawyers in the firm have a broader duty to
ensure that all lawyers and non-lawyers in the firm are following the
conflicts rules of the legal profession." The rules of the profession do
not directly apply to non-lawyer employees or independent
contractors in the firm; they apply indirectly by reason of the partners
and supervisory lawyers requiring non-lawyers to follow the standards
of the profession as a condition of employment. Thus, if a law firm
hired a marketing specialist in European Union trade, the firm would
need to ensure that this employee followed the conflicts-of-interest
rules. All matters brought into the firm, whether involving primarily
the services of lawyers or non-lawyers, would need to be handled
according to the rules of the profession.
Under Model Rule 5.7, the "ancillary business" model, the
application of the conflicts rules is more complicated. By definition,
lawyers in a law firm have a financial interest in an ancillary business
and because of this interest they will need to examine whether their
ownership in the ancillary business does in fact create a conflict with
Model Rule 5.7,
the interests of prospective or current clients.'
459. Would the litigation carve-out apply at the outset of the matter if litigation
could be reasonably contemplated or would the MDP have to withdraw once the
court papers were filed even though it had in its employ attorneys who could
competently handle the litigation matter?
460. See Model Rules Rules 1.7 (present client conflicts rule), 1.9 (former client
conflicts rule), 1.10 (imputed disqualification rule).
461. See id Rules 5.1 (duties of partners and supervisory lawyers over lawyers in
the firm), 5.2 (obligations of associates to bring matters of ethics to partners and
supervisory lawyers), 5.3 (duties of partners and supervisory lawyers over non-lawyers
in the firm).
462 See i. Rule 1.7(b) (examining materially limited conflicts when a lawyer has a
conflict with the interests of a client). For example, if a law firm owns a court
reporting service, the firm could not represent a client seeking to overturn the courtrequired use of court reporters in litigation. Similarly, the firm could not represent a
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however, gives lawyers a choice as to whether ancillary services will be
provided along with legal services, or will be provided separately and
distinctly from legal services. If the law firm does not wish to have the
rules of the legal profession apply to ancillary business services, the
firm must keep the ancillary services separate and distinct from the
legal services, and must inform the client that the protections of the
attorney-client relationship do not apply. 463 Note that this analysis
does not relax the application of the conflicts rules; the ancillarybusiness client remains a client of the law firm and the law firm must
ensure that conflicting interests, regardless of
the source, do not
44
materially limit the representation of the client.
In the "command and control" model, D.C. Rule 5.4 answers the
question whether the conflicts-of-interest rules apply to a nonlawyer's activities. Because this rule contemplates law firms that
solely deliver legal services to clients, all lawyers and non-lawyers
must follow the rules of the legal profession. This means that all of
the conflicts-of-interest provisions, including the imputation rules,
apply in full force to all of the firm's matters (including those
performed by the non-lawyer partners in the firm).
In the "contract" model, each entity applies the rules of its
respective profession. Thus, for example, in the case of a contract
MDP involving a law firm and an accounting firm, the law firm is
bound by legal ethics rules, and the accounting firm is bound by the
ethics rules of the accounting profession. When a prospective client
approaches one of the separate entities, that entity will examine the
representation to determine whether a conflict of interest precludes
taking on the client matter. If the law firm is approached to begin
multidisciplinary services, it will first run a conflicts check. If a
disqualifying conflict exists, the law firm would have to decline the
representation and refer the prospective client to the accounting firm;
that accounting firm could retain another law firm to assist it in
providing the integrated multidisciplinary services. If no conflict
arises, the law firm would inform the accounting firm about the
prospective case. The accounting firm would then apply its own
conflicts rules and system for conflicts checks. If the accounting firm
is disqualified, the law firm could find another co-participant to
client seeking to obtain court approval for audio recording by a lawyer in the
proceeding. These two circumstances present a conflict of interest which would
require client consent after consultation.
463. See Model Rules Rule 5.7(a)(2).
464. For example, suppose that a law firm represents a married couple in a wills

and estate representation and the law firm owns an insurance company as an ancillary
business. If the insurance company proposes the sale of a single-payment policy to
fund estate taxes, the law firm would have a conflict of interest, regardless of whether
the ancillary business activity were integrated with the legal services or separate and
distinct. Model Rule 1.7(b) would need to be satisfied for the law firm to continue the
legal representation.
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handle the non-legal services in the matter. If the conflict arises
between a new client of the MDP and an existing client of the MDP,
however, the MDP may be disqualified from representing the new
client and neither professional firm participating in the MDP may
accept the representation by finding another partner to represent the
new client.
In the "joint venture" model, the conflicts analysis should be similar
to that of "contract" model. The professional entities are kept
separate. They form a contractual or entity joint venture to provide
multidisciplinary services to clients. If a potential new client of the
MDP has a conflict with an existing client of the MDP, then both
entities would be precluded from representing the new client. If,
however, the conffict arises only with respect to an existing client from
one of the separate entities, the other entity could possibly pursue the
representation with another co-venturer. A complete analysis of the
problem would require more information about the facts and type of
representation, but the imputation from one entity of a joint venture
MDP to another should not be automatic.
In applying the conflicts-of-interest rules to the single entity MDP,
imputation of conflicts of interest becomes a key question for the
viability of single entity MDPs. One important aspect of this issue is
whether the lawyers in a single entity MDP should be required to test
conflicts against all of the existing and former clients and matters of
non-legal service providers in the MDP. The importance of the
imputation issue depends upon the size of the MDP, the scope of
services provided, and the extent to which the MDP represents
competitors with ongoing matters.6 Large law firms with diverse
practices and offices in different jurisdictions face similar problems.
If the current ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest were
applied, without change, to the single entity MDP, the MDP would
have to consider all of the present and former clients of all service
providers in the MDP for purposes of determining whether a conflict
exists for the legal department. 466 This could have the effect of
preventing many large organizations, including most large law firms
and Big Five accounting firms, from fully participating in offering
integrated multidisciplinary professional services. Accordingly, many
465. A three-person MDP providing gerontological services is unlikely to
encounter many present and former client-based conflicts of interest because of the
imputation rule. A 300-person MDP offering estate and financial planning services in
all 50 states similarly is not likely to have client-based conflicts of interests. However,
a Big Five accounting firm or any large MDP with a litigation department is likely to
have severe conflicts problems under a broad imputation rule.
466. See ABA Commission, 1999 FinalReport, supra note 8:
In connection with the delivery of legal services, all clients of an MDP
should be treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of interest
and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all
employees, partners, shareholders or the like were lawyers.
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commentators have called upon the profession to implement concepts
of screening or firewalls in the context of large law firms and single
entity MDPs.467 Although a comprehensive analysis of this issue is
beyond the scope of this Article, a careful reexamination of the
imputation rules in the context of all large legal service organizations
is in order. One leading commentator has criticized the scope of these
rules, explaining that the:
geographic reach and substantive breadth of law practice today has,
as a practical matter, outgrown the Model Rules.... The notion of
imputed knowledge of facts was developed during a time when law
firms were small and self-contained, in one city or, at most, two
cities in
one state. We should not be governed by antiquated
468
Rules.

The imputation rules may need to be revised to reflect the modern
realities of legal practice conducted by large, multi-jurisdictional
organizations operating in a global economy. For example, it may be
necessary to allow a greater use of screening devices as a way of
dealing with conflicts of interest. Although there are strong
arguments to be made against permitting greater use of screening
devices,469 the current ethical rules endorse the use of screening
devices with respect to government lawyers, and this rule generally
has been regarded as successful in practical application. Moreover,
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers has endorsed screening as a method of avoiding imputation
in the former client context, and when information is learned from a
prospective client who ultimately hires another law firm.4 10 Also, as
other commentators have noted, screening devices and firewalls are
regularly used outside the legal profession to impede the flow of
confidential information.471
One important additional point is that whatever the profession
decides to do with conflicts-of-interest rules for single entity MDPs
must also apply to other large service organizations. The conflicts
rules for all entities providing legal services should be consistent.
Thus, if the conflicts rules are changed for single entity MDPs, they
467. See, e.g., Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 964-67; Reich, Vernick & Horn,
supra note 213.
468. Written Remarks of Tucker, supra note 393.
469. See, e.g., Fox, Ruminations on MDPs, supra note 288, at 1110-11.
470. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 27, 204 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 1996).
471. Screening devices have been implemented in the securities industry by
legislation and the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-704, amendment to 15 U.S.C.
78 (1934); see generally Marvin A. Freedland, NationalBanks as Service Providers to
Employee Benefit Plans, 113 Banking L.J. 994 (1996). Additionally, other regulatory
systems in the financial world have considered the implementation of screening
devices to limit conflicts of interest.
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must be changed in a similar way for law firms. Such consistency is
important to maintain competition among different types of legal
service providers and to treat all legal service providers with fairness.

Finally, a serious conflicts-of-interest concern and a potential threat
to the attorney-client privilege results from a non-lawyer supervisor's

conflicting professional obligations,4" such as an accountant's
obligation in its auditing function to ensure that its clients publicly
disclose material information even of a negative nature.'3 The SEC's

position is that an accounting firm that undertakes audits for SECregistered companies is precluded from providing auditing services for
a registrant client for which the auditing firm also provided legal
services.4'

In the SEC's view, an auditing firm's independence would

472. One commentator argues that one benefit of allowing a lawyer to practice law
in an MDP is that lawyers in MDPs may be more likely to whistleblow to audit
committees and independent directors on corporate executives who violate the law.
See generally Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition from
Accounting Firms May Help Corporate Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical High
Ground, 20 Pace L. Rev. 43 (1999); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs:
Multidisciplinary Partnershipsin Corporate Legal Practice, 84 Minn. L Rev. 1213
(2000). Another commentator suggests that corporate clients should waive attorney-

client secrecy in order to make it easier for corporate lawyers to disclose corporate

client fraud. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the
Psychology of Concealment, 84 Minn. L Rev. 1399 (2000). These suggestions and
proposals require changes in the substantive law of confidentiality in the legal
profession. See also Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 964 (arguing that clients may
choose to hire the same MDP to provide both legal and auditing services because they
have nothing to hide and they may allow the lawyers to waive client confidentiality so
as to communicate to the world that they have nothing to hide). Whether the advent
of MDPs has an effect on the modification of these rules is unclear, the debate on
MDPs should not, however, depend on such events.
473. See, e.g., Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 344-45. The
National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants addresses the
concern that an accountant may have an obligation to disclose information that a
lawyer would be obligated to keep confidential. The National Conference had two
responses to the issue. First, it argued that the confidentiality issues that lawyers
would face in MDPs are not different from the confidentiality issues lawyers face
today when advising their clients to disclose certain financial information. The
National Conference reasoned that a lawyer has a duty to advise a client to disclose
information pursuant to SEC regulations. If the lawyer became aware that a client
had not complied with the required disclosure, the lawyer could not continue
representation of the client in the matter and would have to withdraw. Second, the
National Conference indicated that clients concerned with confidentiality issues can
decide for themselves whether they want to use the same firm, offering both legal and
auditing services, or whether to use separate firms. See Written Remarks of Treiger &
Lipton, supra note 385.
474. See ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report, supra note 19; Letter from Lynn E.
Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC, to ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Jan. 22, 1999) (available at <http/%vvww.abanet.orglcprlturner.html>); cf. ABA
Commission, Background Paper,supra note 14, at n.3. The SEC's independence rules
preclude an auditor from certifying the financial statements of a client for whom the
auditor also has an attorney-client relationship. See Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c), 17
C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c) (1999); SEC, Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, §§
602.02e.i, 602.02e.ii. In Matter of Charles E. Falk, Exchange Act Release No. 41426,
No. 3-9902, 1999 WL 311802 (SEC) (May 19, 1999), the SEC issued a formal order
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be impaired if the firm provides legal as well as auditing services to a
registered company.475 The SEC's position on this issue appropriately
recognizes that an auditor's obligations of disclosure and
independence from the client and a lawyer's obligations of
confidentiality and loyalty to the client are fundamentally
incompatible. The private attorney, who acts as a client's confidential
and loyal adviser-advocate, has a quite different role than an
accountant serving as an independent auditor, who must be totally
independent of the client and owes allegiance to the corporation's
shareholders, creditors and the investing public.4 76 This problem can
disciplining an attorney-accountant who had provided legal advice to an audit client
of another partner in his accounting firm. See id. In this order, the SEC stated its view
that the lawyer-client relationship is inconsistent with the required independence of
accountants in their audit role of providing financial information to investors. See id.
at *2-3.
In June of 2000, the SEC proposed amendments to rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X,
which would provide that an accountant would not be treated as independent when
the accountant (1) has a mutual or conflicting interest with the audit client; (2) audits
the accountant's own work; (3) functions as an officer or employee of the audit client;
or (4) serves as an advocate for the audit client. See Rachel Witmer, SEC Proposes to
Update Rules GoverningAuditor Independence, BNA Sec. Reg. L. Rep., July 3, 2000,
at 891. The proposed amendments also would identify certain non-audit services that
the SEC would treat as inconsistent with the independence requirement, including,
among other things, bookkeeping services, actuarial services, investment banking
services, internal audit outsourcing, financial information systems design, legal
services, and rendering expert opinions. See id.
The Independence Standards Board is also studying the independence concerns
raised by auditing firms providing legal services for SEC registrant clients, and is
charged with establishing independence standards for auditors of public entities. See
Independence Standards Board, Discussion Memorandum (DM 99-4): Legal Services
(Dec. 1999). The Independence Standards Board is an advisory organization that was
developed through discussions between the AICPA, the SEC, and various other
representatives of the accounting profession. See id.
Some commentators have argued that these developments disprove the claim of
proponents of MDPs that there is a significant demand for, and are substantial
benefits from, one-stop shopping. See Fox, Ruminations on MDPs,supra note 288, at
1104-06. The current debate over consulting and auditing services in accounting firms
does not in and of itself prove that the one-shop stopping concept is "dead," as
Lawrence Fox would claim. Id. Instead, this debate shows that accounting firms' role
as independent auditors is sufficiently unique that it may be necessary to preclude
them from doing any other work for their audit clients that could interfere with that
independent audit function. The debate demonstrates nothing about the benefits of
one-stop shopping in the context of other professional services, including non-audit
accounting services. The one-stop shopping benefits of MDPs, outside of the
accounting firm audit context, are real and a major driving force underlying the
worldwide movement in favor of MDPs.
475. See, e.g., MDP Advocates Campaign to Convince Sceptics, Int'l Acct. Bull.,
June 30, 1999, at 3 (discussing views of Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant of the
SEC).
476. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that an accountant's tax accrual workpapers prepared in the course of
regular financial audits of a corporation are not protected from disclosure to an IRS
summons by any accountant-client or work-product privilege. The Court stated:
The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the private
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best be remedied by providing that an MDP may not perform auditing
services for a client for which it also provides legal services.
Accordingly, if this proposal were adopted, an MDP would be
required to choose whether it wanted to provide auditing services or
legal services for a particular client-it could not do both for the same
client without subjecting itself to professional discipline and
enforcement action by the SEC.478

Serious concerns about conflicts of interest and inconsistent
professional obligations are also raised by the accounting firms
providing audit clients with management consulting services' and
attorney's role as the client's confidential adviser and advocate, a loyal
representative whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most
favorable possible light. An independent certified public accountant
performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively
depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client. The independent public accountant performing this special function
owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as
well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands
that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from
disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's
financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the accountant's
role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.
Id at 817-18 (emphasis in original).
477. Dean Fischel takes a contrary view and argues that there is no good reason to
prohibit accounting firms from providing management consulting or legal services for
their audit clients. See Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 961-64. He argues that the
regulators of MDPs should defer to the market and let clients determine whether it
makes sense to hire different firms or the same firm to do audit and legal work. See id.
In his view, some clients will choose to hire different firms to do audit services and
legal services so as to avoid any inference that the auditor's independence was
compromised. Other clients will purchase both auditing and legal services from a
single firm in order to realize the benefits of obtaining different types of services from
an integrated firm. See id In effect, Dean Fischel views the SEC's concerns to be
focused largely on the appearance that an auditor's independence could be
compromised by the fact that the auditing firm provides other services to the audit
client, rather than focusing on whether the auditor's independence is compromised in
fact. See id. Dean Fischel believes that this kind of concern is best regulated by
market forces. See id.
478. Some accountants have indicated that this restriction would be acceptable to
them, if necessary to overcome regulatory hurdles to formation of MDPs involving
lawyers and accountants. As noted by one author.
Some accountants make the point that even outright prohibition of the
provision of legal services to auditing clients would be acceptable to them,
given the fact that each of the Big Five firms necessarily would be prohibited
from providing legal services to a maximum average of only twenty percent
of possible publicly held clients, and that their Big Five competition for legal
work from the other eighty percent of the market would consist of only three
other firms, the fourth conflicted out by the audit relationship.
Ward Bower, A Look at the Rise of MultidisciplinaryPartnerships,Philadelphia Law.,
Jan. 30,2000, at 3.
479. The SEC has been pressuring Big Five accounting firms to cease providing
consulting services to their audit clients. Partly in response to this pressure,
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selling them aggressive tax planning products.4 ° In both cases, the
accounting firms' independence in the audit area may be
compromised by their performance of these other services for their
audit clients. These conflicts concerns exacerbate the tensions
between the accounting firms' role as independent auditor and its role
as multidisciplinary service provider, and provide further support for
the idea that accounting firms should not be allowed to provide nonaudit services to their audit clients.481
Large accounting firms believe that these problems could instead be
solved by a less drastic measure-namely, by maintaining effective
firewalls or screening devices between the firm's audit employees and
the firm's other employees providing law or other non-audit services
to the clients. However, given the crucial role of the independent
audit function in our society, and the need for the public to have
confidence in the autonomy of accountants when they are performing
their audit function, a screening approach to solving these problems is
inadequate.
Some commentators have suggested that the Big Five firms divest
themselves completely from auditing if they wish to provide legal
services or other professional services to clients (even management
consulting services).'8 This view assumes that if an accounting firm
drafted a legal structure for a non-audit client, and later audited
another client with a similar structure, the accounting firm's fear of
injuring the non-audit client would discourage it from characterizing
PricewaterhouseCoopers announced plans to spin off its consulting business, and
Ernst & Young announced plans to sell its consulting practice to Cap Gemini, a
French company. See Elizabeth MacDonald, PricewaterhouseCoopersNears Plan for
Restructuring Involving Split or Sale, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 2000, at Cll; Elizabeth
MacDonald, PricewaterhouseCoopersWill Divide Into Two or More Parts, Under
Pressure,Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 2000, at B8; Anne Newman, A Big Five Firm Gets a Lot
Smaller, Bus. Week, Mar. 13, 2000, at 46; John Tagliabue, Cap Gemini to Acquire
Ernst & Young's Consulting Business, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2000, at Cl; see generally
U.S. General Accounting Office, The Accounting Profession-Major Issues: Progress
and Concerns 41-42 (Sept. 1996) (concluding that none of the studies on the issue of
accountant independence "reported any conclusive evidence of diminished audit
quality or harm to the public interest, or any actual impairment of auditor
independence, as a consequence of public accounting firms providing advisory or
consulting services to their audit clients").
480. The SEC also is reportedly examining whether accounting firms are violating
conflict-of-interest rules by selling aggressive tax planning products to their audit
clients. See Sheryl Stratton, SEC Looks at the Sale of Aggressive Products to Audit
Clients. 87 Tax Notes 13 (2000). The SEC is particularly concerned about those
situations in which the accounting firm provides those aggressive tax products on a
contingent fee basis (including, in the SEC's view, so-called "value-based" fees). See
id.
481. See Fox, Preserving Professional Independence, supra note 126, at 977
(examining the Big Five accounting firm practice of steering audit clients to the other
businesses of the firm).
482. See, e.g., Needham, supra note 126, at 1318-23 (stating that auditing services
and other professional services must be done by different entities); Statement of
Wolfman, supra note 28 (same).
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the structure as "risky" or "unlikely to prevail" in the audit client's
financial statements. Such positional conflicts, however, should not
disqualify an MDP from providing auditing services to clients that do
not receive legal or other non-audit professional services from the
firm. The conflict is simply too attenuated to adopt a per se ban on
auditing firms doing any other type of professional work, even if the
other work is for non-audit clients of the firm. Such a ban would
downgrade the quality of the auditing work performed because the
"best and brightest" in the accounting world would not want to work
for firms with such a limited mission, even though that mission is a
very important one to our society.8 Such a complete ban would be
justified only if there were strong empirical evidence that non-auditing
work performed for non-audit clients of an accounting firm in fact
undermined the independence of the firm when doing audit work for
other clients.' The ability of the accounting profession to provide
high-quality audit services is too important to the functioning of the
financial markets and economic system to risk undermining that
ability by adopting an overly broad conflicts rule.
4. Rendering Competent Advice
Some of the critics of MDPs argue that non-law professionals are
likely to provide less competent services to their clients. In particular,
some point out that the Big Five accounting firms have been active in
the marketing of "products" to their clients. "Products" refers to
financial investments, tax shelter programs, and similar legal devices
that an MDP might market and sell to multiple clients with similar
needs. The Big Five apparently have been very successful in
Some
providing their clients wvith these sorts of products.
commentators have expressed concerns about both the quality and
legitimacy of the products as well as some of the tactics used in
promoting them.
First, the Big Five apparently have sought to cloak their products
with the protections of intellectual property law. They have been
treating the products as trade secrets, and have asked prospective
clients to sign non-disclosure agreements. This practice should not be
cause for concern. Whether the law of intellectual property will
ultimately offer legal protection to these products of professional
services is still an open question. Nonetheless, the ethical rules of the
483. One concern here is that auditing services may not be sufficiently profitable to
stand alone and to continue to attract talented accountants to firms that do only that
type of work.
484. Similarly, there is no good reason for prohibiting accounting firms who do
auditing work for SEC registrants from providing management consulting or other

professional services to non-audit clients. Legitimate concerns of the SEC and others
about independence in the audit function do not require a complete ban on all

management consulting work by accounting firms.
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legal profession do not currently and should not in the future preclude
a lawyer from seeking to obtain such protection, regardless of whether
the lawyer works in a law firm, MDP, or some other type of
organization.
Second, some have argued that it is inappropriate for a firm to
charge subsequent purchasers of a product the same price that it
charged the first purchaser, given that substantially less time was spent
on behalf of later purchasers. Again, however, no ethics rules
regarding fee arrangements prohibit this practice. Many law firms use
such billing arrangements on some fee matters-sometimes calling it
value billing, other times a contingency fee. The only restrictions are
that a lawyer cannot misrepresent the number of hours spent on a
matter or the basis for calculating the fee. The overall fee must be
"reasonable" within the meaning of Model Rule 1.5 or not "clearly
excessive" within the meaning of DR 2-106(A) of the Model Code, as
the case may be. Lawyers must sell such services at a flat rate or
contingent fee. As noted above, however, value billing in connection
with the selling of aggressive tax products raises serious issues of
conflict of interest, providing additional support for the idea that
accounting firms should be precluded from providing non-audit
professional services to their audit clients. 45
Third, Professor Bernard Wolfman has suggested that the sale 48of6
such mass produced products may reflect a lack of competence.
Professor Wolfman assumes that a firm that sells a product to a client
will not tailor it to the specific and individual needs of the client.
Given the prevalence of computer generated work products, this is a
danger for all professionals. The law firm, accounting firm, or MDP
that fails to take into account its clients' individual needs will
undoubtedly violate its duty of care.4" Moreover, the use of "stock
products," as Professor Wolfman calls them, 488 is a tried and true
practice in the legal profession. Most lawyers use briefs, pleadings, or
contracts from prior client matters as the starting base when drafting
new ones.
Similarly, many lawyers use form books or the
computerized equivalent as the starting point in developing their own
litigation and business documents. In fact, the major difference
between lawyers and accountants in this stock practice is that lawyers
are less effective marketers of their services. Indeed, the lawyer with
the largest stock bag is often the most valuable to his clients, given his
experience in handling similar matters for other clients. Because this
problem is not unique to the accounting profession, this should not be
a special concern for the regulation of MDPs.

485.
486.
487.
488.

See supra text accompanying notes 473-80.
See Written Remarks of Wolfman, supra note 28.
This duty is derived from Model Rules Rule 1.1 (competence).
See Written Remarks of Wolfman, supra note 28.
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Finally, some have argued that the aggressiveness of Big Five
accounting firms in marketing corporate tax shelter devices of
questionable validity is another competence concern that underlies
the opposition to MDPs. Undoubtedly, some of these products are of
questionable validity. Professionals who promote them should be
subject to discipline, and clients who use them to substantially reduce
their tax liability should be subject to serious monetary penalties. It is
not only accounting firms, however, that are marketing these devices;
prominent lawyers working in major law firms have also been
involved in creating abusive tax shelters. In any event, it is not the
type of firm in which tax professionals practice that gives rise to this
problem, but rather, the ethical perspectives (or lack thereof) of the
tax professional involved as well as the imperfections in the tax system
that provide the grist for the mill of these tax shelters. Thus, the
corporate tax shelter problem is a serious one for the federal tax
system and for the legal and accounting professions, but the solution
lies not in impeding the formation of MDPs.
5. Control and Authorized Participants in an MDP
Under the guise of protecting the core values of the legal
profession, critics raise three issues about MDPs: (1) the necessity of
lawyer control over MDPs; (2) the ownership of MDPs by passive
investors, i.e., owners who invest capital but do not provide services
for the firm; and (3) the types of service providers permitted to join
lawyers in providing integrated services.
The issue of lawyer control is derived from the requirement of
professional independence from the other professions. Essentially,
lawyers must maintain independence so that they have the freedom to
exercise professional judgment in the representation of clients. The
ABA Commission's 2000 Final Report and many state proposals
require that all MDPs must be controlled by lawyers. The extent of
lawyer control varies according to the proposal. Some authorities
look for functional control over the practice of law and others look to
a specific percentage benchmark of ownership and voting control. 4
489. For example, Pennsylvania's proposal (which was not adopted by the
membership of the bar) provided that lawyers may share legal fees with non-lawyers,
that they may form partnerships and other arrangements with non-lawyers, and that
they may practice with non-lawyers in an entity delivering legal services as long as the
following requirements are met:
A. No more than forty (40%) percent of the ownership of such partnership,
professional corporation or other association or arrangement (collectively,
the "MDP Entity") shall be held by non-lawyers.
B. The organic law governing the internal affairs of the MDP entity shall
guarantee that ultimate managerial control shall remain with the lawyer
partners, shareholders or members of the same. Each non-lawyer partner,
shareholder, member or employee of the MDP Entity shall be bound by all
Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to the lawyer partners,
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The control requirement, as stated in the ABA Commission's 2000
Report, is properly designed to protect independence in the delivery
of legal services without unduly constraining the formation of the
MDP entity. The control proposals tied to specified percentages of
lawyer ownership are arbitrary and do not guarantee that non-lawyers
will not dominate an MDP if they happen to bring in most of the
profits or control the majority of the clients. The functional control as
articulated by the ABA Commission is directed at the problem of
non-lawyer interference and is most likely to achieve its goal of
preserving this core value of the profession.
The ABA Commission articulated its position as follows:
"[l]awyers should be permitted to share fees and join with nonlawyer
professionals in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal
professional services.., provided that the lawyers have the control
and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the
49
rendering of legal services.""
The text of the Report elaborated
significantly upon the "control and authority" language:
The "control and authority".. . can be satisfied in a variety of ways,
depending on the practice setting. Percentage of ownership may be
a factor in certain circumstances.
Some members of the
Commission would have added a specific requirement in the
Recommendation that there be a lawyer majority ownership of an
MDP... and that a primary purpose of the MDP be a delivery of
legal services.
[I]n a small size MDP... the lawyer member might or might not
hold a majority ownership interest. The partnership or shareholder
agreement might specifically affirm that decisions relating to the
provision of legal services to the MDP's clients lie exclusively in the
lawyer's province. Neither the percentage of ownership interest nor
any particular wording in the partnership or shareholder agreement
will conclusively determine either control or authority. The control
and authority principle looks to substance not form.49'

shareholders, members and employees.
C. All Rules of Professional Conduct that apply to a law firm shall also apply
to an MDP Entity.
D. The lawyer partners, shareholders, or members of the MDP Entity shall
assume educational and supervisory responsibility to assure the compliance
by non-lawyer partners, shareholders, members, and employees of the MDP
Entity with all Rules of Professional Conduct and, as such, the lawyer
partners, shareholders and members shall be subject to discipline for a
breach of any Rule of Professional Conduct by a non-lawyer or by the MDP
Entity.
Pennsylvania Bar Association, Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice and Related
Trends Affecting the Profession, Report to Pennsylvania Bar Association House of
Delegates,Appendix 1 (2000) (available at <http://www.pabar.org/webmpd2.pdf>).
490. ABA Commission, 2000 FinalReport, supra note 19, Recommendation 1.
491. ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report, supra note 19 (referring to the effect of
the "control and authority" principle on the structure of an MDP).
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The facts and circumstances approach to control focuses on whether
lawyers are in control of the delivery of legal services and not whether
they are in control of the MDP. Such a requirement is consistent with
the important principle that lawyers should remain in control of the
delivery of legal services regardless of the type of organization in
which those services may be offered.
The state bars should consider adopting the flexible "control and
authority" position advocated by the ABA Commission. Under an
approach that requires majority ownership by lawyers, only MDPs
primarily devoted to offering non-legal services in conjunction with
legal services and seeking to preserve application of the attorneyclient privilege would thrive. The requirement that all non-lawyers
follow the rules of legal ethics (even with respect to non-legal
services) eliminates many MDPs in which the client chooses primarily
a non-legal service for which a lawyer performs minor legal services.
Corporate clients would seek to preserve the attorney-client privilege
for non-legal services that are incident to the delivery of legal services;
thus, the proposed Pennsylvania rule would accommodate clients
seeking this type of multidisciplinary service. Where a primarily nonlaw entity seeks to hire a lawyer for a portion of the services delivered
to a client, however, the ownership limit, the control requirement, and
the requirement that all non-lawyers follow the legal ethics rules
would discourage the formation of such an arrangement.
In the case of non-lawyer control of MDPs, there is heightened
concern that laypersons on the board of directors or in management
will seek confidential client information in order to assist them in
determining whether the profit objectives of the organization are
being met. This concern, however, can be dealt with adequately
without requiring lawyers to hold majority ownership of the MDP.
Model Rule 5.3 would govern such a situation, and would prevent
lawyers working in the MDP from sharing client information with
non-lawyer managers or directors who are not assisting in the delivery
of legal services. Moreover, following the language of the version of
Model Rule 5.4 proposed by the Kutak Commission, one could
require lawyers joining MDPs controlled by non-lawyers to sign
written employment contracts assuring protection of confidential
information.4 2
A related question concerning lawyer independence involves
whether the bar should allow non-lawyers to hold passive ownership
interests in a legal practice, regardless of whether that legal practice is
conducted in an MDP or a traditional law firm. The concern is that
where the non-lawyer is not providing services to clients, the nonlawyer conceivably could be less sensitive to the lawyer's obligation to
exercise independent judgment for the client free from the
492. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:102 n.1.
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interference of non-professionals, particularly where doing so will not
advance the economic interests of the firm.493 In other words, nonlawyer ownership "may give law firms perverse incentives to skimp on
quality."4 94 This potential difficulty may be reduced somewhat if
ownership of the multidisciplinary firm is limited to individuals
providing client services, who also will have much to lose in terms of
their business reputations if poor-quality services are provided or
professional standards are violated to the detriment of the client.495
Notwithstanding these concerns, however, continuing the outright
ban on passive lay ownership of legal services organizations, including
MDPs, would be a mistake for three principal reasons. First, the ban
on passive non-lawyer ownership is based on a faulty assumptionnamely, that non-lawyer passive owners will force the legal service
organization to reduce the quality of the services provided to the
client and ignore the lawyer-participants' professional obligations in
order to reduce costs and maximize profits. As discussed earlier in
this Article, the discipline of the market, as well as various legal
constraints (including concerns about tort and breach of contract
liability), will create an incentive for non-lawyer owners to ensure that
an MDP delivers high-quality services and that lawyer-owners observe
their professional obligations.496 If not, the clients of the MDP will go
to others for their services, and the MDP's profits will suffer.
Second, less drastic alternatives to a complete ban on passive equity
ownership in MDPs are available to deal with the problem of lawyer
493. See id. § 5.4:102; Quinn, Preventive Regulation, supra note 187, at 339-41;
Stuart P. Werling, Written Response to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice (1999) (available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/werling.html>) (stating that
the interest in pecuniary gain will override a lawyer's independent judgment if a law
firm is owned by non-lawyers); Bernard Wolfman, Comment on Report and
Recommendations of ABA Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice (July 21, 1999)
(available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wolfman3.html>) ("We know from common
experience that the influence of those on high, of those with the controlling financial
interest, will find its way to the bottom, like the water on a leaky roof that inevitably
reaches and fills the basement.").
494. Ribstein, supra note 198, at 1721 (discussing a similar problem in the health
care area where "HMOs, whose employees are hired by capital contributors, have
incentives to compromise patient interests by avoiding high-cost treatment such as
referrals to specialists"). Professor Ribstein distinguishes the non-physician owned
HMO from the non-lawyer owned law firm by pointing out that "[c]ombining medical
services and insurance exacerbates the misincentive problem in HMOs by causing the
firm rather than the patient to bear the extra costs of high-quality medical care." Id. at
1721-22. Dean Daniel Fischel responds to the argument against passive ownership of
MDPs by non-lawyers by pointing out that purchasers of integrated financial services
from MDPs, unlike many patients in HMOs, are "typically sophisticated repeat
players sensitive to both the quality and cost of services provided," and will go to
other service providers if the MDP does not fulfill their needs. Fischel, MDPs, supra
note 33, at 958.
495. Proponents of banning passive lay ownership of legal service organizations,
including MDPs, generally do not intend any change in the ethical rules that would
eliminate prepaid legal services plans.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 312-14.
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independence. Concerns about potential impairment of the lawyer's
independent professional judgment also arise in situations outside the
context of MDPs where an organization pays the lawyer's fee for
services rendered to an individual, such as in indemnity insurance
situations. 97 In fact, in today's intensely competitive legal service
organization market, there are serious concerns that the pressure on
all participants in the firm to increase profits comes at the expense of
ignoring or downplaying various core values of the profession,
including lawyer independence. This is hardly a problem limited to
passive, non-lawyer ownership of MDPs. These concerns are
addressed in other provisions of the ethical rules. For example, the
conflicts-of-interest provisions in Model Rule 1.7 require that a lawyer
be faithful to the client's interests, even if they conflict with the
lawyer's own interests or the interests of the lawyer's employer:4
Model Rule 1.8(f) cautions that a lawyer must remain loyal to his or
her client's interests even if a third party pays the lawyer's bills.41 In
addition, under the Kutak Commission's proposed version of Model
Rule 5.4, one could obtain added protection on the lawyer
independence issue by requiring that a lawyer working in an MDP
managed by non-lawyers receive written assurances from the MDP
that his or her professional judgment will not be impaired. 510
Third, and most importantly, implementing a ban on passive
investment in MDPs and other legal service organizations effectively
prevents MDPs from raising capital through public and private passive
equity investment. MDPs need such capital for expansion, acquisition
of other professional service firms, investment in new technologies,
investment in new lawyer and non-lawyer employees, and myriad
other purposes. 5 1 Stated differently, a ban on passive investment in
497. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:102.

49& See Model Rules Rule 1.7.
499. See id. Rule 1.8(f).

500. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 2, § 5.4:102.
501. See Adams & Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?,supra note 75, at 30-37
(advocating that prohibitions against non-lawyer investment and participation in law
firms be removed); Matheson & Adams, Reflecting on the ABA Commission's
Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1301 (stating that "[aIllowing law firms access to

the equity markets-that is, investment by nonlawyer-is a concomitant of
sanctioning MDPs and could result in law firms that are optimally capitalized and,
thus, more efficient"); see also Andrews, supra note 71, at 629-31 (tracing the history
of the rules prohibiting partnerships of lawyers and non-lawyers and supporting a
change in those rules to allow such partnerships; also suggesting that less restrictive
alternatives to a complete ban on law firms selling shares to non-lawyers exist, which
would remedy the principal objections to such selling); Huber, supra note 232, at 580

(ban on non-lawyer ownership of law firms works to the detriment of new lawyers
starting up their own practices by forcing them to use debt, rather than equity,
financing, which is a particularly serious problem "when interest rates are high or loan
capital is scarce"). For another leading commentator's view that MDPs should be
allowed to sell ownership interests to passive investors, see Fischel, MDPs, supra note
33, at 967-69. For a view that Model Rule 5.4 should be modified to allow minority
passive ownership of law firms by non-lawyers, see Bernard Sharfman, Note,
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MDPs puts such organizations at a competitive disadvantage by
preventing MDPs from having access to a capital source that has been
crucial to the development of most other types of business in our
modem economy.: 2 The ban 5forces MDPs to use a less efficient,
"second-best capital structure." " In the end, concerns about the
negative effects of passive ownership in MDPs on the independence
of lawyers working in MDPs are overstated and the benefits of
allowing such passive investment are significant enough that a ban on
passive investment in MDPs cannot be logically maintained."°
The final issue relating to participants in an MDP concerns whether
there should be any restrictions on the type of service providers who
can be a participant in an MDP. Some authorities seek to limit
participants in an MDP to what one might call "non-legal
professionals." Some commentators have suggested that, absent such
a limitation, a tow truck driver, undertaker, beautician, or the like
could enter into practice with an attorney. 05 There are many lawyers
Modifying Model Rule 5.4 to Allow for Minority Ownership of Law Firms by
Nonlawyers, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 477,494-98 (2000).
502. See Adams & Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?,supra note 75, at 40.

503. Ribstein, supra note 198, at 1722. Professor Ribstein points out that the ban
on passive ownership of legal service organizations raises five economic efficiency
concerns. First, the ban forces law firms "to bundle capital raising and legal services,
thereby raising the cost of capital by losing the advantage of specialization of skills
and financing." Id. Second, the ban "exacerbates the problem of lawyer risk
aversion" by "preventing lawyers from transferring risks to outside owners with
diversified portfolios." Id. at 1723. Third, the ban also may partly explain why law
firms use "promotion-to-partner 'tournaments' ... in which winning associates get a
limited number of big partnership prizes, as a way of providing a deferred reward to
motivate associates." Id. at 1723-24. Fourth, the ban limits the ability of legal service
organizations "to design compensation that is calibrated to reward agency cost
reduction." Id. at 1724-25. Finally, the ban creates incentives for the managers and
owners of the legal service organization "to maximize customers' use of legal services
by either performing excessive amounts of legal services or under-recommending
such related nonlegal services as accounting and finance." Id. at 1725.
504. Professors Edward Adams and John Matheson argue that allowing MDPs and
law firms to raise capital in equity markets will facilitate the financing of large and
financially risky contingency fee cases, thus providing access to the legal system for
plaintiffs who might otherwise go without representation. See Matheson & Adams,
Reflecting on the ABA Commission's Recommendations, supra note 126, at 1301.
Thus, they see this factor as one that supports lifting the ban on passive ownership of
interests in MDPs and law firms.
Dean Daniel Fischel, who also supports lifting the ban on passive ownership of law
firms and MDPs, has a different reaction to the possibility that law firm access to the
capital markets will help finance litigation. Rather than seeing this possibility as a
positive argument in favor of lifting the ban, he raises the subtle issue of whether the
fact that capital might be raised by an MDP or law firm to finance litigation is instead
an argument against lifting the ban on passive ownership interests. The concern is
that law firm access to large amounts of equity capital might lead to an increase in
wasteful litigation. See Fischel, MDPs, supra note 33, at 968. He ultimately concludes,
however, that the better approach for dealing with this potential problem is to change
the substantive or procedural rules directly, or else to require the losing party in a
litigation to bear the full costs. See id. at 969.
505. See Oral Testimony of DiPiazza, supra note 428 (arguing that "there are
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in the bar who find these prospects distasteful, and are fearful that
such arrangements would demean the whole profession. Therefore, a
temptation exists to craft a bright line rule that would clearly preclude
these types of partnerships. Two obvious approaches are the
following: (1) a rule limiting the MDP to non-lawyer professionals;
and (2) the rule adopted in some states by the accounting profession
limiting the practice to individuals who offered services that were not
"incompatible" with the practice of law. The ABA Commission's
2000 Final Report adopts the view that an MDP may only be formed
with "members of recognized professions or other disciplines that are
governed by ethical standards."5 6
Both of these approaches suffer from a serious definitional flaw.
The term "professional" is itself ambiguous. Does an economist, an
appraiser, or an investment banker with an MBA but no accounting
or law degree qualify? What about an expert software designer who
never graduated from college?
Likewise, what services are
"compatible" with the practice of law? The services offered by a
private investigator may be quite compatible with the practice of a
criminal lawyer, but are they compatible with the practice of a family
law attorney? Undoubtedly, some who practice in the family law area
would argue that a private investigator's services are essential to their
work in a contested divorce situation involving allegations of marital
infidelity. Moreover, who is to be the arbiter of these questions? If
the state bars are to decide this issue, one can safely predict that there
will be numerous, inconsistent answers to these questions that will
create uncertainty concerning the validity of multidisciplinary practice
arrangements involving partners who are neither lawyers nor
accountants.
Further, merely attempting to respond to these
compatible and incompatible professions and that most people know them when they
see them"); Jay G. Foonberg, Oral Testimony Before the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary
Practice
(Feb.
6,
1999)
(available
at
<http:/lwww.abanet.org/cpr/Foonberg.html>) (stating that tow truck drivers could be
included under the present definition of MDPs); Laurel S. Terry, Remarks About the
Recommendations and Report of the ABA Commission on MDPs (Mar. 12, 1999)
(available at <http://wvw.abanet.org/cprlterryb6.html>) (Forms of Association Item
A lists the testimony of witnesses who address the issue of allowing particular
individuals to join MDPs).
506. ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report, supra note 19. The ABA Commission
declined to provide a specific list or other definition of what professionals may
qualify. It did state, however, that such a list could include "accountants, certified
financial planners, engineers, psychologists, psychiatric social workers, and real estate
brokers." Id. Note that South Carolina has in fact created a list of authorized
professionals. See Task Force on Multidisciplinary Practice, Recommendation to the
South CarolinaBar House of Delegates (2000). This list includes, architects, CPAs,
certified financial planners, enrolled agents, land planners, licensed social workers,
licensed insurance agents, physicians, professional engineers, registered investment
advisors, registered land surveyors, registered nurses, stock brokers and investment
advisers registered with the NASD or SEC, and other members of licensed
professions. See id.
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questions is fraught with peril, given that it puts the bar in the
uncomfortable position of deciding with whom a lawyer should
associate. Although the laundry list approach does have some appeal,
it would definitely be under-inclusive of the types of individuals who
would be able to provide valuable services to the MDP.
It is useful, perhaps, to take a step back and analyze whether the
limits on who may participate as partners in an MDP serve any
valuable function. What bothers the legal profession about a lawyer
partnering with a tow truck driver? The concern is that the tow truck
driver will steer clients to her lawyer partner. But the ethical rules
already forbid such conduct, and so the lawyer who sought to use his
tow truck driver partner for such purposes would find himself
forestalled by his professional obligations.: 7 The arrangements that
the profession most fears, and that are held out as generating the need
for a prophylactic rule, would in all likelihood not occur very often. A
lawyer will only wish to enter into a partnership with someone who
can add value to her practice.: °
E. Enforcing the Legal Profession'sRules in an MDP
When a state bar decides to accommodate multidisciplinary
practice, the issue will arise whether the bar should have a special
regulatory structure to regulate MDPs.5 9 The 1999 Final Report of
the ABA Commission proposed that state bars impose a list of special
requirements on MDPs that are not controlled by lawyers.5 10 The
requirements were implemented by placing statements in a general
certification document that non-lawyer controlled MDPs would need
to submit each year to the regulatory authority in each state."' In
such a certification, the chief executive officer and board of directors
of the MDP would need to sign a document attesting to the following
conditions: (1) they agreed not to interfere directly or indirectly with
the lawyers' professional judgment; (2) they would agree to create and
maintain procedures to protect the exercise of independent judgment
by the lawyers in the MDP; (3) they would honor the legal
507. See Model Rules Rules 7.2,7.3, 8.4.
508. If a tow truck driver were made a partner in an entity with a lawyer, this would
tend to advertise the violation to society and thus make it easier to ban.
509. One commentator argues that society should view the integration of the
different professions into a "professional services" model similar to a healthcare
network of physicians and other professionals. See Greg Billhartz, Note, Can't We All
Just Get Along? Competingfor Client Confidences: The Integration of the Accounting
and Legal Professions, 17 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 427 (1998). Each profession is
responsible for following its own rules of conduct; the entire system, however, is
responsible for ensuring that clients receive competent services.
510. See ABA Commission, 1999 FinalReport, supra note 8, at Recommendation,
pt. 14.
511. The recommendation actually refers to the highest court in the state. See id.
In most integrated bar states the court delegates its power to regulate lawyers to a
mandatory state bar. See id.

2000]

MDPs AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

profession's obligation to maintain client trust funds; (4) they would
require that the lawyers followed the rules of professional conduct in
their service of the MDP's clients; and (5) they would honor the
profession's commitment to pro bono services.51 2 The ABA
Commission imposed the certification requirement on an annual basis
and required each MDP to provide such information to its lawyers
and to the regulatory authorities (including the courts) in the states in
which the MDP operated. 13 It also required non-lawyer MDPs to
submit to an administrative audit, determined by the regulatory
authority in the jurisdiction, and to bear the cost of the administration
of audits through an annual certification fee." 4
The justification for the special requirements for non-lawyer
controlled MDPs lies in the belief that non-law practice potentially
threatens the core values of the legal profession. Additionally, lawyer
controlled MDPs are largely regulated by the state bars through
individual regulation of lawyers in an MDP, and the requirement that
partner and supervisory lawyers in an MDP ensure that the rules of
professional conduct are observed.5 5 The ABA Commission
believed, however, that it needed to target the non-lawyer controlled
MDPs because, in those entities, the regulation of individual lawyers
may not be sufficient to protect the MDP's clients. The Commission
believed that these requirements did not impose an unreasonable
burden on non-lawyer controlled MDPs.
As discussed earlier in this Article,1 6 the notion that lawyer or nonlawyer control is the touchstone to whether the core values of the
legal profession will be observed is unjustifiable. Similarly, it does not
make sense to assume that the profession's rules on supervision of
57
non-lawyer activities will be honored in a lawyer controlled MDP.
The very presence of non-lawyers delivering other professional
services is the condition that poses the threat to the core values of the

512. See id. pts. 14(A)-(E).
513. See id. pts. 14(F), (G).
514. See id. pts. 14(H), (I).
515. See Model Rules Rules 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 (addressing the requirements of partner
and supervisory lawyers over supervised lawyers and non-lawyers in a law firm).
516. See supra Part IV.D.5.
517. It is likely that the ABA Commission viewed these special requirements on
non-lawyer controlled MDPs as a necessary compromise to ameliorate the concerns
of the opponents of MDPs. The certification and audit requirements were believed to
bring under the umbrella of lawyer regulation all entities with lawyers who were
delivering legal services to clients in an otherwise non-law setting. Some believed that
the audit and certification requirements would discourage Big Five accounting furms
from offering legal services because they would not want to subject their entire
enterprises to lawyer regulation. Others thought the cost of the certification would
give an advantage to lawyer controlled MDPs. Thus, as a political compromise, the
audit and certification requirements made sense; as a way to protect the core values,
they were underinclusive, and economically inefficient.
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profession, not whether the MDP is controlled by lawyers or nonlawyers.
Critics attacked the audit requirement because it applied only to
non-lawyer controlled MDPs for which the annual cost was too
burdensome, and because no evidence indicated that lawyers in nonlawyer controlled MDPs were more likely to violate the rules of ethics
than lawyers in lawyer controlled MDPs or in law firms. Partly in
response to the criticisms, and partly because it had decided to
address the concerns about lawyer independence by requiring that
legal services be controlled by lawyers, the ABA Commission
removed the audit requirement from the ABA Commission's 2000
Recommendations.518 The May 2000 recommendations suggested
that if a state permits single entity MDPs, it should "weigh carefully
the advantages and disadvantages of audit and regulatory procedures
such as those the Commission previously proposed or as others may
'
formulate."519
The ABA Commission's guidance on regulatory structures does
merit consideration by the states. The premise is that, when lawyers
and non-lawyers cooperate in the delivery of both legal and non-legal
services, the influence of the non-lawyer's motives may undermine the
core values of the legal profession. For example, assume a situation in
which non-lawyers refer clients to lawyers in a relationship in which
both will perform services and share in the legal fee. The non-lawyer
may wish to have some role in shaping the delivery of the legal
services to the client, and perhaps in influencing the decisions of the
client. Such involvement of the non-lawyer could pose professional
independence problems if the non-lawyer's actions overrode or
otherwise interfered with the judgment of the lawyer. Thus, the
delivery of integrated services by lawyers and non-lawyers, regardless
of the model, may justify some form of special regulatory procedures.

518. See ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report, supra note 19 ("The Commission
received a number of comments to the effect that the audit and certification
procedures were unworkable. Accordingly, it decided not to include them in the
current Recommendation.").
519. Id. In a footnote, the Commission takes issue with the criticism that audit and
certification requirements were mere "paperwork." Id. at n.13. It stated:
The audit and certification procedures have a valuable education function.
Moreover, the lawyers in MDPs and the MDPs' chief executive officer and
board of directors are most likely to appreciate the seriousness of any
written undertakings that they must execute. Both the lawyers and the
nonlawyers are not likely to disregard a statement that they are signing
under penalty of perjury and submitting to the highest court of the state.
Furthermore, they will be cognizant that these sworn-to statements might be
used against the MDP in any action for malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty in which the lawyers' exercise of independent professional judgment is
questioned.
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The most basic regulatory design issue is determining whether the
state regulatory authorities would have jurisdiction over the activities
of an MDP operating within its borders. It should be without
controversy that any individual or entity that delivers legal services
must subject itself to jurisdiction of the state bar regulatory structure.
Such jurisdiction would normally extend primarily over the delivery of
legal services, but in some circumstances, may extend to non-lawyer
activities that jeopardize the core values of the profession.5 ° Such
regulatory jurisdiction, and a requirement that MDPs consent to such
jurisdiction, whether through certification or registration, is
imperative to preserve the appropriate authority of state bar
regulators over the practice of law.
Once the appropriate bar regulatory authorities have jurisdiction
over the MDP, the question arises whether the legal ethics disciplinary
system will be directed against individuals, the MDP as an entity, or
both. Historically, discipline has been focused on individual lawyers
and not law firms.11 In recent years, Professor Ted Schneyer's call for
firm discipline' has been recognized in New York and New Jersey.5
Although the ABA Commission's 1999 Final Report seemed to
permit firm discipline of MDPs through the audit and certification
requirement, the 2000 Final Report "continues the historic tradition
of directly regulating only individual lawyers." 4
The system of professional regulation of lawyers is designed to
protect the public through a quasi-criminal system of professional
licensure. Although historically the disciplinary system has focused
on individual lawyers, the rules have brought many partners and
supervisory lawyers into the disciplinary realm. ' In the light of the
arguments presented by Professor Schneyer in favor of extending
discipline to law firms, 16 the rules relating to MDPs should extend
professional regulation to MDPs as entities. State regulatory
authorities should have the power to discipline MDPs for both
punitive and rehabilitative reasons. An MDP that compromises the
quality of legal services should face possible suspension or
520. For example, if a non-lawyer offered to use the non-lawyer's professional
services to effectively become a runner for the lawyer's professional services, the bar
should have jurisdiction over such activities.
521. See Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7,at 79-144 (examining professional
discipline for lawyers).
522- See Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L Rev.
1 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline].
523. See N.Y. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 1-102(A), 22 NYCRR 1200.3(A) (2000); NJ.
Rules of Disciplinary Jurisdiction, Rule 1:20-1(a) (2000).
524. ABA Commission, 2000 Final Report,supra note 19.
525. See Model Rules Rules 5.1, 5.3.
526. Professor Schneyer argued that professional discipline of firms is needed
because of the change in the nature of law practice and the fact that individual
discipline is not effective for lawyers practicing in large law firms. See Schneyer,
ProfessionalDiscipline,supra note 522, at 13-23.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

disbarment. An MDP with lax internal controls ensuring that the
rules of professional conduct are followed should face remedial
discipline to improve the necessary internal checks and balances.
After all, the accounting and investment banking professions have
subjected their business entities to professional regulation, and many
positive consequences have resulted from this system of entity
regulation. 21 7
In a disciplinary system in which both lawyers and their entities are
subject to regulation, the further question arises whether special
Obviously, the ABA
requirements should exist for MDPs.
Commission believed that non-lawyer controlled MDPs should
subject themselves to the audit requirement and should bear the cost

of the audit through an annual fee. Several state bars have
implemented random audit programs for lawyer trust accounts,528 and
are beginning to consider more seriously calls for peer
some states
529
review.

Such proposals are positive steps for the entire legal profession to
consider if the core values of the profession are to be maintained.531
Thus, the profession should turn to implementing "audits" or peer
5 31
review of all entities that deliver legal services, including law firms.
When such steps are implemented profession-wide, the public interest
should be better protected; limiting such audits to MDPs, however, is
probably not justifiable.
CONCLUSION

The American legal profession has historically embraced the basic
tenets of a profession: education, self-regulation, and a spirit of public
service. 32 The ABA, as the self-designated body to lead the
527. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994) (regulation by the SEC); see generally David P.
Doherty, Arthur S. Okun, Steven F. Korostoff & James A. Nofi, The Enforcement
Role of the New York Stock Exchange, 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 637 (1991) (describing the
regulatory role of the NYSE).
528. New Jersey and New Hampshire have random audit programs for lawyer trust
accounts. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Ethics: The Lawyer's Deskbook on
Professional Responsibility § 16-3 (2000).
529. Professor Susan Saab Fortney is the leading academic proponent of peer
review for attorneys. See generally Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners
Islands Unto Themselves? An EmpiricalStudy of Law Firm PeerReview and Culture,
10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 271 (1996); Susan Saab Fortney, Law Firm Risk Management
and Peer Review, 51 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 98 (1997); Susan Saab Fortney, Am I
My Partner'sKeeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 329 (1995).
530. See Hazard, Foreword,supra note 96, at 1094.
531. For an examination of peer review in the medical profession, see Matthew J.
Cate, Comment, Physician Peer Review: Serving the Patient or the Physician?,20 J.
Legal Med. 479 (1999) (explaining that peer review is mandatory in most states for
physicians with hospital privileges). This commentary suggests that it is often difficult
to find doctors who want to serve on peer review committees because those
committees are often characterized as being filled with tattle tales. See id.
532- See Dzienkowski, American Legal Profession,supra note 34, at 451-52.
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regulation of American lawyers, has continued to insist on the
importance of professionalism and the maintenance of the core values
of the legal profession. s31 These efforts are all made in the spirit of
protecting the public, who must use legal services to maintain and
protect legal rights in society. -3
Although there have been many challenges for the legal profession
in the past two centuries, the global economy poses some of the most
difficult problems for the regulation of American lawyers. The rise of
the multinational corporation began this movement towards
internationalization, and treaties and trade agreements among
neighboring countries relaxed trade barriers to a limited extent. More
importantly, however, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the development of the European Union, and other regional
trade agreements put in place the basic international framework that
spurred a worldwide movement toward free trade in goods and
services across national borders.
The end to economic protectionism brings many benefits and costs
to a nation. It opens markets for imports and exports and allows the
market conditions of supply and demand to determine the quantity of
a particular good that is produced in a country and the price at which
the good exchanges hands. Ultimately, the public is viewed as the
beneficiary of the free flow of goods and services. Looking at the
matter solely from a national perspective, however, the costs of free
trade include increased competition for national industries, and a
surrender of some of the sovereignty that a nation traditionally enjoys
in its status as a sovereign. The ABA and the state bar regulatory
authorities are beginning to face the pressures of a global economy.
Increased competition from foreign providers of legal services is
imposing pressure on the way in which legal services are delivered in
this country. The ABA and state bars can no longer regulate
American lawyers in a vacuum that ignores the changes brought about
by the growth in international business transactions. If the ABA and
state bars insist on resisting change to the ethical rules to reflect
modem business realities, American lawyers will no longer be
competitive in delivering legal services to the world's business entities
(many of which are multinational in both ownership and location of
business activity).
The provision of multidisciplinary services to corporations,
partnerships, and individuals is certain to occupy a prominent role in
the world economy. If the United States is to remain a center of
533. See ABA Commission on Professionalism, "... In the Spirit of Public
Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism: Report of the
Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
534. See Dzienkowski, American Legal Profession, supra note 34, at 483-85
(examining the purposes of regulating the legal profession).
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global commerce, the legal profession must accommodate the demand
for multidisciplinary services. The state bars now have a unique
opportunity to develop a regulatory structure that protects the core
values of the legal profession while accommodating consumer demand
for integrated services. A decision by the organized bar attempting to
reinforce the status quo ultimately will lead to the American legal
profession's inability to play a key role in shaping the delivery of
multidisciplinary services.
The states should modify their rules of professional conduct as
follows. First, Model Rule 5.4 should be modified to allow fee-sharing
between lawyers and non-lawyers providing professional services to a
client. No pure referral fees should be permitted to non-lawyers.
Second, the rules should be amended to permit lawyer participation in
the delivery of multidisciplinary services. Although a structure that
permitted all models of multidisciplinary services, including the fully
integrated MDP, is optimal, such a step may be too radical for many
states. Thus, states should strongly consider adopting rules that would
permit contractual and joint venture MDPs to exist to offer legal and
non-legal services in a coordinated manner. Both contractual and
joint venture MDPs would offer experimentation in how conflicts of
interest would be handled in the two separate kinds of firms. The
organized bar could evolve the rules on conflicts in response to the
experience with such arrangements. The contractual and entity joint
ventures will afford many of the benefits of multidisciplinary practice
with few of the costs.
The optimal approach for allowing lawyer participation in MDPs
would involve removing the ban against non-lawyer partners and
shareholders in business entities that provide legal services. Lawyers
and non-lawyers should be able to form a single entity to offer both
legal and non-legal services to clients. The delivery of legal services
must conform to the same professional responsibility rules and
standards as would apply if a law firm provided the services. The
delivery of legal services would need to be controlled by lawyers,
although there should be no requirement that lawyers have voting
control in the fully integrated, single entity MDP. In order to
facilitate lawyer control over legal services, lawyers in a single entity
MDP should be organized in a legal department with checks and
balances similar to those implemented in a corporate counsel context.
There should be no requirement that the non-lawyers in an MDP be
only those from a licensed profession because such a requirement is
both vague and theoretically indefensible.
The states should also promulgate professional responsibility rules
and standards that apply to all MDPs. MDPs should be permitted to
litigate in the federal and state courts. Passive investments should be
permitted in both law firms and MDPs; if, however, rules governing
law firms are not liberalized to allow such passive investment, then the
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rules for MDPs on -this issue must remain consistent with those for law
firms. When a client is receiving legal services, a lawyer must
supervise all aspects of work falling within the legal umbrella. Nonlawyer partners and managers must agree not to interfere in the
delivery of legal services and must also require that all lawyers in the
firm follow the rules of professional conduct. Additionally, the
profession should implement peer review for law firms and other
entities, including MDPs, that are delivering legal services to clients.
The question is not whether MDPs will exist and thrive in the future
or whether lawyers in ever greater numbers will choose to work for
MDPs.
The trends in favor of MDPs are pronounced and
unstoppable. Nothing the ABA or the state bars do can change that
fact of economic life. The question is whether the ABA and state bars
will have any significant role in regulating lawyers who work in MDPs,
thereby protecting client interests and ensuring that lawyers'
participation in multidisciplinary practice does not undercut the core
values of the profession.
The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, in its 1999 and
2000 Final Reports, took a step-albeit a small step-in the right
direction. The ABA House of Delegates, however, in its July 2000
attempt to forestall the movement toward multidisciplinary services,
took a giant step backward in the direction of interference with
competition in the market for legal services.
Client protection and protection of the core values of the legal
profession should be the primary basis for regulation of MDPs. The
rules of professional conduct for lawyers should permit innovation in
the professional service marketplace. Unneeded and overbroad
regulation, often motivated by economic protectionism, should be
discarded. The state bar authorities should design their regulation of
MDPs in the manner this Article suggests and thereby protect the
public interest without unnecessarily interfering with the operation of
market forces in the professional services arena.
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